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Abstract
This thesis is a micro-econometric investigation into the relationship between globali-
sation, productivity, knowledge and firm structure. It is composed of three main investi-
gations using large panel datasets of UK firms. The datasets are created by combining the
ARD, BERD, BSD. The AFDI is used to identify multinational status and FAME pro-
vides additional financial statistics. The first investigation aims to identify if differences
exist between multinational and non-multinational firms in terms of productivity and
knowledge and also if complementarities exist between internal and external knowledge.
The data is analysed using a Cobb-Douglas production function including knowledge
interaction terms with system GMM. The findings show that multinational firms are
more productive than non-multinational firms and the main source of this arises from
differences in the returns to capital. The study shows little evidence to support comple-
mentarities between internal and external knowledge. Secondly, it aims to understand
the motivations behind firm restructuring events and if these motivations differ between
foreign and UK-owned firms. This investigation uses a multinomial logit model to identify
average characteristics of firms engaging in each type of event. The findings imply that
managerial, synergistic and refocusing motivations for restructuring are present. Foreign
firms may be motivated to engage in joining events by innovation synergies. The third
aim is to determine the impact of firm restructuring events on productivity and innovation
activity. The propensity score method is applied to obtain matched samples to estimate
the treatment effect on the treated. The results show that restructuring events lead to
an increase in productivity, but the findings for innovation activity are less conclusive.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Aims
This thesis investigates the relationships between globalisation, firm structure, productiv-
ity and knowledge. Globalisation refers to increasing interconnections between countries
across the world. Rising integration in recent decades has arisen from technological
advances and enhanced liberalisation of trade policy. Technological advances in commu-
nication and transportation have lowered the costs of organisation and distribution and
therefore improved the economic viability of international trade. Reductions in import
tariffs, quotas and other government imposed barriers have been promoted by interna-
tional institutions1 to encourage free trade and enhance international competition. Firms
have the incentive to engage in international trade to exploit comparative advantage,
overcome limitations of domestic demand and to increase geographical diversification to
reduce exposure to domestic shocks.
The Ricardian notion of trade gains from comparative advantage arise when countries
have differing relative efficiencies of production over a range of products. In a two country
example, the incentive to trade exists if the opportunity cost of producing a good is lower
in one country than the other. Lower marginal costs can occur due to the quantity and
quality of factors of production, the level of technology and investment in research and
development (R&D). This facilitates the transmission of knowledge and dissemination
of innovation. Knowledge plays a crucial role in productivity improvements, which are
essential for economic growth and prosperity.
A relationship between firm restructuring and knowledge also exists. Joining events
such as mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by the aim of gaining knowledge from
target firms, creating synergies or applying knowledge to the target firms. This knowledge
may take the form of technical knowledge on products or processes, managerial capabili-
ties or localised knowledge on geographical markets. Differences in these attributes may
1These include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
formerly known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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be particularly distinct for foreign firms.
Incentives for separating events such as breakups and divestments may arise if firm
structure is large and complex. Excessive growth or over-diversification may result in a
lack of communication and dissemination of knowledge within the organisation. This may
have a negative impact on productivity. Refocusing or streamlining may be motivated
by the desire to remove less productive parts of the organisation, free up funds to invest
in improving existing knowledge flows or perform innovation activity.
This thesis aims to identify differences between domestic and globalised UK-based
firms in terms of productivity, innovation activity and firm restructuring. There are
three strands of investigation. The first seeks to establish if differences in productivity
and knowledge exist between multinational and non-multinational firms and if comple-
mentarities exist between internal and external knowledge sources. The second attempts
to identify the motivations behind firm restructuring events and establish if differences
exist between foreign and UK owned firms in terms of these motivations. The third as-
sesses the impact of restructuring events on productivity and innovation activity and also
attempts to distinguish between outcomes for Foreign and UK owned firms.
Each of these micro-econometric investigations provide a contribution to the liter-
ature using a unique combination of firm-level datasets from the Secure Data Service
(SDS). These datasets include the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI),
Annual Respondents Database (ARD), Business Enterprise Research and Development
(BERD) and the Business Structure Database (BSD).2 This allows the research questions
to be addressed using large detailed panel datasets. The majority of previous UK studies
in this literature have used cross-sectional or small panels of data from the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS). This provides mostly qualitative firm-level data on innovation
activity and knowledge sources for a sample of firms. Although it also includes some
self-reported quantitative data on internal and external R&D expenditure, this data is
not utilised by the majority of papers that use the CIS. The CIS is also limited by the
2Data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) is also combined with the SDS
datasets in chapter 4. This provides details of firm-level financial characteristics.
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fact that it only covers a relatively small number of firms during the 1997-2005 period
and few of the firms in the sample perform innovation. The sample is performed in waves
therefore annual CIS data is not available and the rate of attrition is high between waves,
so this presents difficulties in tracking firms over time. BERD contrasts this by providing
annual quantitative data on R&D expenditure for the population of R&D performing
firms in the UK. The ARD provides data on firm characteristics for a stratified sample
of firms and the AFDI indicates multinational status. Firm restructuring events can be
identified from the BSD using some careful coding, as this dataset covers the population
of all UK firms.
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis makes three substantive contributions to the literature. The first contribution
is made in chapter 2. It aims to understand if differences exist between multinational
and non-multinational firms in terms of productivity and knowledge. It also seeks to
establish if complementarities exist between internal and external knowledge sources.
This chapter contains an overview of the relevant literature, description of the ARD,
BERD and AFDI datasets and empirical analysis relating to these research questions.
The empirical analysis uses a Cobb-Douglas production function with output as the
dependent variable and inputs as the explanatory variables. The inputs include capital
stock, labour and a set of knowledge variables. The knowledge variables are stock of
internal R&D expenditure, stock of expenditure on R&D transfers from UK sources and
stock of expenditure on R&D transfers from foreign sources. Interaction terms are used
to investigate differences by multinational status and identify complementarities between
different knowledge sources.
The subsequent chapters develop upon the productivity, knowledge and globalisation
themes introduced in chapter 2 with the additional theme of firm restructuring. Chapter
3 provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature surrounding the motivation
for restructuring events and post-event outcomes. Motivations and outcomes are highly
13
interrelated, therefore it is appropriate that they are discussed together.
Chapter 4 describes the identification of firm restructuring from the BSD using en-
terprise and enterprise group reference codes and the merging of the datasets used in the
analysis. Restructuring events include joining events (acquirer, acquired and merger),
separating events (divestor, divested and break-up) and other more complex events. This
restructuring event variable is used to answer the research questions posed in chapters
4 and 5. The remainder of chapter 4 investigates the motivations behind firm restruc-
turing events using a multinomial logit model. This identifies the average characteristics
of firms engaging in each type of event and allows inferences to be drawn about the
underlying motivations. The findings from this chapter are used to inform the following
chapter. Chapter 5 looks at post-event outcomes in terms of productivity and innovation
activity. The propensity score method is applied to obtain matched samples to estimate
the average treatment effect on the treated. This approach controls for selection bias by
obtaining a matched sample with similar characteristics to the treated firms to create an
estimated counterfactual. The findings of the thesis and conclusions are summarised in
chapter 6.
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2 Productivity, Knowledge and Globalisation
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades the pace of globalisation has increased leading to a sharp rise
in the number of multinational firms. Several studies have found that subsidiaries of
multinational firms tend to outperform their wholly domestic counterparts. If this is
the case, what is the source of this apparent advantage? There is currently a high level
of active investigation aiming to understand the correlation between global engagement
and productivity. Many speculate that differences in the ability to understand and apply
knowledge plays a crucial role in this relationship.
Firms can invest in knowledge creation by performing in-house R&D. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) and Griffith and Van Reenen (2003) suggest that R&D investment has
two aspects. The first aspect being the direct impact on output and the second being
the addition to absorptive capacity; a firm’s ability to utilise and absorb information.
This depends on previous experience in innovative activity or skills embedded within
human capital. Firms that have a higher level of innovative familiarity are more able to
exploit information flows from external sources to their own advantage. Multinational
subsidiaries may benefit from a broader range of knowledge spillovers than purely do-
mestic firms. These spillovers could arise from existing knowledge stocks within their
enterprise group or exposure to foreign markets.
The aim of this chapter is to address the following questions: do differences in pro-
ductivity and knowledge exist between multinationals and non-multinationals? Are there
complementarities between internal and external sources of knowledge? These are inter-
esting questions to address in our increasingly globalised world.
A production function approach is applied to analyse the relationship between pro-
ductivity, multinational status and various forms of knowledge. These forms include the
firm’s own knowledge stock, knowledge transfers from external sources and non-market
15
knowledge spillovers from firms within the local area or industry sector. A specific con-
tribution to the literature is made by investigating the role for knowledge spillovers and
distinguishing between types of labour. Labour is divided into skilled R&D labour and
other labour to observe differential effects between the two types of labour in the work-
force. This is then analysed by multinational status.
This investigation also adds to this very active research area by using a unique combi-
nation of highly detailed datasets. The data used for the analysis is taken from the ARD,
BERD and AFDI and covers the period 1998-2005 and includes 8057 firms. The ARD
provides a census on all large enterprises and a stratified sample of firms with less than
100 employees. It includes data on value added and capital expenditure. Data from the
AFDI is used to identify multinational status and the foreign ownership code from the
ARD is used to distinguish between UK and foreign multinationals. BERD provides data
for all known innovating firms and includes data on R&D expenditure and employees.
The use of quantitative innovation data distinguishes this analysis from other UK studies
in this area which mostly use qualitative survey data taken from the CIS. An additional
benefit of BERD is that data is collected annually. This allows the creation of a panel.
The CIS is performed less regularly and questions are often inconsistent across waves.
This study investigates a number of methodological approaches to estimate the pro-
duction function coefficients. Initially OLS is employed including time and industry
dummies. This provides a benchmark set of results which are likely to be biased. Sec-
ondly, the regression is weighted by the inverse sampling probability in order to generate
estimates that are consistent for the population of innovating firms despite a non-random
sample. Thirdly, fixed effects is used which has the benefit of controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. However a drawback to this method is that the multinational coefficient re-
lies on changes between status. Those that maintain constant status over the period must
be omitted. The fourth method used is two-stage least squares with industry averages
as instruments as an alternative way of treating endogeneity arising from simultaneity.
Industry averages should control for industry wide shocks to the firm-level variables. The
16
final and preferred method for treating endogeneity in this study is system GMM.
Key findings are consistent with the literature and suggest that multinationals are
more productive than domestic firms. This is partly attributed to differences in returns
to capital, whereas no significant differences exist in terms of returns to R&D invest-
ment between multinationals and non-multinationals. No significant evidence is found to
support the notion of absorptive capacity.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Introduction
This section is divided into three parts and highlights the approaches taken and impor-
tant findings in the literature. Firstly a brief overview of the Productivity-Knowledge-
Globalisation literature is provided, where the key concepts and theoretical background
are explained. The second part outlines and considers a variety of knowledge measures
used in the literature. Thirdly, a detailed analysis of the approaches taken to model
productivity and knowledge is covered. Specific attention is paid to methodology and
functional form for a selection of key and relevant papers. A summary of the empirical
studies described in this section are provided in table (2.1).
2.2.2 Overview of the Literature
Knowledge and Productivity
The increasingly popular term, absorptive capacity, has been incorporated into various
studies involving innovation and knowledge transfers. The idea was introduced by Ar-
row (1969) and described as the second face of R&D in a seminal paper by Cohen and
Levinthal (1989). Within a firm, R&D has a primary role of creating new knowledge and a
secondary role of improving a firm’s ability to absorb and utilise knowledge spillovers. By
undertaking R&D, firms gain familiarity with specialist concepts. This leaves them better
placed to understand and apply information derived from external sources. Therefore a
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firm’s absorptive capacity depends on the level of R&D it has previously undertaken. In
their model, absorptive capacity is not directly observable so they test for the influence
of absorptive capacity on the technological opportunity variables, which include sources
of external knowledge such as universities, research institutes, suppliers or customers.
Lokshin et al. (2008) state that absorptive capacity is the intangible attribute derived
from internal R&D activity that assists in the assimilation of external knowledge. They
test for complementarities between internal and external R&D using a firm-level panel
of annual data from the Netherlands and find that a positive impact of external R&D is
only found when sufficient internal R&D has been undertaken. This finding supports the
idea of absorptive capacity.
Other papers, such as Leiponen (2005) and Kneller and Stevens (2006), choose to
broaden the definition of absorptive capacity by going beyond the second face of R&D
and including a role for human capital. These studies argue that absorptive capacity,
defined as a firm’s ability to absorb spillovers, depends on previous R&D activity and
also the skill sets of employees.
Global Engagement and Productivity
Since the early work of Caves (1974), the theory of the multinational enterprise has been
dominated by the notion of intangible assets. Entry into foreign markets is costly and
domestic firms have the advantage of possessing local knowledge. Only firms with supe-
rior intangible assets can successfully become multinational and compete with domestic
firms. These intangible assets usually take the form of management expertise and supe-
rior technological capabilities and are likely to lead to higher observed productivity for
multinational firms. If costs surpass benefits for multinationals they may be less produc-
tive, but costs associated with entry are only expected to be a temporary impairment to
performance.
Early empirical studies conform to the general consensus that a positive relationship
exists between productivity and global engagement. Some of these studies use naive
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methodology that does not fully control for industry and firm characteristics. More
recent work has used more robust methodology. Results are mixed but the majority
find a positive relationship. Harris and Robinson (2003) estimates a production function
using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach to test for TFP differences
between foreign and domestically owned plants. The data is taken from the ARD and
covers 20 UK manufacturing industries. The sample is weighted to ensure representation
of the UK manufacturing population. The findings show foreign owned plants generally
perform better than domestic owned plants. Conyon et al. (2002) suggest that foreign
firms may select the most productive firms as acquisition targets. Their findings for the
UK show that on average acquisition by foreign owners improves labour productivity of
an acquired firm.
Knowledge and Globalisation
There is a large literature relating to spillovers that emanate from multinational firms and
lead to improvements in productivity of domestic/local firms. Blake et al. (2009) study
the effects of foreign direct investment on local firms within Chinese manufacturing. They
suggest various channels through which productivity spillovers may be transfered from
multinationals to local firms including labour mobility between firms, vertical linkages
via the supply-chain between supplier and customer, horizontal linkages with competing
firms and state-owned organisations and by encouraging the local firms to engage in
exporting activity by displaying exporting possibilities which local firms can mimic. This
suggests that the knowledge spillovers take various forms.
Driffield and Love (2003) suggest a role for the reverse of these spillovers, where the
multinational firm benefits from the absorption of knowledge spillovers emanating from
the host country. The choice of FDI location may therefore depend on proximity to
technology leaders, such as universities or competing firms. It is expected that evidence
of reverse spillovers will be stronger in industries which have placed more emphasis on
R&D investment and therefore may generate more spillovers for foreign firms to draw
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upon. They identify two types of foreign investors in host country, these are those which
seek to adapt technology to suit the host country market and those that seek to absorb
spillovers.
Harris and Li (2009) use UK data from the CIS 3 and ARD to explore the relationships
between exporting, R&D and absorptive capacity. They use a probit model, where R&D
and exports are binary variables,with their preferred method being a Heckman sample
selection model which acknowledges the self-selection aspect of exporting.3 They find that
R&D and absorptive capacity plays a role in overcoming barriers to entering international
markets and also establishment size, in terms of number of employees, is also found to
be important.
Crespi et al. (2008) use UK panel data to test the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.
There is a causality issue with the study of exporting and productivity as firms with higher
productivity are more likely to export. The point of difference with this study is that
it attempts to measure learning rather than looking directly at the relationship between
productivity and exporting. The latter approach may distort the discernable relationship
between learning and exporting as correlations are likely to exist between exporting and
other unmeasured variables. In order to establish if learning has occurred, they use
responses from CIS 2 and CIS 3 which identify if a firm has used clients or customers
as a source of knowledge for innovation. Using a production function approach with a
balanced panel of 787 firms, they then test if exporting firms are more likely to learn
from customers than entirely domestic firms. They find that firms that have previously
exported are more likely to learn from their clients than from alternative sources and for
those that have previously learned from clients, there is a greater likelihood that they
will have higher productivity.
3Melitz (2003) finds that more productive firms chose to become exporters, whereas less productive
firms tend to remain as domestic suppliers.
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2.2.3 Measuring Knowledge
The dictionary defines knowledge as expertise and skills acquired through experience or
education, the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject or what is known in a
particular field. In this instance the aim is to measure the level of knowledge that a firm
possesses. This can be created through R&D, embodied in skilled human capital and
through absorbing information flows from external sources.
Knowledge is a difficult concept to measure as it is not directly quantifiable. Various
approaches have been taken; broadly speaking these measures are based on inputs into
the innovation process, innovation outputs or innovation survey responses.
Inputs include variables such as R&D expenditure and number of research employees.
Outputs include data on patents. These observable variables are not perfect indications
of the level of knowledge possessed by a firm. Not all innovations are patented therefore
some innovation activity will be overlooked in patent statistics. Furthermore, each patent
is assumed to generate a homogenous level of impact. Drawbacks to R&D expenditure
arise due to differences in set up costs and efficiency across projects.
Measuring Internal Knowledge
Knowledge within the firm is built up over a period of time. Following Griliches (1979),
current state of knowledge is assumed to be a function of current and previous R&D
undertaken R, which interacts with a lag polynomial to weight the contribution of R&D
in reference to time t. This ties in with Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction by
recognising that knowledge is a path dependent process which becomes obsolete over
time; as new knowledge is created, old ideas become outdated.
Kit = Rit + (1− δ)Rit−1 + (1− δ)2Rit−2 + . . .+ (1− δ)nRit−n (2.1)
This perpetual inventory method for creating a knowledge stock variable has been used
in a vast array of studies with various measures of R including patents, R&D expenditure
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and R&D employees.
Measuring Absorptive Capacity
Absorptive capacity is an intangible concept and therefore presents measurement difficul-
ties. This section outlines the approaches taken. A number of theoretical and empirical
papers define absorptive capacity as the level of R&D, or stock of R&D, including Grif-
fith and Van Reenen (2003), Gru¨nfeld (2006), Leahy and Neary (2007). Other proxies
which capture this aspect include the existence of an R&D lab (Veugelers (1997)) and
engagement in continuous R&D activity (Becker and Peters (2000)).
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) suggest that absorptive capacity
is derived from stock of R&D and education, training and learning by doing, although
the human capital element is omitted from their model. They use lagged R&D stock as a
measure of absorptive capacity. Leiponen (2005) uses share of employees with a technical
or science degree and share with a post-graduate degree to model the human capital
aspect of absorptive capacity at the firm level. Whereas Kneller and Stevens (2006)
use average years of schooling in the population and stock of R&D using the perpetual
inventory method as a proxy in their macro level study.
Schmidt (2010) argues that a firm’s absorptive capacity is composed of three factors.
These are previous R&D activity, skills and knowledge of employees and internal knowl-
edge flows within the firm. These dimensions act as complements because some compe-
tency in each attribute is required in order to identify, assimilate and exploit external
knowledge to commercial ends. He argues that output measures can proxy absorptive
capacity.
Harris and Li (2009) use a merged CIS and ARD dataset. They define absorptive
capacity as the ability to exploit knowledge that is embodied in intangible assets and
use a principle components analysis4 of 36 CIS variables to define five distinct variables
which capture different aspects of absorptive capacity. These include networking with
4This is a orthogonal transformation which converts a large number of potentially correlated variables
into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables
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external bodies at the national level, implementing new organisational structures and
human resource management strategies, building up partnerships with other enterprises
or institutions at the international level and acquiring and absorbing codified knowledge
from research partners. This technique may present problems with interpretation as the
meaning of the correlated variables may be poorly defined.
Hussinger (2012) investigates the role of absorptive capacity in post-merger innova-
tion by empirically testing if the absorptive capacity of the acquiring firm has a positive
impact on patent productivity. They use two measures of absorptive capacity, stock of
external co-authors which captures the ability to acquire, assimilate and exploit external
knowledge and stock of non-patent references (i.e. citations of scientific articles) which
proxies the ability to decode complex information. The degree of technological diversifi-
cation in the firm’s patent portfolio is taken into account. The variable is close to 1 for a
highly diversified portfolio and equals zero for firms which patent only within one class.
The results show that firms with higher levels of absorptive capacity require “less post-
acquisition measures” to achieve the same levels of productivity as other post-acquisition
firms.
Measuring External Knowledge
If a firm has adequate levels of absorptive capacity, they can utilise incoming knowledge
spillovers from external sources, therefore the size of the relevant external knowledge pool
available to a firm will affect its level of knowledge. Spillovers occur due to imperfect
appropriability as a result of failure in the methods of innovation protection. The majority
of spillover proxies in the literature are calculated as the weighted sum of other firm’s
knowledge stock, where the knowledge stocks have been weighted in various different
ways, such as industrial proximity, geographical proximity and size.
KSit =
∑
j 6=i
ωitK
R
jt (2.2)
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Jaffe (1986) proposes that a firms’ technological position can be identified according to
the distribution of patents across technology-based patent classes. A position vector F
is created for each firm which contains the proportion of total patents in each class.
The weighting is calculated using the uncentred correlation of vectors Fi and Fj, thus
measuring the technological proximity of firm i to another firm j.
ωij =
FiF
′
j√
FiFjFij
(2.3)
The weighting ωij can take any value between 0 and 1, where 0 would occur if firms
i and j have no common research areas and 1 would indicate that firms i and j have
identical F vectors. This method generates a logical spillover weighting as it places
a greater weighting on spillovers emanating from firms that innovate in closely related
technological fields. A disadvantage of using patent data is that some innovations may
go unrecorded and therefore the measure may not represent the true weighting.
Kaiser (2002) attempts to imitate Jaffe (1986), but replaces patent data with a selec-
tion of variables from the Mannheim Innovation Panel. The assumption here is that the
chosen variables reflect technical proximity between firms, these include the proportions
of high, medium and low skilled employees, expenditure on training, labour cost per em-
ployee, investment and 5 ‘hampering innovation’ variables. A criticism of this method
is that if the firms are matched on these characteristics, it does not necessarily imply
that the knowledge a firm may spillover would be useful to the other firm as it does not
include information about common industry or research areas.
Ornaghi (2006) suggests that simply using the sum of knowledge stocks within a firm’s
industrial classification implies that all firms within the same industrial classification are
equally able to absorb and utilise information. Under the assumption that the size of firm
i relative to firm j determines firm i’s ability to absorb spillovers from firm j, he groups
firms into 6 size classifications and creates 11 spillover variables depending on relative
size. Variables exist for -5, -4, -3,-2,-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of these categories will
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be missing for each firm. Missing values are replaced with zero before normalising with
respect to the mean. This seems an odd approach to take as the underlying assumption
does not appear to be particularly robust. The data is taken from a Spanish Survey of
Business Strategy and may have arisen due to constraints of available data.
2.2.4 Modelling Productivity and Knowledge
The production function has featured heavily in the productivity literature and has given
rise to much debate about its specification. In generalised form, the production function
depicts output Y as a function of inputs into the production function X.
Y = f(X) (2.4)
The vector of inputs X include labour and capital, but other inputs such as materials,
energy, human capital and knowledge have been included in some specifications. There
is some debate as to whether it is justifiable to enter knowledge or human capital into
the production function as an input or as a factor influencing technological change. The
Cobb-Douglas production function assumes that inputs can be traded off against each
other, as firms can chose to be more labour intensive or capital intensive.
The seminal work by Griliches (1979) discusses modelling the relationship between
innovation and productivity and highlights the associated measurement problems. He
specifies the production function as Y = F (X,K, u) where Y is a measure of output,
X is a vector of conventional inputs into the production process such as labour L and
capital C, K represents the level of technical knowledge at the current time as defined
by a knowledge production function. Griliches (1979) suggests that the current state of
knowledge K is a function of current and previous R&D undertaken.5 This recognises
that knowledge is a path dependent process, but knowledge becomes obsolete over time.
He chooses to measure this using R&D expenditure rather than an R&D output measure.
5This interacts with a lag polynomial to weight the contribution of R&D in reference to time t as
discussed earlier.
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The model assumes separability of L and C from K and states that functional form is
not of crucial importance unless there is particular interest in the interaction between K
and another input or reason to suspect that a complementarity exists. For simplicity, the
production function is specified in Cobb-Douglas form and assuming that all firms are
technically efficient.
Y = DCαLβKγexp(λt+ u) (2.5)
where D is a constant, exp is the inverse of natural log, and α, β, γ and λ are parameters.
Although it is acknowledged that knowledge is a different type of input than labour
and capital, they all enter the equation in the same way. This approach is adopted in
subsequent papers such as Hall and Mairesse (1995).
Hu et al. (2005) investigate the role of R&D and technology transfer on productivity
using data from China. The data is taken from an annual survey of large and medium size
enterprises and the panel covers around 10,000 manufacturing firms during a five-year
period. A Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed for the production function.
Yit = AitC
α
itL
β
it (2.6)
Y represents value added output, A is the total factor productivity parameter, C
and L denote capital and labour respectively and α and β are their respective output
elasticities. In this model the firm’s knowledge production function is incorporated into
Ait, which characterises the behaviour of productivity.
Ait = exp(f(K
F
it , K
D
it , K
R
it ) + rt+
∑
j
γjIj +
∑
h
δhWh +
∑
s
λsTs (2.7)
The knowledge production function comprises of KRit the stock of firm’s own R&D,
KFit the stock of foreign technology transfer and K
D
it the stock of domestic technology.
The technology transfer variables are representative of knowledge spillovers from sources
external to the firm. Stocks are calculated using the perpetual inventory method to
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account for path dependency and depreciation of knowledge6. Industry dummies Ij,
ownership dummies7 Wh and time dummies Ts are also included. exp is the inverse
of the natural logarithm. Ait is substituted back into equation (2.6) to provide the
single estimating equation below, where lowercase letters indicate the natural logs of the
variables.
yit = α0 + α1cit + α2lit +
∑
R
βRk
R
it +
∑
R
∑
F
βRFk
R
itk
F
it +
∑
F
βFk
F
it+∑
F
∑
D
βFDk
F
itk
D
it +
∑
D
βDk
D
it +
∑
D
∑
R
βDRk
D
it k
R
it +
∑
j
γjIj +
∑
h
δhWh +
∑
s
λsTs + it
(2.8)
Their model is estimated using OLS and IV methods as the explanatory variables are
likely to be correlated with the error term, . They use all explanatory variables averaged
at the four-digit industry level and ownership structure, year and industry dummies as
instruments. They find positive and significant effects of in-house R&D and negative and
significant effects of knowledge transfers from domestic sources. The interaction terms
between KRit and the two technology transfer variables capture some of the effects of
absorptive capacity and are found to be positive and significant in most of their results,
furthermore when these interactions appear in the model, the coefficients on the KDit K
F
it
terms are negative.8 Hu et al. (2005) suggest that this indicates that technology transfer
is more productive for a firm with a higher level of absorptive capacity. By entering
the knowledge production function into Ait, this model is assuming that the knowledge
variables can only influence output through shifting the production frontier as technical
change is hicks neutral and therefore does not directly interact with labour and capital
to adjust the shape of the production frontier. The Cobb-Douglas specification of the
6 It is conventional in the literature to use a discount rate of 0.15 to calculate R&D stock. This rate
is used by Parisi et al. (2006) and Hu et al. (2005) amongst others.
7The ownership dummies control for state owned, privately owned, collectively owned, limited liability,
jointly operated, stock-incorporated, foreign-invested and Kong-Taiwan-Macao-invested enterprises.
8Also, KFit reduces in significance compared to the results from the interaction omitted model.
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model assumes that all firms are technically efficient, suggesting that they do not have
the potential to increase output through improvements in technical efficiency without an
increase in inputs. Hu et al. (2005) can be criticised as they do not attempt to investigate
the human capital aspect of absorptive capacity, but this may be due to the limitations of
the data. Furthermore, they do not investigate the impact of knowledge spillovers from
external sources.
Parisi et al. (2006) use data taken from two waves of an Italian Manufacturing firms
survey, ‘Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere’ to study the effect of process and product
innovations on productivity. Each wave contains around 5000 firms, but by merging the
two waves, removing outliers and firms with missing observations they obtain a balanced
panel covering 465 manufacturing firms. This results in large amounts of unused data and
a relatively small sample which is less representative of the general population as there
are a higher proportion of large firms within the sample than in the population. They
argue that the use of a data panel is necessary to overcome endogeneity problems arising
from correlations between the explanatory variables and the error term. The production
function is specified in Cobb-Douglas form, where Yit is gross output, Mit represents
inputs of materials and services measured using a Tornqvist index9, Kit is a measure
of fixed capital stock calculated using the perpetual inventory method, Lit represents
labour, measured by the number of non-R&D employees, Ait is technical progress, λ and
η denote firm i and time t specific shocks respectively and  is a random error term.
Yt = AitM
θ
itK
β
itL
α
ite
λi+it+ηt (2.9)
Equation (2.9) can be written in log-linear form.
lnYit = lnAit + θlnMit + βlnKit−1 + αlnLit−1 + λi + it + ηt (2.10)
Technical progress lnAit is modelled as a function of a series of innovation dummies
9Mit is required because the dependent variable is gross output rather than value added output.
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Dit that indicate if firm i has introduced a product innovation, process innovation or
either during each of the two time periods.10
∆lnAit = φ+ ψDit (2.11)
Equation (2.12) is created by imposing the assumption of constant returns to scale
on equation (2.10), then differencing between the two waves of data in order to remove
time invariant industry specific effects, and substituting in equation (2.11).
∆3ln(
Yit
Lit−1
) = φ+ ψDit + θ∆3ln(
Mit
Lit−1
) + β∆3ln(
Kit−1
Lit−1
) + ∆3it + ∆3ηt (2.12)
This specification imposes the assumption of constant returns to scale by setting
θ + β + α = 1, 11 which places a restriction on the model12. They assume that ∆lnAit
can be substituted into the difference equation despite the fact that it does not span the
same time period as ∆3
13. Innovation enters into the production function via equation
(2.11), which acts to shift the production function and does not interact directly with
the inputs, in a similar way to equation (2.7) in the Hu et al. (2005) model. Findings
show that process innovation provides a greater impact on productivity than product
innovation. Equation (2.11) is far more simplistic as it only includes dummy variables
to indicate the introduction of innovations within the firm, rather than the measures of
internal and external knowledge stock as used by Hu et al. (2005). The analysis is also
limited by the fact that the impact of knowledge transfers and knowledge spillovers are
not investigated.
Crespi et al. (2008) use ARD and CIS data and focus on total factor productivity
(TFP) growth as the dependent variable. Their paper aims to address four questions.
10The first wave covers the period 1992-1994 and the second covers 1995-1997.
11α = 1− θ − β is then substituted into (2.10) and rearranged given that ln(Y/L) = lnY − lnL.
12Although they test this assumption and find it cannot be rejected for their data.
13∆ covers the period during each wave, whereas ∆3 refers to the change between the waves of data.
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These include: which knowledge flows are the source of TFP growth? what is the impact
of these flows on TFP growth? Can these knowledge flows be considered to be spillovers?
How do these results which use direct measures of knowledge flows compare with the
results in other papers which use indirect measures? The data taken from the CIS
involves responses to the question “Please indicate the sources of knowledge used in
your technological innovation activities and their importance”. They suggest that the
raw survey response data cannot be directly compared over a cross-section of firms due
to the heterogeneity in the way that each firm perceives the importance of knowledge
sources. In an attempt to remove firm biases from the CIS survey responses, they use
the difference from the mean level of importance. Levels of importance14 are given values
0 to 3 respectively and the mean is calculated across 17 different information sources.
If the deviation from the mean is positive the variable is given a value of 1 and if it is
negative or equal to zero the variable takes the value of 0, thus creating a binary variable
for each of the information sources.
I(Lj)ij = 1 if (L
j
it − Ljit) > 0 (2.13)
Ljit is the level of importance of source j and L
j
it is the mean level of importance across
all sources.15 The drawback to this method is that it hides a lot of the information given
in the survey. Firms which report all sources to have the same level of importance will
be given a value of zero and those which are low importance may be given a value of one
if other sources are classed as not used. The same value of 1 would be used for highly
important if at least one source was considered less important. Therefore cross-sectional
comparisons are still not valid, although they include the mean level of importance as
a control in their model. The use of this method is potentially advantageous over using
dummies for each source and level of importance as collinearity problems may occur.
Particularly if there is a high tendency for firms to rank each source with the same level
14These are ‘not used’, ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’.
15This method is also used in Crespi et al. (2008) in their analysis of learning by exporting.
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of importance across the five categories investigated.
They test the data in various ways. Firstly, they use a knowledge production function
approach to test the validity of their knowledge variables. They use patents as the depen-
dent variable and include competitors, suppliers, clients, enterprise group and universities
as the information sources. The number of patents takes a non negative integer value,
therefore it is considered to be count data. They appropriately use negative binomial
estimation and also allow for random effects. The majority of the explanatory variables
are not significant, with the exception of universities as an information source. This vari-
able is highly significant, suggesting that firms that regard information from universities
to have above average importance to their innovation activities are more likely to be
involved in development of frontier technology and patent their innovations. Whereas
collaborations with other sources may yield less patentable innovations.
The main analysis in the paper is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function
model, from which the total factor productivity model is derived.
∆lnYit = α
K∆lnxKit +α
M∆lnxMit +α
L∆lnxLit + γ1Rit−1 + Σγ2I(L
j
i )it−1 + γ3Lit−1 + λ+ εit
(2.14)
xKit , x
M
it and x
L
it represent inputs of capital, materials and labour, Rit−1 is the ratio of
R&D employees to total employees, I(L) is the knowledge variables discussed earlier and
L is the mean response. A disadvantage of using the TFP model is that the α coefficients
must stay the same. The model can be criticised as it does not include a direct measure
of absorptive capacity to account for the knowledge stock built up over time within the
firm which assists in the effective utilisation of knowledge flows.16 Although Rit−1 may
capture the human capital aspect of absorptive capacity.
Results are presented for an OLS and random effects estimation of the Cobb-Douglas
model, where input variables, competitors, suppliers and enterprise group are found to
have a significant effect on output growth, ∆lnYit , Rit−1 is found to be significant at the
16This limitation is also noted in the conclusion.
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10% level in the random effects estimation whereas university and clients as information
sources are not significantly different from zero in either estimation. These results are
compared with the estimations from the TFP specification, where coefficients remain at
similar magnitudes but fewer significant variables are observed. The initial sample used
consists only of UK owned firms. They present further results on various subsections of
the sample as robustness checks on both the Cobb-Douglas and TFP forms. Subsections
include firms that do not perform R&D, firms which do perform R&D, firms that patent
and firms that do not patent. They then test for significance of additional variables
using the UK-owned firm sample, such as the share of foreign employees within the 2-
digit sector, which is found to be significant at the 10% level, a competition measure
representing the lag of change in market share, a product innovation dummy and log
number of patents, which are not significant. The sample is then expanded to include
foreign owned firms, and the model is estimated including a multinational dummy, which
is also found to be significant and only has a negligible effect on the size of the coefficients.
In order to relate their work with other literature they perform probit regressions
using the binary knowledge variables as dependent variables, where 1 indicates a pos-
itive deviation from the mean of the ‘importance of information source’. They focus
on competitors and suppliers as knowledge sources. Explanatory variables include R&D
expenditure to turnover ratio at the 3-digit industry level, the price cost margin at the
3-digit industry level, the TFP gap with the 90th percentile 4-digit firm and the ratio
of employment in foreign multinational enterprises to employment in all multinational
enterprises at the 3-digit industry level. This captures the share of the industry inhab-
ited by foreign multinationals. They suggest that MNEs are more likely to locate in fast
advancing industries where firms are likely to experience rapid growth.
Findings show R&D expenditure to turnover ratio and the MNE share of employ-
ees are positive and significant when competitor as information source is the dependent
variable. Whereas price-cost is the only significant variable when supplier is the source
of information. In their discussion they mention the importance of location but do not
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investigate using the CIS data on location of collaborating partner.
Criscuolo et al. (2010) focus on estimating a ‘knowledge production function’ using
data from the UK CIS 2 and 3 merged with data from the Annual Inquiry into Foreign
Direct Investment (AFDI) and Annual Respondents Database (ARD). They suggest that
the findings that globally engaged firms have higher productivity in comparison to their
domestic counterparts can be explained in terms of knowledge differences and specify a
‘knowledge production function’ where new knowledge depends on investment in creating
new innovation and absorptive capacity.
∆Ki = f(Hi, K
′
ii, K
′
i) (2.15)
where ∆K is the change in knowledge stock, K
′
ii and K
′
i are flows of knowledge to firm
i from internal and external sources respectively and H is investment in human capital
which expands absorptive capacity. Data on knowledge flows is taken from the CIS and
identifies universities, government, suppliers and customers, competitors, commercial and
from within the firm as sources. Human capital is measured as the number of full-time
equivalent employees engaged in R&D activities17 A variety of measures are used as
the dependent variable including novel sales which is the value of sales created by new
and improved products, number of patents applied for and binary variables indicating
patent applications and involvement in innovation activities. Their information source
variables differ in construction to those used in Crespi et al. (2008). They create dummies
for each source and level of importance and check for robustness using variables that
indicate whether the information source was used (1) or not (0), disregarding the level
of importance placed on the source as they deem this to be not comparable across firms.
These methods create results which are more intuitively interpretable than Crespi et al.
(2008), where 1 indicates a positive deviation from the mean.
The descriptive statistics show that on average, firms which are part of a multina-
17The model is also run using alternative measures of H which include proportion of scientists and
engagement in intermural R&D.
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tional group find knowledge from within their enterprise group, and external sources,
more important than domestic multi plant firms, with multinational affiliates finding
within group information more important than multinational parents. For the patent
and innovation binary variables probit models in various forms are used. They control
for 2 digit industry, region, firm age, size by number of employees, structural change,
established firm, merger and sale/closure of part of enterprise, but they highlight the fact
that endogeneity arising from unobserved firm effects could cause positive or negative
bias, therefore they experiment with instrumental variables on the human capital vari-
able using Amemiya Generalised Least Squares (AGLS). They also attempt to overcome
endogeneity by using a panel consisting of 2 waves of the CIS, but they note that attri-
tion between the samples may partly be a consequence of firm deaths, thus resulting in
selection bias. They estimate probits on a pooled crossection including a wave dummy,
fixed effects conditional logits are used on a subsample of firms which switch innovation
status18 and also OLS is employed with fixed and random effects. Although OLS is not
considered appropriate for binary dependent variable model as it imposes a linear prob-
ability, they argue that it presents similar marginal effects to the probit and allows for
the computation of elasticities.19
A Tobit model is used when novel sales is the dependent variable. Again, endogeneity
is addressed by using instrumental variables and by using a panel. The negative binomial
model is used when number of patents is the dependent variable as the number of patents
takes a positive integer value. The majority of their results show that multinational firms
generate more innovation outputs and use more internal and external knowledge flows.
But when the conditional logit and negative binomial are employed with fixed effects on
the 2 wave panel, only internal information is found to be significant.
They follow this by using a decomposition method suggested by Mohnen et al. (2006)
to identify the extent of the difference between innovation outputs of multinationals
18They suggest that this subsection consists of 128 firms in section 4.2.1, but in section 5 they indicate
that there are 247 firm, which becomes 494 when observed twice.
19The OLS estimates are not displayed in the paper.
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and domestic firms that is explained by the explanatory variables. They suggest that the
majority of the adjusted differential is explained by knowledge inputs therefore suggesting
that globally engaged firms rely upon a greater use of knowledge inputs to create more
knowledge outputs. The models used in this paper do not directly link innovation with
productivity, but they suggest that it could be a source of productivity differences.
This overview of the literature shows that productivity is mostly evaluated using a
production function with a Cobb-Douglas functional form. This is generally accepted as
a reasonable simplifying assumption. The econometric methodological approach should
seek to remove endogeneity arising from simultaneity of input and output decisions.
Unobserved time-consistent firm effects can be accounted for when panel data is used.
The majority of studies have used qualitative innovation measures. UK studies have
mainly used data from the CIS, which has the disadvantage of providing relatively few
observations in the earlier waves of the survey, it is not performed annually and the sample
varies across waves. Panels of this data tend to be small and heavily biased towards large
firms, whereas cross-sectional analysis is likely to suffer from endogeneity bias. Although
the CIS survey asks a large number of detailed questions, these questions are not always
consistent across waves. These problems cause limitations for the current UK literature
in this area.
Innovation data from BERD appears to be underutilised in the literature. The BERD
dataset provides annual measures of R&D expenditure for the population of R&D per-
forming firms, allowing for the creation of a large panel. This data is very similar to
the Chinese data used in Hu et al. (2005). This paper does not attempt to investigate
the human capital aspect of absorptive capacity. R&D employees are likely to play an
important role in the absorption of knowledge from external sources and therefore this
relationship should be investigated further.
Knowledge spillovers emanating from external sources are also overlooked in the Hu
et al. (2005) analysis. Findings by Crespi et al. (2008) and Criscuolo et al. (2010) using
the UK CIS have shown external sources of information, such as competitors, to be im-
35
portant in knowledge production and productivity growth. This presents further areas for
investigation with BERD data using a measure of external knowledge spillovers similar to
those suggested by Jaffe (1986) or Ornaghi (2006). It would also be interesting to inves-
tigate differences in the effect of these variables for multinational and non-multinationals
firms by merging the ARD and AFDI with the BERD dataset.
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2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 The Model
The model used in this chapter is based upon a generalised production function for firm i.
Value added output Yi is the dependent variable. Capital Ci and labour Li represent the
inputs into production, and Ai represents the firm’s current state of knowledge. By using
value added output as opposed to gross output, it is not necessary to include materials
as inputs into the production function.
Yi = f(Ci, Li, Ai) (2.16)
A firm’s current level of knowledge can be influenced by a number of factors including
the firm’s previous R&D effort, market-based R&D transfers and spillovers from other
firms within the industry. Therefore Ai is determined by the stock of knowledge K
R,
knowledge transfers KT , the knowledge spillovers pool KS, a vector of multinational
dummies M and diversified D firms are included as explanatory variables. Multinationals
may have generated knowledge stocks outside of the UK and can potentially transfer this
knowledge to UK subsidiaries through the direct transfer of information or transfer of
workers between units of enterprise groups. Furthermore, multinational enterprises may
have more exposure to spillovers than domestic firms due participation in foreign markets.
Ai = f(K
R, KT , KSM,D) (2.17)
Knowledge can be considered different to the other determinants of Yi because it does
not directly act as an input into the production process; it influences the way the inputs,
such as labour and capital, are used. Following Griliches (1969), the labour input can
be separated out into highly skilled labour, LHi , and less skilled labour, L
L
i , where highly
skilled labour is measured as the number of employees with a degree level qualification.
Separating these labour variables seems to be a logical step as these different types of
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workers may affect output differently. By taking Ai outside of the production function
f(·) knowledge does not directly interact with labour or capital, therefore Ai acts to shift
the position of the production frontier and the inputs are assumed to be Hicks neutral as
the impact of technology influences labour and capital in the same way.
Yi = Aif(Ci, L
H
i , L
L
i ) (2.18)
This model can be specified more specifically by assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional
form for simplicity. The Cobb-Douglas production function assumes that all firms are
technically efficient, therefore significant coefficients on the dummy variables will indicate
a shift in the production function.
Yi = AiL
Hα
i L
Lβ
i C
γ
i e
ui (2.19)
lnYi = lnAi + αlnL
H
i + θlnL
L
i + γlnCi (2.20)
The knowledge production function can be specified as follows.
lnAi = β0 +β1lnK
R
i +β2lnK
T
i +β3lnK
S
i +β4lnK
R
i lnK
T
i +β5lnK
R
i lnK
S
i +β6M+β7D
(2.21)
The interaction terms model complementarities between knowledge variables. A pos-
itive and significant coefficient on these interaction terms indicates the existence of ab-
sorptive capacity; firms with greater own knowledge stock can better absorb knowledge
transfer or spillovers to improve productivity than those with lower knowledge stocks.
The role of labour can also be explored by including interactions between highly skilled
labour and knowledge transfers or spillovers.
Substituting equation (2.21) into equation (2.20) yields the estimating equation.
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lnYi = β0 + β1lnK
R
i + β2lnK
T
i + β3lnK
S
i + β4lnK
R
i lnK
T
i + β5lnK
R
i lnK
S
i + β6M + β7D
+ αlnLHi + θlnL
L
i + γlnCi +Xi + i (2.22)
The model can test whether multinational and diversified firms have higher produc-
tivity levels than domestic and none diversified firms based on the dummy variable coef-
ficients. Furthermore, it can test whether differences in absorptive capacity help explain
productivity differences.
2.3.2 Estimation Methodology
Bias in OLS
The problem of endogeneity arises when the error term is correlated with the explanatory
variables. This can be a result of measurement error, ommited variable bias and reverse
causality. The presence of endogeneity can lead to seriously biased estimates. This will
be discussed in more detail in the following subsections.
Fixed Effects
The problem of omitted variable bias can be addressed by using a fixed effects model
on panel data. This method removes time-consistent unobserved heterogeneity at the
firm-level. Consider the following equation, where yit is the dependent variable, xit is a
vector of explanatory variables, αi is a fixed effect for firm i that remains constant over
time t and it is the error term.
yit = βxit + αi + it (2.23)
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Averaging this equation over time t for each firm i yeilds the following.
y¯it = βx¯it + αi + ¯it (2.24)
Then subtracting equation (2.24) from equation (2.23) provides equation (2.26), where
αi cancelled out.
yit − y¯it = β(xit − x¯it) + (it − ¯it) (2.25)
yˆit = βxˆit + ˆit (2.26)
yˆit is known as the ‘within’ or time-demeaned transformation on y and similarly for xˆit
and ˆit. Therefore the significance of the coefficients relies upon within firm changes over
time. If xit remains close to its average, x¯it, due to a lack of variation over time, the
coefficient on xˆit will not be significantly different from zero.
The sample used in this study has little within-firm variation over time due to the
persistent nature of production inputs. This implies that coefficients on the fixed effects
model will be closer to zero than coefficients on pooled models. The pooled models capture
within and between firm effects, but are also subject to omitted variable bias. Although
the fixed effects estimator removes some of the endogeneity arising from omitted variable
bias, it may increase problems if time-inconsistent measurement errors are present.
Instrumental Variables
An underlying assumption of the OLS model is that the error term is unrelated to the
explanatory variables, E(|x) = 0. This assumption is required to ensure that estimated
coefficients are consistent. Instrumental variables can be used to provide consistent esti-
mates when explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, assuming that the
instruments z are correlated with the endogenous regressors and uncorrelated with the
error term E(|z) = 0.
Consider a simple model where y is the dependent variable, x is an explanatory
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variable and β represent the estimated coefficients.
y = β0 + β1x+  (2.27)
OLS estimates remain consistent if there is no association between x and , but
estimates become biased if a correlation exists between x and . Simultaneity is likely to
be present in the context of a production function. The level of output is determined by
the inputs, but inputs levels may be chosen to produce a desired level of output, therefore
causality runs in both directions. A shock to the output will lead to an adjustment in
inputs during a given period and vice versa. Measurement error may also exacerbate
the endogeneity problem.20 Error terms can be plotted against the dependent variable
and explanatory variables to test for the presence of endogeneity. Post-estimation tests
which compare OLS and IV models can also be applied to test for endogeneity, such as
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
Suitable instruments z comply with the conditions Cov(z, x) 6= 0 and Cov(z, u) = 0.
The first condition is testable and states that z is correlated with the endogenous explana-
tory variables x. The second condition is untestable and states that z is uncorrelated with
the error. There are various methods of testing the validity of the first condition. Instru-
ments can be regressed on the endogenous explanatory variables to obtain t-statistics,
R2 and the Shea partial R2 statistics (Shea, 1997). Post-estimation tests for instrument
validity should also be performed if the model is over-identified.
Hu et al. (2005) suggest that four digit industry averages of each input variable can
be used as suitable instruments in a production function with knowledge stock variables.
These instruments aim to capture industry conditions. Shocks to the industry may result
in simultaneous adjustments in outputs and inputs by firms, therefore should be correlated
with firm inputs but independent of firm specific characteristics captured in the error.
Measurement error shocks may also be captured by these instruments.
20Panel methods can be applied to remove time-consistent endogeneity arising from omitted variable
bias.
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The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method can be used to obtain parameter esti-
mates. The first stage regresses the instruments on the endogenous variables to obtain
estimated fitted values of the endogenous variables. The fitted values are purged of the
correlation with the error term because the instruments are uncorrelated with the er-
ror. The second stage estimates the structural equation using the fitted values for the
endogenous variables. This removes endogeneity from the structural equation.
The generalised method of moments (GMM) is a method of deriving parameter esti-
mates from moment conditions. OLS and IV estimators can be viewed as special cases
of GMM. This estimation technique can be applied to provide more efficient estimates
when heteroscedasticity is present in the 2SLS model.
Difference and System GMM
Arellano and Bond (1991) present a method of GMM estimation that takes first differences
to remove unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and uses lagged level instruments to
correct for simultaneity. The Arellano-Bond GMM difference method suffers from weak
instrument bias when the level variables are highly persistent overtime. This problem
is present in production data because firm outputs and inputs remain relatively stable
overtime. This results in a weak correlation between the lagged instruments and first-
differences. Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the system GMM estimator to overcome
this problem. The system GMM estimator instruments level variables with differences
to remove fixed effects from the instruments. This will result in less biased estimates,
assuming the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors.
The one-step method equates to 2SLS with GMM using the appropriate instruments.
The two-step procedure is efficient and robust regardless of heteroscedasticity or autocor-
relation. This method uses an estimated weighting matrix based on the residuals from
the one-step model, but generates downward biased standard errors. Windmeijer (2005)
provides a finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix, thus rendering the
two-step estimates preferable to one-step cluster-robust estimates.
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The Sargan test and Hansen test can be used to test for the joint validity of the
identifying restrictions when the model is over-identified.21 This tests the validity of
instruments. The Sargan test is inconsistent if heteroscedasticity is present in the sample,
therefore the Hansen test is considered to be more reliable.
2.3.3 Data Sources and Variables
This study focusses on the UK by using micro-level data from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS). The datasets used include the Annual Respondents database (ARD),
Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) and Business Expenditure on
Research and Development (BERD). These can be matched using the Inter-Departmental
Business Register (IDBR) reference numbers.
The Annual Respondents Database (ARD)
The ARD is a database which contains firm’s responses to the Annual Business Inquiry
(ABI) across eight industries from 1997-2007.22 The survey covers all large firms with
more than 250 employees and a stratified sample of small and medium firms. It provides
a variety of different variables including employment, turnover, sales, purchases, stocks,
capital expenditure and investment, foreign ownership and Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) code. Value added output Y , plant and machinery capital stock C and
total number of employees for L can be derived from this data, where the capital stock
variable is calculated using the perpetual inventory method.
Data in the ARD is recorded at reporting unit level. This generally corresponds with
plant level for multi-plant firms and firm level for single plant firms. SIC codes identify
the main industry of activity at reporting unit level. Therefore diversified firms can be
identified as those with multiple UK plants with different industry codes as their main
industry of activity. This method may also capture single product firms that operate in
21Over-identification occurs when there are more instruments than endogenous independent variables.
22The data included only production and construction industries between 1994 and 1997 and prior to
1994, only production
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multiple industries. For instance, some of these firms may produce different components
of the same product; a car is composed of metal, plastic and electronic parts made in
separate plants. From this data it cannot be clearly distinguished why or how firms are
operating in different industries. Furthermore, it cannot be established if one single plant
produces various products because one main SIC code is recorded for each plant.
In the ARD capital is divided into plant and machinery, buildings and vehicles. As
the sample does not cover the entire population of small firms, some missing values exist
in the data, therefore it is necessary to impute some values in order to perform the
calculations.
Business Expenditure on Research and Development(BERD)
BERD is an annual survey that is available from 1994-2008 and aims to cover the popu-
lation of UK R&D performing firms. These firms are identified from a variety of different
sources including the Annual Business Inquiry, the UK Innovation Survey, New R&D
sector firms for Business Register, International Trade and Services (ITIS), Department
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and HMRC R&D Tax Credit claimants. Data
is provided on R&D expenditure, both internal to the firm and commissioned to external
parties. It also gives the number of R&D employees categorised by scientists, engineers
and technicians. Internal expenditure is broken down in various ways; by type of re-
search expenditure- experimental, applied, basic, R&D salaries and R&D capital, by
funding source, and by product group and purpose.
The number of observations ranges from 4846 in 1994 to approximately 14000 in
2008. The data is self-reported by firms via a postal survey and results are imputed by
the ONS for non-responding and un-sampled innovating firms,23 therefore attrition in the
data only occurs as a result of company deaths or cessation of R&D activity. The data
is provided at reporting unit level, but can be aggregated to enterprise level. Reporting
units may differ between datasets, whereas enterprises remain consistent. Observations
23For example, in 2005 there were around 2971 actual respondents and 10923 imputed observations
50
can be merged with other datasets at the enterprise level using lookup table provided by
Richard Harris.
The stock of knowledge KRi for each firm can be calculated using the perpetual inven-
tory method with BERD data. The knowledge spillover variable KSi can be generated
using a weighted sum of knowledge stocks for all other firm’s within the BERD dataset
covering all UK innovating firms.24 These methods are consistent with a great deal of the
literature discussed earlier. Due to the nature of the dataset, there is a strong possibility
of measurement error in the knowledge variables as a proportion of the data is imputed.
The Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI)
The AFDI is conducted at enterprise group level and comprises of an inward and out-
ward FDI survey. The inward survey provides data on capital flows entering the UK
from foreign subsidiaries/branches to their UK subsidiaries/branches. The outward sur-
vey deals with capital flows leaving the UK from UK subsidiaries/branches to foreign
subsidiaries/branches. Repeated enterprise codes may appear due to foreign enterprises
with more than one UK subsidiary in the inward survey and UK based enterprises with
more than one foreign subsidiary in the outward survey. The ONS use a variety of re-
sources including HM Customs and Revenue, Dunn and Bradstreet’s ‘Worldbase’ system,
and ONS inquiries on Acquisitions and Mergers to compile the register of firms and pro-
vide data on country of parent enterprise or foreign subsidiary. All MNEs which own
large UK firms are asked to complete the survey and a stratified sample of MNEs owning
small UK subsidiaries are also sent survey forms. Annual rotation of the chosen sample
of small firms ensures different firms are chosen on consecutive years. By matching the
enterprise group code with enterprise group code in the ARD, firms or reporting units
can be identified as multinational if a match occurs.
24Innovating firms are defined as firms that “undertake creative work on a systematic basis in order
to increase the stock of knowledge, including the knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of
this stock of knowledge to devise new applications”(OECD Frascati Manual).
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2.3.4 Creating Knowledge Variables
Knowledge Stock
In this study the variable used to measure a firm’s own accumulation of knowledge KRi,t is
created using a perpetual inventory method based on previous and current intrafirm R&D
expenditure. The data on intrafirm R&D expenditure is taken from BERD and includes
basic, applied and experimental research. This excludes R&D salaries and R&D capital
expenditure to avoid double counting. This expenditure data is deflated using industry
deflators from the VICS in order to create real R&D expenditure and remain consistent
with the deflators used in the creation of the capital stock variable and measure of output.
This assumes that inflation on R&D expenditure is the same as industry average inflation
which appears to be a reasonable assumption. The perpetual inventory is calculated as
follows,
KRi,t = RDi,t + (1− δ)KRi,t−1 (2.28)
where KRit represents firm i’s own knowledge stock in year t, RDi,t is firm i’s R&D
expenditure in year t and KRi,t−1 is firm i’s knowledge stock in the previous year which
depreciates at a rate of δ. A depreciation rate of 15% (δ = 0.15) is assumed following
Hu et al. (2005) and Hall and Mairesse (1995), which according to Hu et al. (2005) is the
convention in the literature. Knowledge stock is not accumulated prior to the firm’s first
investment in R&D therefore in this initial year KRi,t = RDi,t. BERD data is available
from 1994 onwards and therefore those units with R&D expenditure in and before 1994
take 1994 as the initial year of knowledge accumulation.
Although the sample used in the regression analysis covers the period 1998-2005, it is
necessary to use as much of the R&D data as possible to create a more accurate portrayal
of the firm’s true knowledge stock. Unfortunately there is no data on birth year of the
firm in BERD which could have been used to estimate knowledge accumulation prior
to 1994 therefore the assumption must be made that all knowledge accumulated before
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1994 is obsolete by 1998 and therefore would not affect productivity during the 1998-
2005 sample. It is not necessary to impute values for missing observations as the ONS
generates observations for the entire population of innovating firms, therefore any missing
data should represent a year when a firm did not incur any R&D expenditures.25
Knowledge Transfer
The knowlege transfer variables represent the market transactions by firms to purchase
knowledge from external sources. The BERD data distinguishes between external R&D
expenditure on market based transfers of knowledge from UK sources and foreign sources.
Therefore stock of knowledge transfer variables can be calculated using the same perpetual
inventory method applied to the firm’s own knowledge stock. The logic behind this is
that as a firm purchases the R&D it absorbs the knowledge, thus adding to its overall
stock of knowledge. Hu et al. (2005) use stock of knowledge transfer variables in their
paper.
Knowledge Spillover
The knowledge spillover pool variable KSi,t attempts to capture the external pool of knowl-
edge relevant to firm i arising via spillovers from other firms j. The size of the knowledge
pool firstly depends on the extent of the information leakage from firm j which may oc-
cur due to ineffectiveness of innovation protection methods or collaboration, and secondly
depends on the mechanisms through which firm i receives the information from firm j,
for instance, industry links or geographical location may be important factors in deter-
mining firm i’s exposure to spillovers from firm j, and finally depends on the relevance
of firm j’s spillovers to firm i as firm i has no use for information completely unrelated
to its product field. The ability of firm i to exploit these knowledge spillovers depends
on its level of absorptive capacity, which is determined by previous R&D experience and
skills of employees and therefore this can be tested using interaction terms between these
25There are few missing values within a run of observations.
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variables.
In order to account for these relationships between firms a set of weightings are created
for every firm i in relation to each other firm j. The knowledge spillover pool is therefore
calculated as the weighted sum of the knowledge stocks of other firms,
KSit =
∑
j 6=i
ωijtK
R
jt (2.29)
where KSit denotes the knowledge spillover pool, ωijt represents the weight given to
firm j in relation to firm i and KRjt is the knowledge stock of firm j.
Unfortunately we have no information on the level of spillovers emanating from each
firm, therefore assumptions must be made. BERD provides information on geographic
region, industry code and product code. Weightings are generated based on geographical
distance and industry sic codes. Distances between firm i and firm j are calculated using
the eastings and northings derived from ONS anonymised postcodes as follows.
Distance =
√
(Firm iEasting − Firm jEasting)2 + (Firm iNorthing − Firm jNorthing)2
(2.30)
A weight of 1 is assigned for firms within a 50km radius of firm i, 0.5 for firms beyond
50km but within a 75km radius and 0.25 for firms beyond 75km but within a 100km
radius. A weight of zero is given to firms which do not share a common 3-digit industry
code with firm i. Various weightings were compared to check robustness of results.26
2.3.5 Creating a Capital Stock Variable
It is necessary to create a capital stock variable because information on capital stock is
not provided via ONS survey data and a pre-calculated measure of capital stock is not
provided within the SDS. The ARD provides data on capital expenditure during each year
26The initial plan was to compute a weighting following Jaffe (1986), but due to the sheer volume
of observations the computations would take a very long time to run. Therefore this idea had to be
abandoned in favour of a more simplistic method of computation. Although when comparing a small
sample of weightings using the Jaffe method to weightings using the less complex method, the results
appeared to provide little difference.
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taken from the ABI survey, therefore a firm’s capital stock can be estimated using the
perpetual inventory method. This requires deflating capital expenditure and adjusting
for depreciation before summing to give an estimate of capital stock.
As with the creation of any variable with a large and complex dataset, there are
various issues to overcome. The ARD covers all large firms but provides a stratified
sample of small and medium sized firms, therefore observations may not be included for
these firms in each year of trading. It is reasonable to assume that firms continue to
invest in capital during the years that they are absent from the survey, hence missing
values may lead to underestimates of capital stock, therefore it is appropriate to impute
observations for the missing years.
The first step in the creation of the capital stock variable is to adjust the capital
expenditure for inflation. This is done using deflators from the Volume Index of Capital
Services (VICS) calculated by the ONS which are split by asset, industrial sector and
year. The ARD data is given in files which are separated by year and sector and therefore
the deflated data must be appended across years and sectors to provide a panel. At this
stage the panel includes only data by firm in the year that they responded to the ABI
survey.
The second step is to update this panel to include observations for all firms which
responded to the ABI survey by year and missing observations for those firms that did
not respond to the survey in a given year but responded in another year. Those firms
that never took part in the survey cannot be included as there is no information to base
imputations on. To do this, a panel is created from a register of firms that includes all
firms regardless of participation in the ABI survey and includes a variable which indicates
if a firm participated in a given year. Those firms that never take part are dropped from
the register panel. The panel of survey responses is then merged with the register panel,
thus creating the appropriate framework to generate the necessary imputed values.27
The third step involves the imputation of missing values based on number of em-
27For further details see Gilhooly, R. ‘Technical Guide: Estimating Capital Stock’
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ployees. This is done by firstly imputing missing number of employee values using linear
interpolations by firms and a localised average for missing values in the first year of firm’s
existence. Investment per employee is then calculated for the years that the investment
data is available in order to create an average investment per employee estimate for each
firm. The missing capital expenditure values are then replaced with the interpolated
number of employees multiplied by the average investment per employee to provide an
estimate of capital investment during the missing year.
The next step is to employ the perpetual inventory method (PIM) to generate esti-
mates of capital stock for each firm by year. The perpetual inventory is calculated as
follows,
Ci,t = Ii,t + (1− δ)Ci,t−1 (2.31)
where Cit represents capital stock in year t, Ii,t is capital expenditure by firm i in year t
and Ci,t−1 is firm i’s capital stock in the previous year which depreciates at a rate of δ.
A depreciation rate of 0.06 is assumed in this study, but robustness checks indicate that
the findings are not sensitive to this assumption. Descriptive statistics indicate that the
variable contains negative series therefore further action is taken to reduce the number of
negative series. It seems reasonable to assume that these series are likely to be incorrect
due to under estimates in investment which may occur due to a missing year coinciding
with a large “lump” investment.
2.3.6 Merging ARD and BERD
Observations are recorded at reporting unit level in the ARD and BERD. Reporting units
are not a meaningful level of aggregation therefore it is more appropriate to undertake
the study at enterprise level. Although identical reporting units references may appear
in the ARD and BERD, they may not necessarily refer to the same part of the firm. The
ARD contains enterprise references for each reporting unit, therefore data for reporting
units can be aggregated to enterprise level. This operation is not so straight forward in
BERD because enterprise reference codes are not available within the dataset. A look-up
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table for obtaining the corresponding enterprise reference codes for each reporting unit
was compiled by Richard Harris. This was created by using the IDBR and identifying
missing enterprise references using postcodes and firm characteristics. This look-up table
was used to obtain corresponding enterprise references for each reporting unit. This
allowed BERD data to be aggregated to enterprise level and matched with the ARD by
enterprise reference code. Table (2.2) indicates the number of enterprise level observations
in the ARD and BERD and the number of matched and unmatched observations.
Table 2.2: ARD and BERD Merge
Year Total Not Matched Matched
BERD ARD From ARD From BERD Keep
1997 1118 48495 47700 323 795
1998 8484 51231 48552 5805 2679
1999 7852 52556 50212 5508 2344
2000 8,591 52324 49683 5950 2,641
2001 8,640 56878 54460 6222 2,418
2002 10781 53472 50268 7577 3,204
2003 9770 52849 50371 7292 2,478
2004 11812 52411 49372 8773 3,039
2005 12470 51158 48103 9415 3,055
Total 79518 471374 448721 56865 22653
Around 75% of BERD observations could not be matched to the ARD. Over 95% of
BERD enterprise references can be matched against the BSD, which acts as a register of
all enterprises within the population. This rules out problems with matching reference
codes as a potential cause of this and confirms that this is due to the overlap of the ARD
and BERD dataset.
2.3.7 Creating a Multinational Dummy
Merging the AFDI and ARD facilitates the identification of multinational firms. Any
firm that is recorded to have an inward or outward flow of FDI is considered to be a
multinational. All enterprises recorded within the AFDI are multinational therefore any
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match between the ARD and AFDI indicates a multinational firm.
On the face of things matching the AFDI and ARD may appear relatively straight
forward, but there are a number of complications that add complexity to the task. The
first complication is that ARD data is given at reporting unit level, whereas the AFDI
data is given at enterprise group level. A second issue with the datasets is the lack of
direct comparability between the reference numbers. A third complication is that the
AFDI and the ARD do not include the entire population in their sample; not all small
firms are included each year.
The first issue is relatively simple to resolve. In the IBDR there are various ways
that units can be classified. Units can be classified by reporting unit or according to
the EU Regulation on Statistical Units (EEC 696/93) as an enterprise, enterprise group,
local unit or kind of activity unit (KAU). An enterprise is the smallest combination
of legal units that organises and allocates its current resources and produces goods or
services. An enterprise may carry out these activities at one or more locations or may be
a sole legal unit. An enterprise group is an association of enterprises bound together by
financial or legal ties. In some cases an enterprise group may consist of a single enterprise
if the enterprise has no associations. A local unit refers to a specific geographic site (e.g.
workshop, office, etc) which undertakes economic activity contributing to the enterprise.
An enterprise may have various local units or consist of only one. Kind of activity unit
refers to the operational subdivisions of an enterprise. The reporting unit is generally
equivalent to the enterprise but in some cases can be defined at a less aggregated level
based on kind of activity units.
In both the inwards and outwards AFDI each enterprise group code may not be
unique. FDI flows are recorded by country therefore multiple observations per enterprise
group many be observed if FDI flows from or to more than one country. In order to
match with the ARD, the AFDI data must be restructured to show one observation per
enterprise group. Table 2.3 shows the number of enterprise group observations in the
restructured AFDI.
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Table 2.3: Number of enterprise group observations in the AFDI Data
AFDI out AFDI in
1997 953 2077
1998 2353 6150
1999 2921 7662
2000 3201 8614
2001 3266 14045
2002 3041 13751
2003 2626 13141
2004 12642 13123
2005 13188 13439
Total 44191 92002
The ARD data provides a enterprise group reference code for each reporting unit
observation. A one to many match will identify the reporting units which belong to a
multinational enterprise group, as there are repeated enterprise group references in the
ARD and unique enterprise group references in the restructured version of the AFDI.
The second issue arises from the inconsistencies that exist between the enterprise groups
reference codes in the ARD and the AFDI. Each enterprise group should have a 10 digit
reference code stored as a string variable in stata, yet some reference codes are stored
as numeric variables without lead zeros resulting in less than 10 digits and some of the
codes in the AFDI have a leading number ranging from 1 to 6 which results in an 11
digit code. These inconsistencies are addressed by converting all reference codes to string
variables with 10 digits by removing the lead numbers in the AFDI, see Criscuolo and
Martin (2007), or adding lead zeros for those with less than 10 digits.28
Observations in the ARD with missing enterprise group codes have their enterprise
group code replaced with their enterprise reference code. If this is also missing, the
enterprise group reference code is replaced with their reporting unit code. This is a
legitimate replacement as many observations have enterprise group reference codes which
28Firms with missing enterprise group reference codes in the AFDI must be dropped as there is no
other form of reference code which allows of the data to be matched.
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are consistent with their enterprise reference and also reporting unit reference. This
improves the number of matches between the two datasets although there are still some
AFDI enterprise group codes which do not match up with the ARD. This may be due to
the fact that the ARD does not include all firms, a stratified sample of medium and small
firms is taken, therefore the small firms included in the AFDI sample may not correspond
to those included in the ARD or could be as a result of further differences between the
enterprise group reference codes. For the purposes of this analysis the unmatched data
from the AFDI is dropped as it is cannot be used without the corresponding ARD data.
Table 2.4: ARD-AFDI matches
AFDI out AFDI in
Year Unmatched Matched Total Unmatched Matched Total
1997 48462 33 48495 48433 62 48495
1998 49115 2116 51231 50107 1124 51231
1999 50066 2490 52556 51506 1050 52556
2000 50088 2240 52328 51324 1004 52328
2001 54368 2485 56853 54698 2155 56853
2002 51300 2141 53441 51542 1899 53441
2003 50848 1970 52818 50654 2164 52818
2004 50862 1560 52422 51082 1340 52422
2005 49640 1515 51155 49881 1274 51155
Total 454749 16550 471299 465632 13453 471299
”unmatched” indicates the number of unmatched observations from the ARD and ”total” indicates the total number
of observations in the ARD.
In summary, after adjusting enterprise group references codes to yield the optimum
number of matches, the dataset used for this analysis is derived by matching the ARD with
the outward and inward AFDI. Unmatched observations from the AFDI are dropped but
all observations from the ARD are kept regardless of their match status. Therefore this is
the best sample that can be obtained given the constraints of the data. A multinational
dummy is created where observations with a match with inwards AFDI or outwards
AFDI are indicated with 1 and observations with no recorded flows of FDI, in or out, are
indicated with 0.
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Inaccuracies in correctly identifying multinational status may arise for small enter-
prises because when a small multinational enterprise is omitted from an AFDI survey
there will be no match with the ARD and hence a zero value will be entered in the multi-
national dummy. An updated dummy is created where missing data is imputed based
on multinational status in previous and succeeding years i.e. a zero is replaced with 1 if
there are 1s in n− 1 and n+ 1 and this affects around 100 observations.
2.3.8 Creating a Foreign Ownership Dummy
The BSD is a snapshot of the IDBR at a specific point in time and contains two vari-
ables for country of ownership; imm foc is immediate country of ownership and ult foc
is ultimate country of ownership. Country of ownership data is taken from the Dun and
Bradstreet (D&B) Worldbase and updated on the IDBR, where ownership is defined as
the owners with the largest ownership share and majority voting power or least 10% of
ordinary shares. Firms may potentially have multiple owners across different countries
but the country with the largest ownership share is recorded. Ultimate ownership refers
to the highest level of ownership at enterprise group level, whereas immediate ownership
may to refer the owner of a unit within an enterprise group such as an enterprise or
reporting unit.
The source of the ARD foreign ownership code is not explicitly stated in the ARD
userguide but it seem sensible to assume that it is either taken directly from D&B or
the IDBR. Comparisons between ARD and BSD show that this code is consistent with
ult foc. A few missing ownership codes in the ARD are replaced with codes from the
BSD to maximise the number of non-missing codes.
For the purposes of this analysis it would be useful to distinguish UK-owned and
foreign-owned firms. Foreign ownership codes do not remain consistent over years. Ac-
cording to the “ARD User Guide 2002”, the UK is marked as 783 or 801. But a more
recent list of codes obtained from the IDBR team suggests that UK-owned enterprises
may also be coded as 826, 830 or 833. Missing codes are imputed if the codes in the pre-
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vious and following year indicate ownership of the firm by the same country. This allows
a foreign ownership dummy to be created where UK-owned firms are recorded as 0 and
non-UK ownership codes are recorded as 1. The foreign ownership dummy can be inter-
acted with the multinational dummy to identify non-multinationals, UK multinationals
and foreign multinationals.
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Table 2.5: List of Variables
Variable Description
logY log of gross value added
logC log of capital stock
logL log of the number of employees
logLH log of the number of R&D employees with Science and Technology degrees
logLL log of the number of other employees, where LL = L− LH
logKR log of in-house R&D stock
logKS log of knowledge spillovers
logKT log of knowledge transfer stock
logKTF log of knowledge transfer stock from foreign sources
logKTUK log of knowledge transfer stock from UK sources
logKR.logKT log interaction between in-house R&D stock and knowledge transfer stock
logKR.logKS log interaction between in-house R&D stock and knowledge spillovers
logKR.logKTUK log interaction between in-house R&D stock and knowledge transfer stock
from UK sources
logKR.logKTF log interaction between in-house R&D stock and knowledge transfer stock
from foreign sources
logKR.logLH log interaction between in-house R&D stock and the number of R&D
employees (with Science and Technology degrees)
logKT .logLH log interaction between knowledge transfer stock and the number of R&D
employees (with Science and Technology degrees)
Multinational Dummy variable where 1 indicates multinational status and
0 indicates non-multinational status
UK Multinational Dummy variable where 1 indicates UK-owned multinational and
0 indicates otherwise
Foreign Multinational Dummy variable where 1 indicates Foreign-owned multinational
and 0 indicates otherwise
Hi− Techindustry Dummy variable where 1 indicates activity in a high-technology industry
Hi− Techfirm Dummy variable where 1 indicates a high-technology firm
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2.4 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the analysis is created by matching data from the ARD, AFDI and
BERD. Therefore the size of the sample is dependent on the number of matches between
the ARD and BERD. The number of matches with the AFDI does not affect sample
size because these matches are used to indicate multinational status and the unmatched
observations are given non-multinational status and remain within the sample. This is
likely to generate a sample which has a slightly higher proportion of medium to large
firms than the general population of UK firms because these firms are more likely to be
common to BERD and ARD datasets. Table 2.6 shows the number of observations in
each size-band for the ARD, BERD and ARD-BERD datasets for the period 1998-2005.
Table 2.6: Number of Observations by Size-band in Each Dataset 1998-2005
Number of Employees ARD BERD ARD-BERD GMM
Sample Sample
0-20 269592 67061 854 204
21-50 69677 20879 2024 750
51-100 43789 15261 2583 1306
101-150 22904 8013 2612 1561
151-500 46722 16696 7463 4949
501-1000 13844 3676 2986 2210
1001-2500 8076 1921 1314 1008
2501-5000 2616 563 424 311
5001-10000 1155 192 189 142
10001+ 709 289 219 170
Total 479084 134551 20668 12611
The ARD-BERD sample has 20668 observations covering the period 1998 to 2005. The
observations from 1997 were dropped from the sample due to the poor merge rate with the
AFDI in this year, resulting in few identified multinationals. A further 1190 observations
were dropped due to missing variables. Columns 2-4 of table 2.7 indicate that the number
of observations in each year fluctuates as firms move in and out of the sample. This sample
is used to create OLS, Fixed Effects and 2SLS estimates. System GMM uses lagged first
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Table 2.7: Number of Observations by Year and Multinational Status
ARD-BERD Sample GMM Sample
Non- Non-
Year Mult Mult Total Mult Mult Total
1998 673 1,688 2,361 - - -
1999 416 1,759 2,175 220 1,307 1,527
2000 532 1,998 2,530 195 1,316 1,511
2001 491 1,809 2,300 248 1,490 1,738
2002 800 2,262 3,062 257 1,524 1,781
2003 1,230 1,139 2,369 979 1,066 2,045
2004 1,956 980 2,936 1,145 756 1,901
2005 1,967 968 2,935 1,296 812 2,108
Total 8065 12603 20668 4340 8271 12611
differences as instruments, therefore the available sample size becomes smaller. Columns
5-7 indicate the number of observations by year for this smaller sample. This table also
indicates the number of multinationals and non-multinationals in each year of the sample.
This is largely due to the composition of the sample which includes only R&D performing
firms and higher proportion of medium to large firms than the general population. These
types of firms are more likely to be multinationals. When the entire BERD 1998-2005
dataset is divided into foreign and UK owned, over 50% of observations are foreign owned
implying more than half of observations have multinational status. When the ARD is
categorised into non-multinational, foreign owned and UK multinational, the majority of
observations fall into the non-multinational category.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 provide some average values with standard deviations. The mean
statistics indicate that multinationals tend to be larger than non-multinationals. On
average multinationals firms have higher output, capital stock, levels of knowledge stocks
and more R&D employees and total employees. The capital to labour ratio and labour
productivity also vary significantly across groups with particularly high values for foreign
multinationals. Standard deviations are large suggesting a broad range of values exist
65
Table 2.8: ARD-BERD Sample Summary Statistics
Non-Multinational (N=8065)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 16130.35 182721.80 2599.00 34.90 1451.38
Capital Stock 9839.48 220904.10 652.05 75.88 6312.61
No. Employees 425.66 5149.74 112.00 33.80 1232.79
No. R&D Employees 10.12 120.03 1.44 34.85 1382.03
Capital-Labour Ratio 94.52 4691.72 5.86 63.33 4025.46
Labour Productivity 109.27 3479.32 24.01 60.90 3903.01
In-house R&D Stock 3175.66 43212.69 240.00 38.21 1668.91
Knowledge Spillover 174.57 2509.82 0.00 28.22 942.49
Knowledge Transfers 296.77 4153.99 9.87 28.10 929.95
Knowledge Transfers UK 206.38 3135.61 7.25 31.66 1182.16
Knowledge Transfers F 90.39 1549.54 1.38 35.02 1439.73
UK Multinational (N=1112)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 111083.80 636522.30 10460.00 10.81 138.02
Capital Stock 66638.76 717086.80 5144.83 21.72 496.80
No. Employees 1336.32 6245.61 330.00 11.72 160.32
No. R&D Employees 46.30 270.10 4.18 10.78 128.41
Capital-Labour Ratio 2827.86 76642.50 15.31 32.65 1079.82
Labour Productivity 5422.00 121718.80 33.99 30.78 988.10
In-house R&D Stock 22659.87 135425.50 1233.29 10.81 131.90
Knowledge Spillover 480.62 5650.25 0.00 16.57 292.65
Knowledge Transfers 3748.48 41732.76 38.72 22.92 602.42
Knowledge Transfers UK 1759.42 14507.10 27.41 16.04 324.10
Knowledge Transfers F 1989.06 28743.06 7.30 24.53 666.12
Foreign Multinational (N=11491)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 48743.11 287000.90 8822.00 22.45 668.06
Capital Stock 38462.71 285546.30 4339.80 29.48 1189.14
No. Employees 1262.52 10002.90 310.00 38.06 2094.69
No. R&D Employees 29.29 142.97 3.44 11.46 167.10
Capital-Labour Ratio 890.51 34312.69 13.59 57.58 3525.27
Labour Productivity 1142.66 42008.86 28.79 66.05 5049.26
In-house R&D Stock 13976.96 84049.96 717.45 13.90 247.42
Knowledge Spillover 276.36 3949.84 0.00 28.62 1008.23
Knowledge Transfers 2220.64 25437.11 21.47 23.63 697.90
Knowledge Transfers UK 1309.72 12227.79 14.59 16.84 338.79
Knowledge Transfers F 910.92 15730.35 3.66 36.02 1579.09
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Table 2.9: GMM Sample Summary Statistics
Non-Multinational (N=4340)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 22536.94 230650.00 3860.13 29.18 993.92
Capital Stock 15731.56 299260.30 1464.01 56.61 3478.93
No. Employees 603.71 6455.76 156.00 27.22 801.51
No. R&D Employees 12.97 128.94 1.75 30.24 1055.19
Capital-Labour Ratio 165.58 6394.57 8.81 46.46 2166.17
Labour Productivity 157.55 4693.94 25.45 45.90 2186.69
In-house R&D Stock 5047.69 56865.50 460.18 30.13 1016.05
Knowledge Spillover 188.89 2745.04 0.00 28.81 958.00
Knowledge Transfers 455.09 5289.43 21.21 23.15 619.88
Knowledge Transfers UK 310.88 3886.45 15.53 26.35 817.06
Knowledge Transfers F 144.21 2051.62 3.17 27.49 863.70
UK Multinational (N=867)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 127821.50 709139.20 12362.00 9.89 113.81
Capital Stock 79910.88 810280.90 6842.78 19.27 389.79
No. Employees 1495.98 6806.29 380.00 11.15 142.47
No. R&D Employees 50.75 285.59 4.36 10.44 119.77
Capital-Labour Ratio 3613.95 86793.27 17.41 28.82 841.50
Labour Productivity 6929.42 137828.00 34.31 27.17 770.05
In-house R&D Stock 26852.34 149183.80 1597.18 10.01 112.18
Knowledge Spillover 508.43 6017.82 0.00 16.29 278.27
Knowledge Transfers 4003.45 42889.88 50.63 24.25 654.33
Knowledge Transfers UK 1940.87 15013.01 35.78 16.23 333.44
Knowledge Transfers F 2062.57 29711.93 10.59 25.87 714.09
Foreign Multinational (N=7404)
mean s.d. median skewness kurtosis
Gross Value Added 54247.51 306613.50 10538.50 21.76 613.53
Capital Stock 46248.83 332668.60 5773.66 27.45 980.06
No. Employees 1447.51 11248.80 359.50 37.03 1915.17
No. R&D Employees 35.05 160.38 4.00 10.27 132.79
Capital-Labour Ratio 1235.52 42225.34 15.84 47.68 2381.55
Labour Productivity 1081.52 30498.61 29.66 48.69 2668.99
In-house R&D Stock 18976.16 100419.50 1096.89 11.88 179.48
Knowledge Spillover 293.68 3956.31 0.00 24.21 673.25
Knowledge Transfers 3066.25 30606.28 32.02 20.04 499.64
Knowledge Transfers UK 1815.32 14870.39 22.19 14.17 236.80
Knowledge Transfers F 1250.94 18676.30 6.02 31.17 1179.62
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within each group.
Table 2.10: Number of Changes from Domestic to Multinational Status
ARD-BERD Sample GMM Sample
Year No Change Change Total No Change Change Total
1998 2361 0 2361 - - -
1999 1989 186 2175 1341 186 1527
2000 2471 59 2530 1452 59 1511
2001 2222 78 2300 1660 78 1738
2002 2961 101 3062 1680 101 1781
2003 2328 41 2369 2004 41 2045
2004 2877 59 2936 1842 59 1901
2005 2838 97 2935 2011 97 2108
Total 20047 621 20668 11990 621 12611
Table 2.10 indicates the number of changes between multinational and non-multinational
status in either direction. All changes in status are from domestic to multinational sta-
tus. Changes become important when using fixed effects because variables that remain
constant over time are swept out of the model. The table suggests that relatively few
changes occur compared to the number of observations.
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2.5 Estimation Results
In this section the estimation results are interpreted and discussed. Estimations were
performed using OLS, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) , Fixed Effects (FE), two-stage
least squares (2SLS) and System GMM. The OLS, WLS, 2SLS and system GMM models
include year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise unit in the
OLS and FE models29. The GMM method is applied to 2SLS to provide efficient estimates
in the presence of heteroscedasticty and two-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005)
standard errors is applied. The key findings are presented in this results section and
robustness checks are found in the appendix. Results for the basic model using each
methodology are initially displayed and subsequent tables provide two-step System GMM
results. This is the preferred methodology. The subsequent results include interaction
terms and allow for labour to be separated by R&D and non-R&D workers. Estimations
are also performed and compared for sub-samples of the data by multinational status.
The progression in the methodology is described as follows. OLS simply provides a
baseline specification as a point of reference to compare with other specifications. Esti-
mates are likely to be biased because they do not account for endogeneity. WLS is used
because the descriptive statistics suggest that the sample is biased towards medium sized
firms. The regression is weighted by the inverse sampling probability in order to generate
estimates that are consistent for the population of innovating firms despite a non-random
sample.
Fixed effects is the most frequently used method of correcting for endogeneity arising
from unobserved heterogeneity with panel data. A disadvantage of this method is that
it assumes the unobserved firm specific characteristics remain constant over time and
wipes out useful interfirm variation. This variation accounts for a large proportion of the
total variation in this relatively short panel and time-consistent measurement error bias
may be accentuated. Other papers in the literature have also found that the relationship
between productivity and R&D stock is less robust in the time-series dimension than in
29The cluster option is not available when the the svy command is used for WLS.
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cross-sectional data (Griliches (1984), Hu et al. (2005)).
The 2SLS instrumental variables approach offers an alternative approach to dealing
with the endogeneity problem. Instruments should be correlated with the inputs but un-
correlated with the unobserved error term. Following Jaffe (1986) and Hu et al. (2005),
four digit industry averages of input variables are used as instruments for the input vari-
ables. These instruments aim to capture industry conditions and are independent of
firm specific characteristics. This controls for unobserved industry specific shocks and,
unlike fixed effects, does not sweep away firm specific characteristics, such as intangi-
ble managerial capabilities. This model is exactly identified because each instrument is
derived from an explanatory variable, therefore the number of instruments equates to
the number of endogenous variables. Post-estimation test of instrument validity require
over-identification of the model therefore cannot be performed in this instance. The Shea
Partial R2 tests the validity of instruments by confirming the correlation between instru-
ments and endogenous variables. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% level
implying that the instruments are weak and estimated coefficients will be biased.
Two-stage System GMM is the preferred methodological approach. Lagged first dif-
ferences provide suitable instruments according to the Hansen test, therefore endogeneity
should be accounted for and estimates should be unbiased. The Windmeijer (2005) cor-
rection for standard errors provides reliable t-statistics. Less observations are available for
this model because 2 years of consecutive data are required to create the first-differenced
instruments.
The results reported in table 2.11 show the estimated coefficients and standard errors
for the basic estimating equation with each methodological approach. The results remain
fairly consistent regardless of the methodology used. The basic Cobb-Douglas estimating
equation has no interaction terms and labour is represented by total employment. In
all specifications capital and labour have significant positive effects on output. The size
of the coefficients on labour and capital are larger in the OLS, WLS, and 2SLS models
than in the FE, GMM models. The size of the coefficients in the system GMM model
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on capital and labour appear to be slightly low compared with other estimates using UK
firm-level data from the ARD reported by Harris and Robinson (2003), but this could
be due to the industry composition of the R&D performing firm sample. The size of
the coefficients on capital and labour in the OLS and 2SLS models are smaller than the
coefficients on the equivalent model in the Hu et al. (2005) paper, which may indicate
that output is more sensitive to changes in labour and capital for Chinese firms than for
UK firms. Firms’ own stock of R&D (KR) also has a positive and significant effect on
output. The size of the coefficient is larger than the coefficient for in-house R&D stock in
Hu et al. (2005), suggesting that UK firms see a greater increase in output than Chinese
firms for a given increase in in-house R&D stock, other things held constant.
Knowledge transfers (KT ) have a significant negative impact on output. Knowledge
transfers represent new knowledge bought through market transactions from external
sources. This finding is consistent with Hu et al. (2005) and may represent difficulties in
understanding and applying information from external sources. Further analysis reveals
that the coefficients remain negative and significant when knowledge transfers are sepa-
rated out into transfers from foreign sources and UK sources. When LogKT is interacted
with foreign ownership, the coefficient on LogKT remains negative and the coefficient on
the interaction is positive, although very small and not significant. This indicates that
the negative effect is still present for foreign owned firms. These results imply that the
source of the transfer and foreign ownership do not influence this effect, although a more
detailed breakdown of transfer sources and foreign ownership by country may highlight
differences between developed and developing countries. Additional findings show that
the effect differs across industry sectors. Analysis by industry indicates that knowledge
transfers have a positive impact in the ‘service’ sector and also in the ‘transportation, util-
ities and telecommunication’ sector. For these sectors, an increase in knowledge transfers
leads to an increase in output.
The knowledge spillover pool variable using the postcode method (KS) has a positive
significant effect on output in the OLS, IV and WLS models, but it is not significant in
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the FE or system GMM models. This suggests that location relative to other firms may
play a role, but changes over time in the knowledge spillover pool for a given firm do not
have an impact on productivity. This implies some persistence in behaviour. Those firms
that benefit from the spillover pool continue to benefit and those that don’t benefit do
not change this pattern.
Table 2.11: Base Specification
OLS WLS FE 2SLS GMM
logY logY logY logY logY
logC 0.361*** 0.382*** 0.100*** 0.427*** 0.120***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.034) (0.044)
logL 0.382*** 0.304*** 0.092*** 0.350*** 0.139***
(0.024) (0.044) (0.013) (0.045) (0.041)
logKR 0.119*** 0.164*** 0.033*** 0.088*** 0.049**
(0.014) (0.026) (0.011) (0.025) (0.026)
logKS 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.0064 0.044*** 0.016
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
logKT - 0.016*** -0.021*** -0.0043 -0.011** - 0.015**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Multinational 0.116*** 0.118** 0.026 0.089*** 0.254***
(0.024) (0.051) (0.046) (0.030) (0.022)
Diversification 0.254*** 0.299*** 0.033* 0.225*** 0.399***
(0.027) (0.073) (0.019) (0.027) (0.053)
Constant 4.170*** 3.684*** 7.209*** 3.811*** 6.057***
(0.282) (0.303) (0.162) (0.283) (0.376)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668 12611
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The coefficient on the diversification dummy is significant in all columns of table 2.11.
The positive value of the coefficient indicates that firms that are part of a diversified
enterprise are more productive. The multinational dummies are positive and significant
in all except FE and 2SLS. As shown in table 4 of the descriptive statistics, there are
relatively few changes between multinational status. Therefore a non-significant multi-
national coefficient is expected in the FE estimates.
Table 2.12 and subsequent tables provide results using the preferred system GMM ap-
proach. Column 1 repeats the results of the basic specification for comparison. Column
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Table 2.12: Knowledge Interactions using System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logY logY logY logY logY
logC 0.120*** 0.141*** 0.150** 0.170** 0.163**
(0.044) (0.050) (0.053) (0.064) (0.058)
logL 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 0.162***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039)
logKR 0.049** 0.045* 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.054**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
logKS 0.0160 0.012 0.013 0.007** 0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011)
logKT -0.015** -0.019** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Multinational 0.254*** 0.247*** 0.219*** 0.225***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.051) (0.041)
UK Multinational 0.112**
(0.033)
Foreign Multinational 0.262***
(0.028)
logKR.logKT -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
logKR.logKS 0.000
(0.001)
logKR.logKTUK -0.001
(0.001)
logKR.logKTF 0.001
(0.001)
Diversification 0.399*** 0.376*** 0.357*** 0.350*** 0.355***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052)
Constant 6.057*** 5.965*** 5.732*** 5.555*** 5.664***
(0.376) (0.410) (0.418) (0.463) (0.438)
Observations 12611 12611 12611 12611 12611
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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2 extends the basic model by including separate dummy variables for foreign multina-
tional and UK multinational. The results show UK and foreign multinationals to be
more productive than domestic firms with a positive and significant effects on output.
Output is 12% higher for UK multinationals and 30% higher for foreign multinationals
than non-multinational firms, other things held constant.30 The coefficient on foreign
multinationals is larger than UK multinationals, implying that subsidiaries owned by
foreign multinationals are more productive that those owned by UK multinationals. This
is relatively consistent with the findings in Criscuolo and Martin (2009) which show US
multinationals to be 42% more productive and other multinationals to be 30% more
productive than British non-multinational plants using ARD data.
Knowledge interaction terms are introduced in the subsequent columns. The specifi-
cation presented in column 3 includes the log interaction between firm’s own R&D stock
and knowledge transfers (LogKR.logKT ) column 4 includes an interaction between firm’s
own R&D stock and the knowledge spillover pool (LogKR.logKS) and column 5 includes
interactions between firm’s own R&D stock and knowledge transfers from UK sources
(LogKR.logKTUK) and from foreign sources (LogK
R.logKTF ). The coefficients on these
variables are not significant at the 5% level. This suggests that in-house R&D stocks
do not impact a firm’s ability to productively utilise knowledge transfers from external
sources. The literature postulates that experience and knowhow created through engage-
ment in in-house R&D provides a greater capacity for that firm to absorb and utilise other
knowledge sources. Yet the lack of significance of the coefficient implies that a firm does
not increase its absorptive capacity by increasing its in-house R&D expenditure. 31 Table
2.13 focuses on labour. Again, column 1 provides the basic specification for comparison.
Column 2 expands the basic specification by splitting labour into R&D employees (LH)
and non-R&D employees (LL), where R&D employees is defined as the number of skilled
science and technology R&D workers. The coefficient on non-R&D employees is strongly
30The coefficients on the dummy variables are converted into percentages using 100.(exp(β)− 1).
31Results using alternative methodologies are provided in the appendix. OLS and WLS provide small
positive significant coefficients on interactions, but these are likely to be biased as endogeneity is not
suitably accounted for. FE results concur with the system GMM findings.
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Table 2.13: Labour Interactions using System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logY logY logY logY
logC 0.120*** 0.127** 0.185** 0.185**
(0.044) (0.050) (0.075) (0.075)
logL 0.139***
(0.041)
logLH 0.017* 0.008 0.004
(0.009) (0.023) (0.024)
logLL 0.097*** 0.131*** 0.136***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
logKR 0.049*** 0.054** 0.086*** 0.062***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020)
logKS 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.018
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
logKT -0.015** -0.019** -0.026*** -0.015***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Multinational 0.254*** 0.273*** 0.247*** 0.265***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.062) (0.058)
logKR.logLH 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
logKT .logLH 0.003
(0.002)
Diversification 0.399*** 0.403*** 0.343*** 0.338***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Constant 6.057*** 6.181*** 5.501*** 5.589***
(0.376) (0.388) (0.483) (0.470)
Observations 12611 12611 12611 12611
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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significant, where a 1% increase in the number of non-R&D employees increases output
by 0.1%. The coefficient on R&D employees is much smaller and less significant. This
implies that non-R&D workers have a larger impact on value added output in the short-
run, but the impact of R&D employees is expected to increase over future periods. The
returns arising from R&D labour may take time to impact productivity. In columns 3
and 4, R&D labour is interacted with in-house R&D and knowledge transfers. These
interactions aim to capture absorptive capacity intrinsic to the labour force. The coeffi-
cients on these variables are not significant, again providing no support for the notion of
absorptive capacity. This evidence is inconclusive because number of R&D workers is an
imperfect measure as it represents quantity rather than quality of the workers.
Column 1 of Table 2.14 focuses on differences between non-multinationals and multi-
nationals by interacting the multinational dummy with the explanatory variables of the
basic specification. An F-test indicates that the dummy and interaction terms are jointly
significant. The individual findings show no significant differences between multination-
als and non-multinationals in terms of knowledge variables, but differences in labour and
capital. There is a positive coefficient on the multinational-capital interaction and a neg-
ative coefficient on the multinational-labour interaction. This implies that multinational
firms have a greater output elasticity of capital than non-multinationals. Multinationals
may transfer existing technology from their overseas operations to UK subsidiaries, thus
enhancing productivity.
It is important to acknowledge that projects and R&D size differ between and within
industries and firms. Projects can focus on product or process innovation, they can have
a specific aim or be purely experimental. The extent of experimental R&D is likely to be
related to firm performance as firms are more likely to invest in this type of research when
profits are high. Some industry sectors are considered to be more R&D intensive, such as
the pharmaceutical and electronics industries, where projects are costly and continuous
innovation plays an important part in competition. Differences in R&D also exist within
industries, some firms are more R&D intensive than their industry counterparts. These
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firms are likely to be at the forefront of their industry, acting as technology leaders
with state of the art innovations. Columns 2 and 3 of table 2.14 investigate differences
between high technology and low technology firms. Two methods were used to identify
high technology firms. Both methods are based on R&D intensity, defined as the ratio
of R&D expenditure to output. Method 1 identified high technology firms as those
operating in the top quintile of R&D intensive industries and Method 2 identified high
technology firms as those within the top quartile of R&D intensive firms. The results
show no significant differences between high and low technology firms within the sample,
regardless of the high technology definition.32
32No significant differences were found when high technology was defined at the top decile either.
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Table 2.14: Multinational and High-Technology Interactions using System GMM
(1) (2) (3)
logY logY logY
logC 0.187** 0.165** 0.137**
(0.076) (0.083) (0.054)
logL 0.244*** 0.156** 0.126**
(0.044) (0.073) (0.093***)
logKR 0.112*** 0.081** 0.093***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.031)
logKS 0.018 0.011 0.027*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
logKT -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Multinational 0.203*** 0.299*** 0.215***
(0.040) (0.014) (0.024)
Diversification 0.342*** 0.372*** 0.355***
(0.050) (0.046) (0.052)
Mult.logC 0.100***
(0.030)
Mult.logL -0.128***
(0.038)
Mult.logKR -0.021
(0.022)
Mult.logKS -0.011
(0.010)
Mult.logKT -0.005
(0.005)
Hi− TechIndustry 0.766
(0.721)
Hi− TechFirm -0.880
(0.904)
Hi− Tech.logC -0.059 0.076
(0.080) (0.120)
Hi− Tech.logL -0.025 0.034
(0.083) (0.078)
Hi− Tech.logKR -0.024 -0.034
(0.041) (0.054)
Hi− Tech.logKS 0.010 -0.020
(0.019) (0.021)
Hi− Tech.logKT 0.016 0.011
(0.014) (0.016)
Constant 4.847*** 5.448*** 5.978***
(0.416) (0.661) (0.531)
Observations 12611 12611 12611
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
78
2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was firstly, to investigate differences between multinationals and
non-multinationals in terms of productivity and knowledge and secondly, to investigate
the existence of complementarities between internal and external source of knowledge.
The findings provide an interesting insight into the relationships between knowledge,
productivity and multinational status. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this
study is the data sample obtained from a unique combination of datasets. The sample
provides particularly detailed firm-level data with a large number of observations. This
allows contributions to the literature to be made by investigating the role for knowledge
spillovers, distinguishing between skilled R&D and non-R&D labour and examining the
robustness of previous findings using alternative data samples.
The results show that multinational firms are more productive than non-multinationals.
Furthermore, foreign-owned multinationals are more productive than domestic-owned
multinationals. This finding seems logical because multinationals possess intangible ad-
vantages that allowed them to break into foreign markets.
The basic findings regarding the relationship between knowledge and productivity are
supported by previous studies. The stock of in-house R&D expenditure has a positive
impact on output, whereas knowledge transfers from external sources have a negative
impact on output. These findings remain consistent regardless of multinational status,
although the impact of knowledge transfers varies across industries. It would be useful
to investigate differences in R&D behaviour across industry sectors in further research.
Increases in the number of skilled R&D employees may create a small positive impact on
productivity in the short-term, but returns to number of skilled R&D employees may be
greater in the medium-long term.
There is little conclusive evidence to support the existence of absorptive capacity,
which contrasts some previous studies. The findings suggest that an increase in the stock
of in-house R&D expenditure or an increase in number of R&D workers does not improve
a firm’s ability to productively utilise knowledge from external sources, via transfers or
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spillovers. This result should be viewed with caution because R&D expenditure and
number of R&D workers are imperfect measures of knowledge. They measure inputs
into the R&D process and therefore do not perfectly represent the quality of knowledge
created.
Differences in productivity between multinationals and non-multinationals are partly
attributable to differences in the productivity of capital and labour. Multinational firms
obtain higher returns to capital and lower returns to labour than their non-multinational
counterparts. This implies that multinational firms have access to better machinery
or utilise their equipment more effectively, suggesting evidence of technology transfer
form other countries. The remainder of the productivity difference may be attributed
to intangible knowledge that is not captured by the R&D expenditure based measure
of knowledge stock. Intangible knowledge may include factors such as managerial skills,
marketing and other forms of immeasurable know-how.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.15: Robustness Checks
Description
Variable Creation
• Different small numbers were used to replace zero values for knowledge
variables to prevent missing numbers being created when logged.
• Different weightings for knowledge spillover variable
• Different depreciation rates for knowledge stock variables
• Different definitions of domestic and multinational firms
• Share of R&D employees rather than number of R&D employees
Samples
• Zero values for knowledge variables dropped from sample
• Multinational sample
• Non-Multinational sample
• High-tech samples
Functional Form and Restrictions
• Translog
• Constant Returns to Scale
Various checks were performed to validate the robustness of the results. These include
estimation using different methodological approaches, specifications and sub-samples and
assumptions of variable creation as outlined in table (2.15). Tables (2.16) to (2.21) show
results for different specifications and methodological approaches. Tables (2.22) to (2.24)
show results for subsamples. The findings generally support the key conclusions presented
in chapter 2, although some significant coefficients appear on the knowledge interaction
terms in the OLS and WLS models. These results are considered to be invalid as they
do not control for endogeneity.
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Table 2.16: Base Specification with UK and Foreign Multinational Dummies
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
log C 0.362*** 0.361*** 0.0999*** 0.382***
(0.0183) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0257)
log L 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.0919*** 0.294***
(0.0234) (0.0269) (0.0128) (0.0433)
log KR 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.0317*** 0.162***
(0.0144) (0.0293) (0.0117) (0.0257)
log KS 0.0278*** 0.0647*** 0.00469 0.0404***
(0.00524) (0.0112) (0.00622) (0.0122)
log KT -0.0160*** -0.0145*** -0.00443* -0.0212***
(0.00215) (0.00542) (0.00259) (0.00433)
Diversification 0.250*** 0.247*** 0.0331* 0.264***
(0.0274) (0.0277) (0.0194) (0.0692)
Foreign Multinational 0.0965*** 0.0940*** 0.0138 0.115**
(0.0230) (0.0255) (0.0396) (0.0498)
UK Multinational 0.0883*** 0.0838*** 0.0273 0.0811***
(0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0217) (0.0308)
Constant 4.203*** 4.191*** 7.227*** 3.767***
(0.283) (0.281) (0.162) (0.310)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.17: Base Specification with Knowledge Interaction
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
logC 0.359*** 0.374*** 0.0999*** 0.428***
(0.0182) (0.0250) (0.0199) (0.0342)
logL 0.378*** 0.297*** 0.0915*** 0.349***
(0.0234) (0.0423) (0.0129) (0.0455)
logKR 0.119*** 0.165*** 0.0331*** 0.0879***
(0.0138) (0.0235) (0.0113) (0.0249)
logKS 0.0262*** 0.0354*** 0.00638 0.0443***
(0.00410) (0.00896) (0.00475) (0.00849)
logKT -0.0442*** -0.0858*** -0.00505 -0.0271*
(0.00764) (0.0124) (0.00642) (0.0141)
logKR.logKT 0.00380*** 0.00942*** 0.000114 0.00240
(0.00108) (0.00170) (0.00102) (0.00236)
Multinational 0.124*** 0.131*** 0.0261 0.0893***
(0.0246) (0.0504) (0.0463) (0.0300)
Diversification 0.244*** 0.262*** 0.0330* 0.220***
(0.0270) (0.0658) (0.0194) (0.0276)
Constant 4.200*** 3.719*** 7.209*** 3.826***
(0.284) (0.309) (0.162) (0.284)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.18: Base Specification with Knowledge Interactions
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
logC 0.359*** 0.374*** 0.0998*** 0.428***
(0.0182) (0.0250) (0.0199) (0.0342)
logL 0.378*** 0.298*** 0.0918*** 0.349***
(0.0234) (0.0419) (0.0129) (0.0457)
logKR 0.117*** 0.161*** 0.0322*** 0.0854***
(0.0142) (0.0231) (0.0115) (0.0260)
logKS 0.0166 0.0174 -0.00211 0.0311
(0.0135) (0.0336) (0.0133) (0.0261)
logKT -0.0438*** -0.0850*** -0.00486 -0.0261*
(0.00756) (0.0124) (0.00642) (0.0140)
logKR.logKT 0.00373*** 0.00931*** 0.0000866 0.00224
(0.00107) (0.00170) (0.00102) (0.00235)
logKR.logKS 0.00142 0.00287 0.00116 0.00211
(0.00201) (0.00459) (0.00186) (0.00410)
Multinational 0.124*** 0.131*** 0.0256 0.0893***
(0.0247) (0.0505) (0.0464) (0.0301)
Diversification 0.244*** 0.262*** 0.0332* 0.220***
(0.0270) (0.0657) (0.0194) (0.0276)
Constant 4.211*** 3.737*** 7.214*** 3.839***
(0.285) (0.313) (0.162) (0.284)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.19: Labour Specification
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
log C 0.361*** 0.372*** 0.0996*** 0.421***
(0.0180) (0.0250) (0.0198) (0.0338)
log LH -0.0393*** -0.0792*** -0.00397 -0.0497***
(0.00869) (0.0174) (0.00506) (0.0145)
log LL 0.374*** 0.349*** 0.0907*** 0.360***
(0.0189) (0.0320) (0.0124) (0.0400)
log KR 0.157*** 0.203*** 0.0363*** 0.125***
(0.0155) (0.0247) (0.0117) (0.0261)
log KS 0.0264*** 0.0334*** 0.00611 0.0445***
(0.00404) (0.00890) (0.00476) (0.00838)
log KT -0.0167*** -0.0224*** -0.00470* -0.0117**
(0.00208) (0.00449) (0.00264) (0.00483)
Multinational 0.0999*** 0.0917* 0.0217 0.0898***
(0.0240) (0.0484) (0.0465) (0.0296)
Diversification 0.261*** 0.293*** 0.0337* 0.240***
(0.0276) (0.0642) (0.0195) (0.0278)
Constant 4.078*** 3.469*** 7.209*** 3.726***
(0.282) (0.295) (0.161) (0.284)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.20: Labour Specification with Labour Interaction
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
logC 0.360*** 0.372*** 0.0991*** 0.419***
(0.0176) (0.0245) (0.0198) (0.0333)
logLH -0.0814*** -0.132*** -0.0159 -0.108***
(0.0244) (0.0367) (0.0146) (0.0366)
logLL 0.372*** 0.341*** 0.0888*** 0.358***
(0.0191) (0.0318) (0.0125) (0.0404)
logKR 0.153*** 0.207*** 0.0368*** 0.124***
(0.0163) (0.0225) (0.0111) (0.0260)
logKS 0.0261*** 0.0334*** 0.00615 0.0431***
(0.00405) (0.00893) (0.00476) (0.00844)
logKT -0.0166*** -0.0224*** -0.00481* -0.0122**
(0.00209) (0.00450) (0.00261) (0.00494)
logKR.logLH 0.00535* 0.00653 0.00162 0.00816
(0.00312) (0.00424) (0.00214) (0.00521)
Multinational 0.109*** 0.0937* 0.0196 0.0856***
(0.0252) (0.0482) (0.0462) (0.0295)
Diversification 0.254*** 0.274*** 0.0331* 0.223***
(0.0267) (0.0604) (0.0195) (0.0287)
Constant 4.107*** 3.462*** 7.220*** 3.753***
(0.286) (0.298) (0.161) (0.291)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.21: Labour Specification with Labour Interactions
OLS WLS FE 2SLS
logY logY logY logY
logC 0.359*** 0.372*** 0.0988*** 0.419***
(0.0176) (0.0247) (0.0197) (0.0331)
logLH -0.0672*** -0.126*** -0.0140 -0.101**
(0.0259) (0.0393) (0.0145) (0.0402)
logLL 0.371*** 0.340*** 0.0891*** 0.357***
(0.0190) (0.0314) (0.0125) (0.0406)
logKR 0.156*** 0.208*** 0.0381*** 0.125***
(0.0164) (0.0222) (0.0111) (0.0253)
logKS 0.0258*** 0.0333*** 0.00605 0.0428***
(0.00406) (0.00893) (0.00475) (0.00847)
logKT -0.0225*** -0.0240*** -0.00604** -0.0144**
(0.00328) (0.00607) (0.00270) (0.00700)
logKR.logLH 0.00319 0.00563 0.00126 0.00700
(0.00331) (0.00441) (0.00207) (0.00606)
logKT .logLH 0.00279** 0.00114 0.000653 0.00155
(0.00111) (0.00187) (0.000736) (0.00280)
Multinational 0.113*** 0.0952** 0.0196 0.0867***
(0.0252) (0.0481) (0.0461) (0.0294)
Diversification 0.252*** 0.274*** 0.0333* 0.222***
(0.0268) (0.0607) (0.0195) (0.0286)
Constant 4.107*** 3.460*** 7.213*** 3.754***
(0.288) (0.299) (0.160) (0.291)
Observations 20668 20668 20668 20668
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.22: High-Technology Subsamples using System GMM
Industry 25% Industry 10% Firm 25% Firm 10%
logY logY logY logY
log C 0.0880** 0.0951 0.207* 0.146
(0.0436) (0.0820) (0.114) (0.110)
log L 0.136*** 0.250*** 0.149*** 0.124**
(0.0473) (0.0654) (0.0505) (0.0600)
log KR 0.0741*** 0.150*** 0.0513 0.112
(0.0267) (0.0395) (0.0415) (0.0728)
log KS 0.0284* 0.0384** 0.00759 0.00771
(0.0145) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0269)
log KT -0.0174** -0.0138 -0.0201* -0.0149
(0.00876) (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0168)
Multinational 0.259*** 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.202***
(0.022) (0.071) (0.050) (0.035)
Diversification 0.330*** 0.220*** 0.305*** 0.355***
(0.0571) (0.0490) (0.0738) (0.110)
Constant 6.130*** 5.089*** 5.143*** 5.062***
(0.366) (0.458) (0.593) (0.742)
Observations 8468 4201 5359 2293
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.23: Multinational Interactions using Hi-Tech Subsamples and System GMM
Industry 25% Industry 10% Firm 25% Firm 10%
logY logY logY logY
log C 0.127* 0.161 0.198** 0.114
(0.0666) (0.102) (0.0934) (0.0775)
log L 0.250*** 0.311*** 0.301*** 0.375***
(0.0513) (0.0677) (0.0672) (0.0731)
log KR 0.155*** 0.227*** 0.165*** 0.251***
(0.0257) (0.0472) (0.0452) (0.0546)
log KS 0.0260* 0.0305* 0.0135 0.0162
(0.0140) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0195)
log KT -0.0325*** -0.0226** -0.0212** -0.0148
(0.00682) (0.00930) (0.00972) (0.0115)
Multinational 0.211*** 0.198*** 0.210*** 0.197***
(0.017) (0.051) (0.041) (0.021)
Diversification 0.290*** 0.176*** 0.224*** 0.285***
(0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0530) (0.0822)
Mult.log C 0.146*** 0.135** 0.256*** 0.292***
(0.0379) (0.0527) (0.0655) (0.0754)
Mult.log L -0.133*** -0.124* -0.211*** -0.318***
(0.0473) (0.0677) (0.0604) (0.0793)
Mult.log KR -0.0686*** -0.0674* -0.122** -0.0828
(0.0241) (0.0400) (0.0503) (0.0682)
Mult.log KS -0.0000548 0.0310 -0.0132 0.0130
(0.0134) (0.0196) (0.0174) (0.0292)
Mult.log KT -0.00429 -0.00987 -0.00700 -0.00505
(0.00623) (0.0111) (0.00980) (0.0127)
Constant 4.937*** 3.988*** 3.887*** 3.253***
(0.340) (0.381) (0.310) (0.411)
Observations 8468 4201 5359 2293
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 2.24: Multinational Subsamples using System GMM
All Multinational Non-Multinational
logY logY logY
log C 0.120*** 0.180** 0.0654
(0.0438) (0.0716) (0.0458)
log L 0.139*** 0.113*** 0.353***
(0.0406) (0.0415) (0.0713)
log KR 0.0489** 0.0413 0.163***
(0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0408)
log KS 0.0160 0.0168 0.00419
(0.0114) (0.0126) (0.0255)
log KT -0.0152** -0.0161** -0.0289**
(0.00736) (0.00790) (0.0121)
Multinational 0.254***
(0.022)
Diversification 0.399*** 0.404*** 0.135
(0.0525) (0.0610) (0.0986)
Constant 6.057*** 6.708*** 4.830***
(0.376) (0.670) (0.480)
Observations 12611 8271 4340
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
90
3 Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
In the subsequent chapters of this thesis the term ‘event’ refers to firm restructuring
events, including acquisitions, mergers, change of ownership, divestments, break-ups and
trade-sales. This review of the literature covers studies of acquisitions, mergers and
divestment. There are a number of studies investigating merger and acquisition events,
but fewer have investigated divestment. Previous studies have not investigated other
events types due to data limitations.
Post-event outcomes are highly dependent on the underlying objectives of the firm’s
strategy, therefore it is important to discuss pre-event characteristics as drivers of post-
event outcomes. Characteristics can give some indication of the type of firms undertaking
these events and a sense of the underlying motives.
This section provides a summary of papers from the economics and management liter-
ature. Firstly, a theoretical background to this literature is provided, secondly, pre-merger
and acquisition (M&A) characteristics are discussed, thirdly, post-M&A innovation out-
comes, fourthly, productivity outcomes and foreign acquisition and finally, pre-divestment
characteristics and post-divestment outcomes. A summary of the key findings in the lit-
erature concludes this section.
3.2 Distinguishing between Event Types
“Joining events” can be used as a term to broadly define a scenario where two or more
firms join together. Manne (1965) observes the market for corporate control and identi-
fies three mechanisms of gaining control of a target. These include proxy fights, direct
purchase of shares and merger. A proxy fight describes a scenario where the acquirer
attempts to convince shareholders of the target firm that the management should be
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replaced. This form of takeover is more common when the company shares are widely
distributed, rather than when there are large holdings. This type of takeover may be
seen as a compromise if the acquirer is unable to raise sufficient capital to buy control
and reveals a willingness to share potential gains with other shareholders as payment for
their vote. Shareholders are more likely to side with the acquirer if they are unsatisfied
with the current management of the the target firm.
Another method of taking control of a target firm is via buy-outs with the direct
purchase of shares. If the acquirer purchases a sufficient proportion of shares, they have
the majority vote on governance proposals and therefore have control of the firm. Shares
can be bought on the open market, via private negotiations with existing shareholders or
by asking for tender offers. A tender offer is an offer from existing shareholders to sell
shares to the acquirer at set price above the market value.
The merger differs from the previous mechanisms for gaining control in two major
ways. Control is generally obtained through the exchange of shares rather than cash
buy-outs and the merger is recommended by existing management. The ‘Acquired’ firm
and the ‘acquirer’ are expected to have different characteristics because the ‘acquirer’ is
in a dominant position, whereas the acquired target is vulnerable. Previous applied work
has struggled to distinguish between the acquired firm and the acquiring firm, yet clearly
we expect important differences between them. The merger event category consists of
merger targets and merger acquirers, therefore there may be more variability within this
category.
A ‘change of ownership’ indicates a situation where the firm becomes owned by a
new majority shareholder enterprise group that has not existed previously in the UK.
Therefore this event category also consists of firms that have been acquired by foreign
enterprise groups that have not had any majority holdings in the UK before.
The term “separating events” can be used to jointly describe corporate actions where
an enterprise splits itself into separate sections. These are known as divestments or
demergers and can occur in various different ways. One mode of separation involves the
92
creation of spin-off firms from the parent firm. The spin-off firm33 takes assets, intellectual
property, technology or products from the parent firm. Shareholders of the parent firm
are reimbursed for this loss of assets with sufficient shares in the spin-off firm, therefore
ownership of both spin-off and parent remains consistent at the time of divestment. The
distribution of ownership changes as the shares are traded. In this type of separation
there is no cash flow to the parent. The management team of the spin-off firm are often
from the parent firm. Often market value will increase prior to a spin-off announcement
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). This could be due to a expected increase in
focus for both firms .
Another method of separation is via equity carve-outs. These events involve the
creation of partial spin-offs or split-off IPOs. The new firm is launched on the stock
market as a separate entity from the parent firm. Generally a proportion of the shares
are retained for the existing shareholders of the parent firm and the remainder are offered
to the public (Slovin et al., 1995). This mode of divestment creates cash flows for the
parent firm. The ‘divested’, ‘divestor’ and ‘breakup’ events from the data can be defined
in relation to this discussion. The ‘divestor’ belongs to the parent enterprise group and
the ‘divested’ firm is the spin-off or partial spin-off from the enterprise group. The mode
of divestment may or may not involve cash-flows for the parent firm because this cannot
be distinguished from the data. A ‘break-up’ is an event that generates two or more
separate firms and the parent enterprise group ceases to exist in the UK. The enterprise
group could continue to exist elsewhere if it is multinational. The ‘break-up’ situation can
occur in various different ways. Separation could be established by distributing ownership
of shares for the new enterprise groups among existing shareholders or could represent two
of more simultaneous divestments from a foreign parent, which may or may not generate
cash for the parent group.
An asset sell-off, asset sale or trade-sale is another mode of divestment that generates
cash funds for the parent. Shares from the divested firm are sold to an acquiring firm. The
33Also known as split-offs, spin-outs or starbursts.
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parent may maintain part ownership of the firm of transfer ownership entirely (John and
Ofek, 1995). From an industry perspective, this event combines separating and joining
events. This type of situation is indicated by the ‘tradesale’ event in my data. This event
category is assigned to the firm that undergoes a change in ownership from the divesting
parent to the acquiring parent. This type of event is likely to generate cash flows for the
divesting parent. Furthermore, the situation where a ‘break-up’ firm becomes owned by
a foreign enterprise group is a trade-sale where the acquirer is likely to be an existing
foreign enterprise group that has no previous majority ownership of firms within the UK.
Some demographic events can be defined as voluntary and others as involuntary.
‘Takeover’, ‘divested’ and ‘tradesale’ are generally assumed to be involuntary events,
where the enterprise group has ultimate power over the decision and the target has
no control. ‘Acquirer’ and ‘divestor’ appear to be voluntary events, although in some
situations a firm may appear as an ‘acquirer’ or ‘divestor’ in the data but the decision is
made at the enterprise group level. The decision maker in ‘merger’, ‘break-up’ or ‘change
of ownership’ events cannot be distinguished.
In summary, this overview has outlined the differences between event types. It is
preferable to disaggregate event types rather than consolidate them into fewer groups.
This allows the data to identify similarities or differences between the types of firms
engaging in each event type. The data used in this study benefits from the capacity
to identify these detailed events. A drawback to the data is that it is impossible to
distinguish between events that involve cash transfers and those that do not. The transfer
of cash can influence motivations for divestment and takeover.
3.3 Theory
3.3.1 Economic Motivations for Joining Events
The application of the Cournot framework to the horizontal merger situation by Salant
et al. (1983) assumes that a reduction in competition is the only motivation for firms to
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join together. When the assumption of constant costs and symmetric firms is imposed,
joining firms may see a reduction in post-event joint profit, leaving profit maximising firms
with no incentive to enter into a merger or acquisition. This self proclaimed “bizarre”
result is known as the merger paradox. Subsequent papers relaxed the strong assumptions
of this model to provide profit-based motivations for M&A. These extensions include
the incorporation of non-symmetric firms, economies of scale, knowledge synergies and
price-setting behaviour. Alternatively, managers may pursue goals other than profit
maximisation. This section provides a discussion of these theories.
The seminal paper by Salant et al. (1983) applies the Cournot framework to the situ-
ation of horizontal mergers. The model assumes that an industry consists of n symmetric
profit maximising firms. These firms face linear demand and constant marginal costs.
Economies of scale are assumed away and the only motivation for merger is a decrease
in market competition. The number of firms joining by merger is m+ 1. These firms are
described as insiders, whereas the residual n−m−1 firms are the non-merging outsiders.
The joint change in insider profits resulting from a merger is given by g(n,m).
g(n,m) = piC(n,m)− piNC(n,m) (3.1)
Where piC(n,m) represents post-merger insider joint profit and piNC(n,m) represents
pre-merger insider joint profit. Given that firms are symmetric and there are m + 1
insiders, piNC(n,m) can be defined as follows.
piNC(n,m) = (m+ 1)pi(n) (3.2)
The merged insider firms combine to become one firm, therefore the post-merger
industry consists of n−m symmetric firms. Due to the additional assumption of constant
marginal costs, the merged firm behaves identically to the remaining n−m−1 outsiders.
piC(n,m) = pi(n−m) (3.3)
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Assuming a linear demand function P = β −∑ni=1Qi. Profit is given by pi(n) =
(P − α)Q, where α is constant marginal costs. Each firm aims to maximise profits by
selecting the profit maximising output.
max
Qj≥0
Qj[β −Qj −
∑
i 6=j
Qi − α] (3.4)
β − 2Qj −
∑
i 6=j
Qi − α = 0 (3.5)
Output for each firm is identical in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, therefore Qi = Qj = Q.
β − 2Q− (n− 1)Q− α = 0 (3.6)
Q =
β − α
n+ 1
(3.7)
The demand function and equilibrium output 3.7 can be substituted into the profit func-
tion to yeild equation 3.10.
pi(n) = (P − α)Q (3.8)
pi(n) = (β − nQ− α)Q (3.9)
pi(n) = ([β − α]/[n+ 1])2 (3.10)
The change in insider profits following the merger can now be expressed as follows.
g(n,m) =
[
β − α
n−m+ 1
]2
− (m+ 1)
[
β − α
n+ 1
]2
(3.11)
= (β − α)2
([
1
n−m+ 1
]2
− (m+ 1)
[
1
n+ 1
]2)
(3.12)
The profitability of the merger depends upon the number of insider firms in the
coalition and the number of firms in the industry. A merger is profitable when g(n,m) >
0. This requires that (n−m+ 1)−2 > (m+ 1)(n+ 1)−2. Losses from merger are greater
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as the number of insider firms increases, but merger to monopoly is always profitable.
The logic that leads to a merger paradox situation is based on the idea that although
industry profits and per firm profits increase following a decrease in industry concentra-
tion, the merged firms reduce output comparative to pre-merger joint output. Reduced
industry output leads to an increase in price and the outsiders increase output accord-
ingly. Industry output and profits are equivalent for each post-merger firm. This amount
is less than the combined pre-merger profit for the insider firms. For insider firms there
is no incentive for the merger to take place unless it results in monopoly. But a merger
is beneficial for outsider firms within the industry because they will have increased post-
merger profits.
There are several strong assumptions that generate this conclusion. Firstly, insider
firms display a reduction in joint post-merger output and the assumption of constant
marginal costs allows rival outsider firms to increase output to the same level as the
merged firm as a response to a reduction in industry output. This result seems coun-
terintuitive. Managers seek growth as a means of growing their empire, increasing re-
muneration and perks, etc. Economies of scale act as a motive for growth. Secondly,
non-symmetric firms differences in size, state of technology can influence post-merger
outcomes. These assumptions are relaxed in subsequent papers.
Perry and Porter (1985) argue that the combined productive capacity of the merged
firm is greater than its component parts. They look at the incentive for two small firms
to merge into one large firm. The model assumes that each firm is endowed with a share
of industry capital stock and industry capital stock is fixed. This assumption rules out
greenfield entry into the industry or investment on internal growth by existing firms.
Merger is the only method of increasing capital stock. The industry is assumed to consist
of n large oligopolists each with share of capital s and m small oligopolists each with
a share of capital s/2. Total capital in the industry is assumed to sum to 1, therefore
sn+ (s/2)m = 1.
Each firm faces a cost function which depends on the share of capital owned by
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the firm and the amount of output produced. C is linearly homogeneous in output
and capital, which rules out scale economies as a motive for merger. A proportionate
increase in output and capital will lead to a proportionate increase in costs. This places
focus on the incentives to merge relating to firm size and market conditions rather than
efficiency improvements gained through economies of scale. Capital is assumed to be fixed
therefore each firm faces an upwards sloping marginal cost curve with respect to output.
The assumption of increasing marginal costs makes output expansion less attractive to
outsiders.
Demand and marginal costs are assumed to be linear functions of output. The cost
function for a firm with capital stock S is defined as follows, where g represents industry
fixed costs.
C(x, S) = Sg + dx+ (e/2S)x2 (3.13)
Differentiating costs with respect to output generates the marginal cost function, where
d is the intercept.
C ′(x, S) = d+ (e/S)x (3.14)
A change in S causes the marginal cost function to pivot about the intercept. Small firms
with s/2 capital join together to create a merged firm with s capital, therefore the merged
firm faces the same cost function as the large firms. The industry demand function is
given as follows, where Z represents industry output.
P (Z) = a− bZ (3.15)
e and b determine the slope of the marginal cost curve and demand function respectively.
V is total output supplied by the small firms and X is total output supplied by the
large firms. Firm output depends on capital stock and a vector of variable inputs. Both
types of firm have the same conjectural variation δ. The industry equilibrium is defined
for small and large firms respectively as follows.
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P (X + V ) + (1 + δ)(V/m)P ′(X + V ) = C ′((V/m), (s/2)) (3.16)
P (X + V ) + (1 + δ)(X/n)P ′(X + V ) = C ′((X/n), s) (3.17)
Using equations (3.14) and (3.15), the system can be solved to provide the output for
the two types of firms as a function of n.
X(n) =
(a− d)[b(1− δ) + 2e/s]n
∆(n)
(3.18)
V (n) =
2(a− d)[b(1− δ) + 2e/s][1/s− n]
∆(n)
(3.19)
Where ∆(n) = [b(1 + δ) + e/s][b(1 + δ) + 2(e+ b)/s]− b2(1 + δ)n. The industry output
is obtained by summing X(n) and V (n) to give
Z(n) =
(a− d)[b(1− δ)(2/s− n) + 2e/s2
∆(n)
(3.20)
Total output is a decreasing function of the number of large firms n, therefore output
decreases as more small firms merge together to become large firms. This reduction in
output is accompanied by a price rise. The output of the merged large firm is less than the
combined output of the component small firms, therefore the incentive to merge requires
that the increase in price is large enough to offset the decrease in output for the merged
firm. This can be seen by comparing the pre-merger profits of a large firm, piL(n + 1),
with the post-merger combined profits of two small firms, 2piS(n).
piL(n+ 1) = P (Z(n+ 1))
[
X(n+ 1)
n+ 1)
]
− C
[
X(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)
, s
]
(3.21)
piS(n) = P (Z(n))
[
sV (n)
2(1− sn)
]
− C
[
sV (n)
2(1− sn) ,
s
2
]
(3.22)
99
Substituting in the equilibrium conditions and equilibrium output shows that
piL(n+ 1) ≥ 2piS(n) as ∆(n) ≥ ∆¯ (3.23)
piL(n+ 1) ≤ 2piS(n) as ∆(n) ≤ ∆¯ (3.24)
Where
∆¯ =
(2b2q)
2q − (q + e/s)(b(1 + δ) + q) 12 q− 12 (3.25)
and q = b(1 + δ) + e/s. Various scenarios arise from this result, where ∆(n) is a
decreasing function of n. There is always an incentive to merge if maxn ∆(n) = ∆(0) < ∆¯.
There is never an incentive to merge if minn ∆(n) = ∆((1/s)− 1) > ∆¯. The incentive to
merge requires that e > 0 in an industry with differing firm sizes, where e and s define the
slope of the marginal cost function. The Salant et al. (1983) model equates to a special
case of this model where e = 0 and firms are equal in size. Furthermore, the incentive to
merge depends on the relationship between e and b, where b is the slope of the demand
function. There is always an incentive to merge when e > 3b and sometimes an incentive
to merge when e < 3b if n is small and s is sufficiently large.
Perry and Porter (1985) also provide a model depicting an industry that consists of n
oligopolists and a competitive fringe of m small firms. The dominant oligopolists behave
as a Stackelberg group with respect to the competitive fringe. The incentive to merge
for the competitive fringe firms additionally depends upon the conjectural variation δ,
where expectations of competitive responses act as a greater incentive for merger. These
models overcome the merger paradox to suggest that the incentive to merge depends upon
industry concentration and the relationship between supply and demand. They provide
evidence that economies of scale are not a necessary condition for incentive for merger to
exist.
Huck et al. (2001) depict a Stackelberg model that assumes the oligopolistic market
consists of leaders and followers. Linear costs and homogeneous products are assumed.
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They show that bilateral mergers between leaders and followers are always profitable, but
mergers between two followers or two leaders rarely have incentive to merge. The merged
firm produces the same output as the pre-merger leader and the follower essentially
disappears. This results in a price increase that more than offsets the reduction in joint
output. Both merging parties are better off but a reduction in total welfare is incurred.
This outcome only holds if the leader is relatively larger and strategically stronger than
the follower. This implies that the profitability of a merger depends on market structure,
therefore the motivations to engage in merger will depend on a firm’s relative position in
the market.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) investigate horizontal mergers from an efficiency perspec-
tive. The models by Salant et al. (1983) and Perry and Porter (1985) imply that merger
is always associated with a reduction in output and increase in price. This reduces con-
sumer surplus and therefore has welfare implications. Governments may intervene to
prevent mergers that have a strong negative impact on consumer welfare, therefore some
mergers may be prevented despite the existence of merger incentives for firms. Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) suggest that opportunities for learning and economies of scale act as
incentives for merger which enhance profit and may increase output and reduce price.
Merged firms will not necessarily reduce their joint capacity.
Economies of scale lead to reduced average costs as production increases. Fixed costs
are shared over more units and variable costs may be reduced due to improved efficiency
of production. Sources of economies of scale include bulk buying inputs at lower cost, use
of more efficient large scale machinery, increased specialisation through division of labour,
lower cost finance and spreading R&D or marketing costs over greater output. Mergers
are attractive when synergies can be created by combining complementary knowledge
or capital. Learning can occur if one merging partner has superior expertise which can
be applied to the other merging partner. Incentives to merge are greater when synergies
exist because lower costs increase profitability and can potentially induce a positive effect
on consumer welfare.
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The Cournot and Stackelberg models assume that firms set output quantities, whereas
the Bertrand model assumes firms set prices. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) suggests
that the Bertrand model proves that mergers of any size can be beneficial as reaction
functions in a price setting game are typically upward sloping. They suggest that the
finding that mergers are undesirable arises from the focus on quantity as the strategic
variable. Price setting ability implies non-homogeneous products, but this seems to be a
realistic assumption.
Internal corporate structure is more complex than the Cournot, Bertrand and Stack-
elberg models acknowledge. Gordon (1961) notes that the rise in large corporations has
lead to alternative aims other than profit maximisation. Berle and Means (1932) observe
the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. They suggested that a con-
flict in interests may arise between the owners (principals) and the managers (agents).
Although owners may desire profit maximisation, managers may have their own objec-
tives. Baumol (1959) argues that managers aim to maximise sales, Marris (1964) believes
that empire growth is the main objective, whereas Williamson (1963) suggests that pecu-
niary and non-pecuniary remuneration act as important motivations. These motivations
are interrelated because the underlying incentives for managers to expand firm size and
enhance sales growth are the rewards they receive in terms of prestige, perquisites and
increased compensation.
These growth incentives are constrained by the desire to maintain job security in their
managerial role. Baumol (1959) and Williamson (1963) suggest this constraint can be
captured by minimum profit level. Profits must remain above this minimum level in order
to keep shareholders content with dividend payments and ensure financial security of the
firm. Marris (1964) prefers minimum firm valuation on the stock market as a constraint.
The valuation reflects favourability with shareholders and vulnerability to takeover bids.
Loss of shareholder favourability increases the risk of becoming a takeover target, which
will lead to the displacement of management. Managers aim to maximise their objective
function subject to this constraint, which reduces their ability to increase sales, stimulate
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growth or use retained profits to fund pecuniary and non-pecuniary remuneration. Jensen
(1986) argues that high levels of leverage align the managerial and shareholder utility
functions more closely, because failure is more harshly punished by threat of bankruptcy
and managerial replacement becomes easier when debt levels are high. Managers may
choose to invest free-cash-flow in expansion through merger in order to smooth dividend
payments and prevent idle cash. This incentive occurs because fluctuating dividend
payments imply fluctuating performance and shareholders find this unsettling.
The ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of capital is known as the Q
value. The Q theory of investment suggests that a firm’s investment rate should increase
with its Q value. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that investment can be internal or
external, therefore a positive relationship should exist between a firm’s Q and engagement
in M&A activity. Their model treats M&A as used-capital market transactions. Firms
are endowed with technology z and initial capital K. Output is a function of z and K.
output = zK (3.26)
z is firm specific and follows the Markov process.34 It captures all aspects of firm ca-
pabilities that influence efficiency, including managerial competence, use of technological
know-how and innovations obtained through R&D. New capital can be purchased at a
price of 1 per unit and disassembled at the cost of 1− s, where s < 1 is the salvage value.
Firm capital can also be placed on the M&A market at a price of q per unit, where q = s
therefore q < 1.
X is the firm’s investment in internal capital, Y is investment in acquisitions and δ is
depreciation. Capital stock at t+ 1 it therefore given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)K +X + Y (3.27)
The firm faces the cost function C(x, y)K, where x = X/K and y = Y/K are the ratios
34Pr[zt+1 ≤ z′|zt = z] = F (z′, z)
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of investment to current capital. Synergies can be obtained if merging firms have differing
levels of z. The model assumes that the higher level of z can be applied to all capital,
therefore the merged firm can produce more efficiently than the sum of the pre-merged
component firms. One unit of K can generate profit of z−C(x, y)−x− qy and a market
value of Q(z)
Q(z) = max
x≥0,y≥0
[z − C(x, y)− x− qy + (1− δ + x+ y)Q∗(z)] (3.28)
Q∗(z) is the discounted present value of expected capital in t+ 1 given the current level
of z. The firm can sell its capital at t+ 1 at q per unit.
Q∗(z) =
1
1 + r
∫
max[q,Q(z′)]dF (z′, z) (3.29)
The first order conditions for maximisation of equation (3.28) with respect to x and
y are obtained to give equations (3.30) and(3.31), where z is correlated over time and Q∗
is increasing in z.
cx(x, y) = Q
∗(z)− 1 (3.30)
cy(x, y) = Q
∗(z)− q (3.31)
A fixed cost of obtaining capital through acquisition φ is assumed.
C(x, y) =
 c(x, y) + φ if y > 0c(x, 0) if y = 0
Returns to scale remain constant as cost is defined per unit of capital. The gross invest-
ment in efficiency units can be defined as i = x + y. A firm making little investment
will avoid the fixed cost φ by investing in new capital x, whereas a high investment firm
will invest new capital and acquire capital from existing firms. The point of indifference
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between acquiring and not acquiring is defined as follows.
i+ c(i, 0) = φ+ min
y
[(i− y) + qy + c(i− y, y)] (3.32)
The value of i where this equation holds is i∗. Firms will aquire if i is higher than i∗
and will not aquire if i is lower than i∗. The investment ratio i depends on the level of
technology z, therefore a value z∗ exists that generates i∗.
Firms also face the option of staying in business or not staying in business. A firm can
exit the market by disassembling capital or being acquired. If the salvage or acquisition
value s = q is greater than the market value Q(z), firms will exit the market. The point
of indifference is obtained where ze is the level of technology required for equation (3.33)
to hold.
Q(ze) = q (3.33)
Firms with z < ze will be acquired or disassembled. A firm will invest in internal
growth if z∗ ≥ z ≥ ze and will invest internally and externally when z > z∗. This model
essentially argues that market value depends on the level of technology that the firm
possesses. The most efficient firms will in engage takeover activity and the least efficient
firms will become targets or exit the market. This implies that productivity of the target
firms should increase following a joining event. The advantage of this model is that it
takes into account the costs of acquisition and the benefits derived from firm synergies,
although it overlooks the competition element of merger activity. It provides a different
perspective on the incentives to merge relating to technology and the market value for
firms.
Guadalupe et al. (2012) argues that interrelationships exist between innovation and
foreign acquisition. They suggest that two scenarios exist; takeover targets either have low
productivity and acquirers transfer their technology to the targets or high productivity
and acquirers absorb technology from the targets. Firms may increase output following a
foreign takeover because their links with other countries are enhanced, thus increasing the
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size of the market available to them. Their model depicts a monopolistically competitive
industry containing heterogeneous domestic firms, with constant elasticity of substitution
and increasing returns to scale. Firm i has initial productivity ϕi, investment in produc-
tivity increasing innovation γi and marginal cost
1
γiϕi
. Each firm produces one variety of
the product and sets price at a constant markup over marginal cost. Firm i sets price at
1
ργiϕi
where ρ is a parameter in the constant elasticity of substitution utility function and
σ = 1
1−ρ > 1 determines the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties of
the product and is constant across markets. Ai indicates the size of the markets available
to firm i and profits are defined as follows, where χ =
(
1−ρ
ρ
)
ρσ and λi = γ
σ−1
i .
pii = Aiχλiϕ
σ−1
i (3.34)
Vi, the value of firm i is given by profit pii minus the cost of innovation Ci(λ).
Vi(λi) = Aiχλiϕ
σ−1
i − Ci(λi) (3.35)
The cost of innovation is composed of a fixed and a variable component and defined as
follows.
Ci(λi) = αi + bif(λi) (3.36)
State of the art technology Φmax acts as an upper bound to the level of technology
achievable through innovation. Firm i aims to maximise its value by choosing the level of
innovation λ∗i . If the optimal innovation occurs at an interior solution, the firm innovates
up until marginal benefit equals marginal cost.
Aiχλiϕ
σ−1
i = bif
′(λ∗) (3.37)
Case 1 describes a situation where firms with a higher level of initial productivity ϕi,
access to a larger market Ai or facing lower innovation costs bi have a greater incentive
to invest more in innovation, λ∗i = λ
∗(ϕi, Ai, bi). In case 2 acquisition creates an alter-
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native method of increasing initial productivity. If firm i becomes an acquisition target,
technology can be transfered from the parent firm at a fixed cost, where bi = 0. Under
these conditions it can be optimal for firm i to innovate to Φmax.
Foreign acquisition is incorporated into the model in two ways. Firstly, foreign owner-
ship provides access to larger markets. AF = AD +A
∗, where AD indicates the size of the
domestic market, A∗ indicates the additional markets accessed through foreign owner-
ship and AF indicates the size of the market available to a foreign-owned firm. Secondly,
foreign ownership may result in lower costs of innovation, where bF ≤ bD and αF ≤ αD.
The optimum innovation levels are denoted as λ∗Fi for foreign owned firms and λ
∗D
i for
domestic owned firms. The incremental value of foreign acquisition of the firm is given
as follows.
V ∗Fi − V ∗Di = (AFλ∗Fi − ADλ∗Di )χϕθ−1i − (αF − αD)− (bFf(λ∗Fi )− bDf(λ∗Di ) (3.38)
This expression is non-negative assuming that AF ≥ AD, bF ≤ bD and αF ≤ αD. When
a foreign parent acquires firm i, a share (1 − α) of the created value goes to the the
domestic owner and the remaining share α goes to the foreign owner. The price that the
foreign acquirer pays for firm i is given by Ri.
Ri = V
∗D
i + (1− α)(V ∗Fi − V ∗Di ) (3.39)
Furthermore, a fixed cost of making an acquisition K is incurred by the acquirer, arising
from acquisition search and transaction costs. A foreign firm has the incentive to make
an acquisition when
V ∗Fi − (V ∗Di + (1− α)(V ∗Fi − V ∗Di )−K ≥ 0 (3.40)
α(V ∗Fi − V ∗Di ) ≥ K (3.41)
The first derivative of equation (3.38) with respect to ϕθ−1i is obtained to understand
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the relationship between acquisition incentives and firm initial productivity.
d(V ∗Fi − V ∗Di )
dϕσ−1i
= χ(AFλ
∗F
i − ADλ∗Di ) > 0 (3.42)
The relationship depends on the process by which λ∗Fi is defined. In case 1 λ
∗F
i depends
on initial productivity, size of the market and cost of innovation. This implies that the
incentive for foreign firms to acquire increases with the initial productivity of the target
domestic firm. A high level of initial productivity is more valuable under foreign control
because foreign firms benefit from lower costs of innovation and access to larger markets.
In case 2 the technology of the foreign parent Φmax can be transfered to the domestic
target. The value of the firm under foreign ownership becomes V ∗Fi = AFχΦ
1−σ
max − αF
regardless of the initial productivity of the domestic target. This means that the lower
the initial productivity of the target the greater the value created by foreign acquisition.
In this scenario, foreign acquirers have an incentive to target low productivity firms.
The model shows that foreign acquirers will either target low productivity firms or
high productivity firms. This depends upon the ability of the foreign firm to transfer tech-
nological knowledge to the targets. Productivity following foreign takeover is expected
to increase in both cases, but by a greater extent if the target has low initial produc-
tivity. Investment in innovation may increase in case 1 following foreign acquisition due
to increased market size, whereas technology transfer provides little scope for internal
innovation therefore investment may decrease.
This section has identified various incentives for firms to join together. These can
be broadly defined as strategic incentives, synergistic incentives and managerial incen-
tives. Strategic incentives arise from industry conditions and depend upon the number
of firms in the industry, the size of these firms, size of the market, conjectures about
rival behaviour and elasticity of demand and supply. Synergistic incentives arise if the
joining event is expected to create scale economies. This may occur through knowledge
transfer, from a high technology firm to a firm with lower technological capacity, or by
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combining complementary capital. Fixed costs of R&D and marketing can be reduced to
avoid replication. This implies that less productive firms and highly productive firms are
likely to be chosen as joining partners. Managerial incentives arise when a misalignment
of managerial and owner utility functions occurs. Managers may aim for empire growth
to maximise prestige and remuneration.
Post-event behaviour will depend on the initial motivation for joining together. Merg-
ers motivated by synergies are likely to see a rise in productivity relative to their pre-
merger components. Strategy and managerial incentives may be less likely to increase
productivity and the outcome will depend on the extent that synergies exist between the
component firms. R&D expenditure is likely to be reduced when firms join together to
avoid replication, but managers may choose to increase R&D investment in high tech-
nology firms. Foreign takeover provides improved access to international markets, lower
innovation costs and potential for technology transfer. Productivity is expected to in-
crease following foreign acquisition.
3.3.2 Economic Motivations for Separating Events
Separation events can be motivated by various different factors. They can be a strategic
response to market conditions, an entry deterring strategy by an incumbent firm, a re-
sponse to diseconomies of scale occurring through excessive growth and over-diversification
or a shift of emphasis towards other areas as a response to changing demand conditions.
This section discusses each of these incentives.
Baye et al. (1996) investigate the incentives for oligopolists to divide production of
homogenous products among autonomous competing units. Their model focuses on the
strategic motives for divisionalisation and therefore assumes that no cost advantages of
separation exist. The notion of divisionalisation can be expanded to include franchising
and divestment. Each firm is faced with identical marginal costs of production m re-
gardless of the number of units and each unit has identical technology. The formation of
competing units is costly, where the cost of adding another division is constant and equal
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for all firms. The model takes the form of a two stage game where each firm decides upon
the number of divisions in the first stage and each division is an independent competing
unit in the second stage. The inverse demand function for the industry is given as follows,
where Q is industry output.
P = α−Q (3.43)
In stage one, firm i choses the number of divisions δi and output of the jth division of
firm i is qij. The profit of the jth division of firm i is given by
piij(q, δ) = (θ −
n∑
k=1
δi∑
w=1
qkw)qij (3.44)
where θ = α −m > 0 and ∑ni=1 δi denotes the number of competing divisions in stage
two of the Cournot game. The profit of firm i is the sum of its divisions minus the cost
of divisionalisation.
pii(q, δ) =
δi∑
j=1
piij(q, δ)− cδi (3.45)
The model is solved by backward induction. In stage two of the game each division j
chooses its profit maximising output and assumes that firms face increasing fixed costs
as the number of divisions increases, but no reduction in variable costs. Equation (3.44)
is differentiated to obtain the first order condition for profit maximisation.
∂piij
∂qij
= θ −Q− qij = 0 (3.46)
A symmetric Nash equilibrium output solution for each division can be obtained as fol-
lows.
qij(δ) =
θ
1 +
∑n
k=1 δk
(3.47)
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This output is identical across the divisions of all firms, therefore industry output can be
obtained by summing across the divisions.
Q(δ) =
θ
∑n
k=1 δk
1 +
∑n
k=1 δk
(3.48)
Industry output and the output of each division depends upon the number of competing
divisions and the size of the industry θ. As the number of divisions increases, industry
output increases and price tends towards marginal cost. The profit of the parent firm
can be derived by substituting equations (3.48) and (3.47) into (3.44).
pii(δ) =
δi∑
j=1
pi(q, δ) = δi
[
θ
1 +
∑n
k=1 δk
]2
− δic (3.49)
Firm i chooses a number of divisions δi to maximise profits. Profit in each division j
decreases as the number of divisions increases, but revenue of firm i increases with the
number of divisions in firm i assuming that other firms hold their number of divisions
constant. The rise in costs associated with an increased number of divisions acts as a
disincentive for divisionalisation, but each firm has an incentive to divisionalise if the
costs are sufficiently low. If other firms also divisionalise, industry output will further
increase and profits are reduced. Less divisions are created when θ is low, which occurs
when demand is low relative to marginal cost.
To expand this model to the divestiture case, a three stage game is considered. In
stage one firm i chooses the number of divisions to be sold, in stage two these divisions
are auctioned off and quantities are set in stage three. If the supply of purchasers is
perfectly elastic, the sale price of the division equates to the Cournot profit. The results
of the divestment game are equivalent to the divisionalisation game when the game is
not repeated. The strategic incentive to divest in this model depends on the number of
divisions in the industry, supply and demand conditions and the conjectured behaviour of
rival firms. These findings parallel the results from the merger model depicted by Perry
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and Porter (1985).
Entry deterrence provides a further competitive strategy motivation for divestment.
Schwartz and Thompson (1986) present a model where incumbent firms can create a
division at lower cost than potential greenfield entrants to deter entry into the industry.
Firms face the cost function,
C(Qi, Ki) = F + wQ
2
i /Ki + rKi (3.50)
where F is the fixed entry cost, Ki is capital stock, Xi is output and input prices are
given by w and r, where c = 2
√
wr. The fixed entry cost is only incurred once per firm
and there is no cost of creating a division for an incumbent firm. Marginal cost is given
by the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to output.
c = 2w
Qi
Ki
(3.51)
Demand is given by the following linear demand function.
P (Q) = α−
∑
j
Qj (3.52)
An entry threat will exist if the difference between demand and long-run average costs is
sufficiently large, where α− c > 4√F is assumed to be a necessary condition for an entry
threat. The industry is assumed to involve 2 firms. Firm 1 is an incumbent monopolist
and firm 2 is the potential entrant. Firm 1 could set output at the ‘limit price’ output Q¯ to
deter entry by firm 2. This would reduce the potential profits of firm 2 to zero, where the
residual demand price is P (Q¯+Q2) and optimal output becomes Q
∗
2(Q¯) = (α− c− Q¯)/2.
Firm 2 has zero profits when F = (P (Q¯+Q∗2(Q¯))− c)Q∗2(Q¯).
But the limit price output does not equate to the profit maximising monopoly output
for firm 1. The profit maximising output with a single division of firm 1 occurs below
Qˆ = α/2, where Qˆ denotes the output where marginal cost and marginal revenue equal
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zero. If firm 1 choses to produce monopoly output, firm 2 has an incentive to enter
the market since the residual demand is greater than under the limit price conditions
P (Qˆ + Q2) > (Q¯ + Q2) and firm 2 will have above zero profit. Under these conditions
the market equilbrium involves m > 1 firms with capital and output choices defined by
vectors K∗ and Q∗.
K∗ = [K∗1 , K
∗
2 , ...K
∗
m] (3.53)
Q∗ = [Q∗1(K
∗), Q∗2(K
∗), ...Q∗m(K
∗)] (3.54)
The optimal strategy with no entry threat for firm 1 is to produce the profit max-
imising output. When faced with the threat of entry, divisionalisation becomes the best
strategy. Firm 1 will set up m independent divisions to comply with vectors K∗ and Q∗.
In this scenario, firms 2,...m cannot profitably enter the industry. Firm 1 derives the
sum of profits obtained by its divisions, therefore it is better off than if it had allowed
entry. The profits from outputs Q∗2(K
∗) to Q∗m(K
∗) are attributed to the divisions of
firm 1, rather than rival firms. This result also holds when a greater number of initial
incumbents exist.
This incentive for divisionalisation depends on the ability of firm 1 to derive profits
from its divisions. If divisional profits can be fully claimed by firm 1, the incentive to
divisionalise exists. This practice may be seen as anti-competitive by the competition
authorities and may be prevented through legislation. In the case of divestment, a firm
sells ownership of the division to a new entrant. Divestment is preferable to allowing
greenfield entry because firm 1 can derive benefit from the sale of the division. When
divisions are purchased by firm 2...m the fixed cost of entry is paid to firm 1. Furthermore,
firm 1 may maintain a proportion of shares in the sold division and therefore derive some
of the profit.
In the resource-based view of strategic management Penrose (1955) argues that each
firm is composed of a bundle of physical and human resources. Growth is limited by
organisational factors within the firm and market factors outside of the firm. Increases
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in size lead to additional complexity of firm structure and scope of activity. Managerial
capabilities are a limiting factor to growth. Research required to plan growth strategy
diverts managerial resources away from organising existing business activity and the man-
agement team has a limited capacity to over see a large scale company as the efficiency of
decision making is subject to diminishing returns. Large firms may choose to decentralise
decisions, but this can create efficiency costs. Markides (1995) discusses the various ar-
guments across the literature that support the notion of an optimum diversification level.
Growth is limited by agency problems, such as lack of employee effort through shirk-
ing, misalignment of utility functions and distortion of objectives between employees and
management. X-inefficiencies may occur as additional layers of hierarchy create further
costs and processing limitations by central management also act as a constraint.
Over-diversification may occur for several reasons. Growth requires favourable de-
mand conditions, therefore in situations of deficient demand it may be necessary to branch
out into new markets (Penrose, 1955). Flexibility of resources is advantageous. Firms
may decide to switch resources to another market, hence divestment may be necessary to
pursue growth strategies. This interrelationship between different demographic events is
considered in my study.
Jensen (1986) outlines a “free cash-flow theory” which provides a rationale for ob-
served over-diversification. Free cash flow is defined as the remaining cash flow after all
positive net present value projects have been funded. Managers may chose to smooth div-
idends over time by reinvesting profits rather than paying out dividends or pursue goals
such as growth rather than shareholder value maximisation. In this situation, sharehold-
ers and managerial utility functions are not aligned. This may be a particular problem
when free cash-flow is available. External finance is monitored by lenders, therefore riskier
projects are less likely to be financed externally. In the past, the stock market has reacted
positively to the announcement of diversifying acquisitions. This created an incentive for
managers to invest in acquisition even if this was not the best action for them. Diver-
gences in manager and shareholder expectations may also result in over-diversification
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if the manager over-estimates their own ability to transfer skills and assets to another
industry or area, therefore enters a new market over-optimistically. Changes in mar-
ket circumstances can change a once optimally diversified firm into an over diversified
firm. This may occur due to reduced benefits of diversification eroded away through mar-
ket deregulation and increased competition and increased costs of diversification rising
through economic uncertainty, currency fluctuations, etc.
Kaul (2012) suggests that divestment can be seen as a firm strategy with reactive
or proactive motives. The reactive perspective views divestment as a response to poor
performance, over diversification or high levels of bureaucracy in order to improve the
performance of the firm. This form of divestment is motivated by internal characteristics
of the firm and its performance. As firms grow in size and become more diversified, the
costs of associated with monitoring and information processing increase. This can create
greater managerial burden and have a negative impact of firm performance if growth is
excessive. Divestment is a method of reducing agency problems, increasing the concentra-
tion of corporate scope and discarding failed acquisitions to improve firm performance.
This suggests that a firm is likely to have poor performance prior to divestment and
may lack focus on innovation. Furthermore, this also implies that divesting firms may
be more likely to be geographically or product market diversified prior to divestment.
Following divestment, innovation may improve due to increased managerial focus and
reduced bureaucracy costs which will free up resources to invest in R&D. The extent of
the impact of divestment on innovation may depend on whether divestments are involved
in core activities. Innovation may increase if non-core activities are divested as focus will
increase on core activities, whereas an increase in innovation is less likely if core activities
are divested.
In contrast, the proactive view suggests that divestments may be motivated by a
desire to free up resources in order to pursue alternative opportunities or develop new
capabilities as a response to changing market conditions or the emergence of new markets.
This form of divestment is motivated by conditions external to the firm, rather than a
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response to under performance. Therefore this view implies that divestment is likely
to have a positive effect on innovation and would also expect stronger pre-divestment
performance than the reactive motivation. Although the initial motivations differ in
contrasting view points, both scenarios benefit from freeing up resources and creating
organisational slack to enable managerial focus to concentrate on innovation. Divestment
may result in temporary disruptions to organisation, therefore short-run reductions in
innovation may be incurred. The proactive motivation may be associated with acquisition
prior to or following divestment as a wider restructuring strategy in response to changing
external conditions. Innovation may increase following divestment of core or non-core
activities with this motivation.
In summary, the theoretical literature suggests that events are driven by various
factors. Managers may aim to maximise the value of the firm by seeking growth or
R&D policies to improve productivity in existing processes or for product development.
The appropriate strategy depends on market conditions, such as demand, concentration
and the firm’s position relative to competitiors and also financial conditions, including
leverage, liquidity and market valuation. Competition laws prevent firms dominating
markets. Firm growth may be limited by these conditions and by co-ordination costs and
inefficiencies associated with large scale organisations.
The relevance of the strategic motivations depends upon the extent that the parent
firm can derive profits from the divested unit. In my data the change of ownership occurs
when the majority owner changes, therefore the parent firm could potentially maintain a
proportion of shares in the divested firm or generate profit from the sale of shares.
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3.4 Empirical Studies
3.4.1 Motivations for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)
Empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions began to emerge during the 1960s and
1970s due to improvements in available data. The early literature used linear probablilty
models (Kuehn, 1969) or discriminant analysis techniques (Singh (1975), Stevens (1973))
to assess characteristics of acquired and acquiring firms. An overview of these early
studies is provided by Harris et al. (1982). Findings suggest that financial characteristics
play an important role in merger motivation, but these motivations may change over
time. These estimation techniques were superseded by probit and logit models used by
Harris et al. (1982), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986) amongst others.35
Hannan and Rhoades (1987) develop the methodology used in the literature further
by applying a multinomial logit model. They focus on the likelihood of bank acquisition
by studying the relationship between bank and market characteristics and the incidence
of acquisition. The aim is to provide a greater understanding of the motivations behind
mergers and acquisitions specific to the banking industry. These motivations are unlikely
to be identified in studies that use data covering all industries because motivations may
differ. The banking industry has distinct differences from manufacturing, therefore it is
logical to assess this industry separately and seems reasonable to assume that managers
in the banking industry may be driven by similar motives.
The data used in this study covers banks in the US state of Texas during the period
1971 to 1982. Texas is a merger active state and is representative of other US states with
similar competition laws. Limiting to one US state prevents the need to control for the
legislation differences across the country. The data allows for a distinction to be made
between geographically horizontal acquisitions and market extension acquisitions. They
define horizontal acquisitions as those acquisitions where the acquirer comes from within
the same geographical market and market extension acquisitions where the acquirer comes
35Although a number of papers in the management literature continued to use discriminant analysis
methods.
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from outside the geographical market. The sample consists of previously existing, sep-
arately owned banks, therefore excluding newly established firms, non-operating banks,
firms that were not bank holding companies or commercial banks, foreign firms without
previous US operations or acquisitions that account for less than 25% of a company.
The estimated model takes the form of a multinomial logit to account for the fact
that the coefficients on the explanatory variables are likely to differ in strength and
magnitude depending on the type of acquisition. Their multinomial logit allows for three
outcome categories. These mutually exclusive categories are no acquisition, within market
(horizontal) acquisition and outside market (market extension) acquisition. My study can
be considered as an extension of this, where the multinomial logit allows for nine outcome
categories. Their model is defined as follows.
PA int /P
no A
t = exp(X
′
tβ
A in) (3.55)
PA outt /P
no A
t = exp(X
′
tβ
A out) (3.56)
X ′t = f(RORt,MSt, CAt, LAt, BGt,MGt, CR3, Assetst, RUt, T ) (3.57)
PA in(t) and P
A out
(t) denote the probabilities of being acquired in year t by a within
market bank and a outside market bank respectively, given that they were not acquired
during the previous year. P no A(t) is the probability of not being acquired during year t. The
explanatory variables are given by the vector Xt and corresponding beta coefficients by
βA in and βA out. The coefficients are likely to vary depending on whether the acquirer is
from inside or outside the market. RORt represents the rate of return, MSt is the market
share of the bank within its geographical market, CAt is the capital asset ratio, LAt is
the loan to asset ratio of the bank, BGt is bank growth calculated based on deposits,
MGt is market growth, CR3 is the concentration ratio based on deposits of the top 3
banks within the geographical market, Assetst denotes the size of the bank in terms of
assets, RUt is a dummy that differentiates between urban and rural markets and T is a
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set of time dummies.
To test the hypothesis that poorly managed banks are more likely targets they assume
that bad management is linked to poor performance. Using the rate of return as a
performance measure, they estimate the model 4 times using different measures for the
rate of return. These measures include the rate of return on net income on assets, rate
of return on net income on equity, the ratio of the rate of return on net income on assets
to the market average and the ratio of rate of return on net income on equity to the
market average. These ratios aim to offset any fluctuations in market conditions that
may impact the size of the variable. A negative coefficient on the RORt variables would
be consistent with the hypothesis, yet the results show no support for the notion that
poorly managed firms are more likely to become acquisition targets. The coefficients are
not significant in any of the 4 specifications.
A large market share is assumed to indicate good quality to the consumer, which is a
favourable characteristic for a potential target, yet competition laws act as a constraint on
the extent of market share allowed in each state-defined geographical area. Therefore, it is
likely that the coefficients will differ in strength and direction for within state and outside
state acquisition. The results show that market share is an important characteristic for
outside market acquisitions, with positive significant coefficients in all specifications. This
indicates that outside market acquirers may be drawn towards firms with a large market
share to benefit from their existing customer reputation. The market share coefficients
for the within market acquisitions are not significant. This difference highlights the
importance of competition laws in influencing acquisition behaviour.
The capital asset ratio has a negative significant coefficient in all specifications, sug-
gesting that a low capital asset ratio indicates a more attractive target. The coefficient
on the loan to asset ratio is not significant. This suggests the extent of risk taking be-
haviour by the bank does not generally act as a deterrent or to encourage acquisition.
The coefficient representing bank size in terms of assets Assetst is also not significant.
The bank growth and market growth variables are used to test if previous expansion
119
opportunities impact the acquisition decision. BGt and MGt are calculated based on
deposit growth over the 3 year period t−4 to t−1. High bank or market growth suggests
there had been potential for expansion within the local market previously and that could
indicate a good target to acquirers if this potential remained. The coefficients on these
variables are not significant, implying that this is not a motivating factor for acquirers.
Acquirers may use other sources of information to predict potential for market expansion.
The concentration ratio CR3 is based on deposits of the largest 3 banks within the
geographical market. This variable’s coefficient differs according to inside or outside ac-
quisition. The coefficients for inside market acquisition are negative and significant, which
implies that high concentration ratios are associated with a lower likelihood of acquisition
due to competition laws. Whereas the coefficients on outside market acquisition are not
significant, which ties in with the idea that competition laws are no longer a barrier for
acquirers from outside the market.
The dummy that differentiates between banks operating in rural and urban markets
is significant for outside market acquisitions, but not within market acquisitions. This
implies that firms within urban markets may have a desire to expand to more rural
settings to have access to a broader customer base.
This study focuses on the banking industry which has clear differences from the man-
ufacturing industry, therefore a large emphasis has been placed on assessing the impor-
tance of financial characteristics. A study on manufacturing would benefit from including
a broader range of firm characteristics. The distinction between within local and outside
local markets is an interesting feature of the study. This allows differences between the
two types of acquirers to be taken into account. A limitation to this study is that it only
focuses on the characteristics of banks that become targets and pays little attention to the
characteristics of the acquirers. Furthermore, endogeneity arising from sample selection
bias may be a problem. The sample is relatively small therefore results may be sample
specific.
Hay and Liu (1998) aim to investigate behavioural differences between dominant firms
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within industries and how behaviour differs depending on market structure. They use
data consisting of 110 stock market quoted manufacturing firms across 18 3-4 digit in-
dustries. The sample includes firms that make at least 1 acquisition during the period
1971-89. The data contains information on whether a firm has made an acquisition and
the extent of the acquired assets within a given year. The study focuses on the motives
and behaviour of acquiring firms rather than the characteristics of acquired firms.
They highlight various motives behind acquisition related to gaining market share,
utilising free cash-flow and a favourable valuation ratio of the target. Firms may aim
to increase market share through acquistion in order to increase capacity and customers
base simultaneously. This is more likely to be a motive when the industry is growing
because there is less incentive to acquire if the industry is declining. When the industry
is growing, battles for potential targets may take place. Firms may undertake acquisition
with the strategic motive of increasing competitive advantage in oligopolistic markets.
Jensen’s ‘free cash-flow’ theory suggests that managers may prefer to utilise spare cash to
invest in growth through acquisition, rather than pay dividends to shareholders or invest
in new fixed assets. A further motive for acquisition appears if assets can be obtained
cheaply through acquisition i.e. when the valuation ratio of the target is less than 1.
Hay and Liu (1998) use 2 different models to address their research question. The
first model is a probit model.
Acqt = α+β1ln ProfitRate+β2ln InvestRate+β3ln V Ratio+β4ln DARatio+β5RivalsAcq
(3.58)
Acqt is a dummy variable indicating acquisition, ProfitRate represents the gross
post-tax profit rate, InvestRate is the investment rate in capital assets, V Ratio is the
valuation ratio, DARatio is the debt to asset ratio and RivalsAcq is a dummy variable
indicating years when there are acquisitions made by other firms within the firm’s in-
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dustry. The explanatory variables are forcasted values for the acquiring firm at time t.
Predicted values are used rather than observed variables to avoid endogeneity arising
from acquisition. In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity firm fixed effects are
used. Despite identifying a low valuation ratio of the target firm as a motive, they use
the valuation ratio of the acquirer as a explanatory variable.
The results are reported as coefficients and marginal effects of fixed effects probits.
Acquisition and profits are positively related, implying that forecasted rises in cash-flow
make acquisition more likely. The debt asset ratio DARatio has a negative coefficient,
suggesting that it is free cash-flow that matters. Interest payments on debt absorb cash
leaving less available for expansion through acquisition. The coefficient on InvestRate
is positive which suggests that internal and external growth may act as complements.
Internal growth may be necessary to support expansion through acquisition. The valu-
ation ratio is assumed to reflect managerial competence; the higher the valuation ratio,
the more confidence shareholders have in managerial ability. The coefficient on V Ratio
is positive therefore shareholders of the acquiring firm are more likely to support any
acquisition bids when the valuation ratio is high as they are more confident that it will
be an advantageous move. The coefficient on the RivalsAcq dummy is negative but not
significant. This indicates that high acquisition by rival firms in the same industry does
not have a significant impact on the decision to acquire. Firm specific effects are found
to be important when comparing random and fixed effects models, suggesting some firms
may be more inclined to acquire than others due to unobserved factors.
The estimation procedure is also performed on 3 sub-samples of data to test the
robustness of the results and for differences within the sample. The first subsample
includes only low growth acquisitions. These are acquisitions that add to existing capital
stock of the firm by less than 10%. This is done because large growth acquisitions can
be unpredictable and held off for favourable circumstances. The coefficients are generally
in agreement with the results for the whole sample, although profit is more responsive
and the debt to asset ratio is less responsive. The second subsample includes only single
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dominant firms or firms which are part of a dominant group. The coefficients have the
same sign but the marginal effects are much larger. The third subsample includes only
firms in fragmented sectors. Again, the coefficients have the same signs, but marginal
effects are slightly smaller than the full sample.
The second model is a 2 step procedure to account for selection; taking the inverse mills
ratio from the probit model and using a tobit model to allow for a truncated distribution.
The dependent variable has a lower bound of zero.
V alueAcqt
V alueInitialt
= α+β1ProfitRatet+β2InvestRatet+β3
MarketV al
ReplaceV alt−1
+β4MarketSharet−1
(3.59)
V alueAcqt is the value of acquisitions that take place in year t, V alueInitialt is the
initial value of the acquirer in terms of capital stock, ProfitRatet profit rate is the
rate of profit growth after depreciation and interest, InvestRatet is internal growth by
investment in capital stock, MarketV al is the market value of the acquirer, ReplaceV al
is the replacement value of assets and MarketSharet−1 is the market share occupied by
the acquirer during the year prior to acquisition. The dependent variable is the ratio of
V alueAcqt to V alueInitialt, therefore it shows the value of acquisition as a proportion
of the existing assets of the firm i.e. the rate of growth through acquisition. Therefore
this model focuses on the extent of the acquisition, whereas the probit model focuses on
the occurrence of acquisition as a binary event. The predicted values for the profit and
investment rates are estimated using lagged values and time dummies.
The results show that the profit rate is positive and very significant in explaining
the extent of growth through acquisition. Therefore the higher the profits of an acquirer
the larger the acquisition as a proportion of existing assets. This supports the free
cash flow theory. The coefficient on the internal investment rate variable InvestRatet
is negative and significant suggesting acquisition and investment are substitutes. This
result contrasts the findings from the probit model, although this could imply that growth
123
through acquisition at small levels requires complementary investment and a substitution
effect takes over at higher levels. The valuation ratio has no significant effect on the
dependent variable. The coefficient on market share is negative and very significant,
suggesting that large acquisition is less likely when the firm already has a large market
share. This reflects the fact that competition laws prevent market domination.
In summary, the key finding of this paper is that ‘free cash-flow’ is an important
determinant of acquisition and the extent of acquisition. The use of use of the tobit model
provides interesting insights into how the variables differ with the extent of acquisition,
giving additional information beyond the probit results. This proves to be particularly
relevant for the internal investment variable. Firm effects are found to be important,
highlighting the need to take account of unobserved firm heterogeneity. A drawback
to this study is that they place emphasis on acquirer behaviour and mostly ignore the
characteristics of the target firm.
Dickerson et al. (2002) look at the determinants of takeovers with the aim of gaining
a deeper understanding of the market for corporate control. Their study uses a sample
covering 892 UK quoted companies, during the period 1975 to 1990 and poses two research
questions. Firstly, is there evidence of a disciplinary motive for takeover? and secondly,
can the channels through which the market for corporate control operates be identified?
The market for corporate control is hypothesised to operate through various channels.
One of these channels is profitability; if a firm is working towards an aim other than value
maximisation or is poorly managed, profitability is expected to be low. Takeover of these
firms is more likely as it is driven by the motivation to increase managerial discipline
to enhance profitability. Free cash flow theory presents other channels through which
the market for corporate control is expected to operate; via dividends and investment.
When a firm has few positive NPV investment opportunities it may pay higher dividends
to signal to shareholders that their assets are not being wasted by management. This
scenario is likely to be associated with a lower probability of takeover. But if a firm with
no positive NPV investment opportunities chooses to invest, firm value will be reduced,
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highlighting poor management and the likelihood of takeover increases.
Dickerson et al. (2002) criticise the pooled probit methodology used in some of the
earlier literature. The weakness of this method is that it does not control for unobserved
heterogeneity and does not account for path dependency over time. Failure to control for
unobserved firm heterogeneity may imply that older firms are less attractive, whereas,
in reality, unattractiveness may be due to an unobserved characteristic. The fact that
firms are dynamic entities with path dependent characteristics are not accounted for
when observations are assumed to be time independent. Furthermore, they suggest that
fixed effects and random effects probits are also inadequate specifications for this type
of study. Fixed effects depends on changes, therefore the firms not involved in takeover
during the sample period will be ignored. Random effects requires the assumption that
the unobservable component is not correlated with the explanatory variables, which is
unlikely in most economic models. They propose an alternative methodology to overcome
these criticisms.
Given that previous takeover events may impact variables over time, they suggest the
hazard model as an appropriate solution. The hazard model is a survival model using the
hazard rate, which is the probability of an event occurring at time t conditional on having
survived without the event occurring until time t. Their study looks at the conditional
probability of taking over another firm and also the probability of being taken over. This
study is therefore more thorough than the previous studies as it looks at both acquirer
and acquired firms. The hazard rate gi(t) for firm i at time t is defined as follows.
gi(t) = lim
dt→∞
Pr(t 6 Ti < t+ dt | Ti > t)
dt
(3.60)
This model allows them to investigate whether, given that a firm has incurred no
takeover event up until a certain point in time, changes in firm characteristics will lead
to changes in the probability of takeover. The standard proportional continuous time
hazard is defined as follows.
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gi(t) = g0(t) expXi(t)
′β (3.61)
gi(t) is the probability of takeover for firm i at time t conditional on no previous
takeover, g0(t) represents the underlying baseline hazard at time t, Xi(t) is the vector of
explanatory variables and β represents the vector of corresponding parameters. Rather
than only using the common Weibull specification to estimate the baseline hazard, they
also use a discrete time version to overcome the weaknesses of the continuous time model.
This seems appropriate given that the data is recorded annually, therefore a takeover that
takes place during year t actually takes place sometime after the beginning of t and before
the beginning of t+ 1. The discrete time version allows the hazard to be estimated non-
parametrically. The advantages of this more flexible baseline hazard is that it prevents
one aspect of misspecification bias and may reduce negative duration bias arising from
unobserved heterogeneity. The conditional probability can be written in terms of the
hazard as follows.
P (t 6 Ti < t+ 1 | Ti > t) = 1− exp(−
∫ t+1
t
gi(s)ds) (3.62)
= 1− exp(− exp(Xi(t)′β)
∫ t+1
t
g0(s)ds) (3.63)
= 1− exp(− exp(Xi(t)′β) +G(t)) (3.64)
Where G(t) gives the underlying hazard at each discrete duration, thus revealing the
takeover hazard of a firm surviving t years.
G(t) = ln(
∫ t+1
t
g0(s)ds) (3.65)
The non-parametric model is sufficiently flexible to allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
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In order to make comparisons with the Weibull continuous time specification, unobserved
heterogeneity is incorporated into the hazard multiplicatively.
The explanatory variables contained in vector Xi(t) include size in terms of log net
assets36, leverage measured as the ratio of debt37, liquidity38, ratio of tangible assets to
total assets, gross pre-tax dividend yield, ratio of gross investment in tangibles to net
assets and post-tax profitability39. As this study aims to provide a deeper understanding
of the operation of the market for corporate control, the important explanatory variables
include profitability, dividends and investment. These explanatory variables are used
to test the different channels of the mechanism. Furthermore, they calculate Tobin’s q
to distinguish firms with a low q. Under certain assumptions, q < 1 indicates a firm
with no positive NPV investment opportunities and q > 1 indicates a firm with some
positive NPV investment opportunities. If the market for corporate control operates via
this channel, for low q firms, the results should show that higher investment increases
the conditional probability of takeover. An interaction between investment and the low
q indicator is included to test for this. The company accounts data is taken from the
EXSTAT database and the dividends, share prices and share capital are taken from the
London Share Price Dataset (LSPD).
Unobserved firm heterogeneity is apparent when comparing the results from the
Weibull specifications with and without heterogeneity. Whereas the estimated hetero-
geneity parameter is not significant in the model with a non-parametric baseline hazard.
This indicates that the non-parametric specification mitigates some of the unobserved
heterogeneity as anticipated. Furthermore, the extent of the bias in the β estimates aris-
ing from the monotonic Weibull specification can be seen by comparing them with the
estimates from the more flexible non-parametric approach.
The conditional probability of takeover depends non-linearly on the log of size, where
36Net assets are calculated as total assets minus current liabilities
37Debt consists of short term debt, bank loans and overdraft.
38The ratio of net current assets to net assets.
39They use a variety of measures of profitability and find results are not sensitive to the chosen measure.
The measure displayed in their results is the rate of return on net assets
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the coefficient on log(size) is positive and log(size)2 has a negative coefficient, implying
an inverted U-shaped relationship. This differs from previous work, but may be due to the
loosening of constraints during the 1980s. The coefficients on leverage and liquidity are
not significant and the joint significance test for the industry dummies suggests that there
does not appear to be sectoral differences, although the individual coefficients suggested
that some industries had lower conditional activity rates than others.
The estimated baseline hazard differs depending on the type of specification used.
The Weibull monotonic specification results in a negative sloping hazard. When unob-
served heterogeneity is incorporated, the slope becomes less negative. The more flexible
non-parametric hazard is slightly upward sloping, suggesting that the bias exists in the
parametric specification. Given that a large proportion of the sample exists in the be-
ginning of the sample time period, the hazard may be susceptible to time specific effects
or shocks from the macroeconomy. They control for this using start dummies and year
dummies.
The findings suggest that profitability is an important channel for corporate control,
as the coefficient is negative and highly significant. The coefficient on investment is
negative and significant and the coefficient on dividends is negative but not significant.
This implies the effects of a firm’s investment policy are larger that its dividend policy.
The signs remain consistent when investment and dividends are interacted with tobin’s
q indicator dummies. The interaction terms show that, for low q firms, an increase in
investment reduces the conditional probability of takeover. This contrasts the free cash
flow hypothesis, although the negative coefficient on dividends is consistent with free cash
flow theory. Higher dividends appear to indicate to shareholders that managers are not
wasting their assets on unprofitable investment opportunities.
In summary, this paper investigates the motivations behind takeover. They introduce
an alternative methodology into this literature which is arguably more appropriate than
the conventional probit method, particularly with small samples. Although, signs on the
probit coefficients are consistent with the hazard models.
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Dickerson et al. (2003) is an extension of the previous paper. This follow up paper
investigates whether acquisition can be used to reduce the likelihood of being acquired
by looking at how these events interrelate. They aim to test if a firm can use acquisition
strategically to influence its own fate. The hazard methodology is extended to include
competing risks. In each period a firm faces the risk of being acquired, bankruptcy or
acquiring another firm.
The continuous time proportional hazard for company i and risk r is defined as follows.
θri(t) = θrr0(t) exp(Xri(t)
′βr), r = 1, ..., R (3.66)
θri(t) represents the instantaneous probability of risk r conditional on survival to t,
θr0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t and β is the vector of coefficients corresponding
to the vector of explanatory variables Xri(t). In a similar manner to the previous paper,
this continuous time hazard can be estimated parametrically using the Weibull function
to impose a monotonic baseline hazard. Alternatively, a more flexible non-parametric
discrete time approach can overcome misspecification bias. The discrete time proportional
hazard is given as follows.
Φri(t) = 1− exp(− exp(Xi(t)′β) + Θr(t)) (3.67)
Each hazard has an extreme value distribution where Θr(t) gives the underlying haz-
ard at each discrete duration for risk r.
Θr(t) = ln(
∫ t+1
t
θr0(v)dv) (3.68)
In order to answer their research question they test for proportionality of the com-
peting risks following Narendranathan and Stewart (1991).
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H0 : βr = β and θr0(t) = θ0(t) ; r = 1, ..., R (3.69)
This provides a formal test of whether the impact of the explanatory variables Xi(t)
and baseline hazards θr0(t) differs depending on the conditional probability of being
acquired, bankruptcy or acquiring another firm. A weaker version is also tested.
H ′0 : βr = β ; r = 1, ..., R (3.70)
Furthermore, a previous acquisition dummy is included in their model to test the
direct effect of making a previous acquisition on the likelihood of takeover. But indirect
effects must also be considered. Previous acquisition will impact the characteristics of the
firm therefore the indirect effect acts via the explanatory variables Xi(t). These include
log(size), log(size)2, profitability, leverage, liquidity, tangible assets, internal investment,
dividends, a previous acquisition dummy and a dummy indicating if company i exists at
the start of the sample. The net effect of previous acquisition on the probability of
takeover consists of the direct and indirect effects. This is estimated by calculating the
the relative hazard, the ratio of the post-acquisition hazard to the pre-acquisition hazard.
Pr =
θpost−acquisitionr
θpre−acquisitionr
(3.71)
This is evaluated for the mean change in covariates between periods t − 1 and t + 1
around an acquisition event that happens at time t.
Two data samples are used in this study. The first spans from 1948 to 1970, covers
2280 companies and is taken from the DTI Databank of company accounts. The second
covers 969 companies over the period 1975 to 1990 and is taken from EXSTAT. Both
datasets are merged with the London Share Price Dataset (LSPD) to include stock market
data. The samples reflect the characteristics of the population. The data is at company
level therefore an acquisition leads to an amalgamation of resources and the acquired firm
ceases to exist as a separate entity.
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Results are shown for two risks; making an acquisition and being acquired. The esti-
mated coefficients show the relationships between the probability that the risk occurs con-
ditional on survival until time t and the explanatory variables. The specifications with the
Weibull hazard and non-parametric hazard generate very similar results. Firstly, focusing
on the conditional probability of making an acquisition, the coefficients on log size and
profitability are positive and significant. This is consistent with the literature as larger,
more profitable firms tend to be the main acquirers.40 Internal investment has a negative
coefficient implying that internal and external growth are substitutes.41 The coefficients
on liquidity, leverage differ in sign or significance depending on the data sample. The liq-
uidity coefficient is negative and significant for the 1975-1990 sample, but not significant
when using the earlier sample. This contrasts Jensen’s idea that ‘free cash’ may increase
a firm’s inclination to acquire. Leverage has a negative coefficient implying that high
debt levels are associated with reduced likelihood of acquisition. This could arise due to
difficulties in obtaining additional external finance to fund acquisition. Two methods are
used in order to test whether previous acquisition increases the likelihood of acquisition
at time t. The first method includes a dummy variable indicating previous acquisition in
the model and the second method includes a cumulative42 number of acquisitions vari-
able. Both methods indicate that acquisition is ‘habit forming’ with positive coefficients
on the variables. There may be scale economies over time in terms of reduced search
costs for suitable targets. Acquisition may result in gaining further knowledge from the
target or knowledge from the initial target search could identify additional targets for
future acquisition.
Secondly, focusing on the conditional probability of being acquired, the coefficient
on log size differs depending on the sample. A negative and significant coefficient is
found in the earlier sample, whereas an inverted U-shape relationship is found in the
1975-1990 sample. This suggests a declining probability of takeover as size increases for
40Although some smaller firms may undertake acquisition to gain access to R&D, this only accounts
for a small proportion of takeovers.
41Hay and Lui (1998) find mixed evidence on this.
42Truncated at ‘6 or more’.
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the 1948-1970 sample, whereas medium size firms are more likely to be targets during the
1975-1990 period. Less profitable companies were more likely to be taken over, suggesting
acquirers may choose targets with the aim of restructuring the firm to improve profitabil-
ity. Investment and dividends have negative coefficients, which also ties in with this idea.
The coefficient on the start dummy is not significant, suggesting that cohort effects are
not important, but significant coefficients on the time dummies imply that macro effects
influence the likelihood of being taken over. The previous acquisition dummy implies
that previous acquisition does not have a direct effect on the likelihood of becoming a
target, but indirect effects could be at work via other explanatory variables, such as size.
Proportional risk tests of H0 and H
′
0 are performed to test whether making an acquisition
is a feasible form of strategic defence against being acquired. These tests suggest that
the characteristics of targets and acquirers are distinctly different from each other. This
enables a company to act strategically to avoid becoming the victim of acquisition by
changing characteristics to differ from a target’s profile. The relative hazard test sug-
gests that making a previous acquisition reduces the conditional probability of becoming
an acquisition target by around 30%. This is mostly driven by the fact that acquisition
increases the size of the company.
In summary, this paper contributes to the literature by using a competing risk frame-
work to look at the characteristics of acquirers and their targets. It highlights the distinct
differences in their characteristics and provides insight into how the two event types inter-
relate. This has been neglected in previous studies. Acquisition is viewed as a potential
strategic tool to reduce the likelihood of becoming a target.
Desyllas and Hughes (2009) investigate the motives for high technology acquirers by
analysing their choice of targets. They identify two R&D centred motives; the search for
superiority and the search for inferiority. Most studies do not take innovation motives into
account.43 This is important because innovation motives are likely to be less important
for firms in low technology industries.
43Hall (1999) includes R&D intensity as an explanatory variable in her model, but does not distinguish
between high and low technology firms.
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The search for superiority describes acquisition with the motive of gaining access to
superior innovation relative to industry counterparts. This idea originates from resource
based theory. Firms may choose to invest in acquisition as a favoured substitute for
expansion of in-house R&D. This may be a faster and less risky way of obtaining the latest
technology, gaining a competitive advantage by becoming a technology leader or catching-
up in terms of competitiveness. In-house R&D requires time and is path dependent.
Furthermore, acquisition can be viewed as a method of revitalising a firm’s knowledge
base.44
The idea of the search for inferiority is based on the theory of the market for corporate
control. This theory suggests that when product market competition is ineffective in pro-
ducing perfectly efficient firms, the assets of inefficient firms will be obtained by superior
managers through acquisition. The market for corporate control describes the platform
where managers compete over the ownership of assets, in order to gain ownership and
organise assets more efficiently.
The search for superiority predicts that target firms have better innovation perfor-
mance than other non-target firms, whereas the search for inferiority has the expectation
that target firms will have lower innovation performance than non-targets. These com-
peting hypotheses are tested.
The data is taken from Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum Datasource. High tech-
nology firms are defined as those with primary activity in Chemicals and Allied Products
(SIC 28), Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment (SIC 35),
Electronics and Electrical Equipment (SIC 36), Transportation Equipment (SIC 37),
Measuring, Analysing and Controlling Instruments (SIC 38) Communications (SIC 48),
Business Services (SIC 73), Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and related
services (SIC 87). The data covers the period 1984-1998 and is aggregated to the parent
firm. There are 628 acquired firms and 4,124 non-acquired firms included in the sample.
Patents data was taken from the NBER dataset and R&D expenditure from Datastream
44Danzon et al. (2007) find that acquisition is used by pharmaceutical firms as a fast response to
shortages in innovation projects.
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and Compustat.
They chose not to use a hazard model because it requires data on firm age, which
is not consistently available in their data. Furthermore, they suggest that results from
logistic and hazard models are similar; coefficients are likely to be matched in sign and
significance but may differ in magnitude. Therefore they use a logit model to provide
results for the following specification.
Acqit = α+β1I
I
t−1+β2I
D
t−1+β3ln(I
S)t−1+β4sizet−1+β5size2t−1+β6growtht−1+β7Profitt−1
+ β8P
D
t−1 + β9ln(Tobin
′sQ)t−1 + β10leveraget−1 + β11liquidityt−1 + γInd+ γT + 
(3.72)
Acqit is a binary variable indicating acquisition at time t for firm i, I
I represents
innovation intensity. This variable is measured in two ways; R&D intensity measured
by R&D expenditure to total assets and patent intensity measured as successful patent
applications to total assets. Patents are normalised by dividing the number of citations
by the cohort average within the same year and technological classification to account
for industry differences. ID is a dummy that indicates zero innovation intensity, IS is
the accumulated innovation output or innovation stock calculated using the perpetual
inventory method, size, size2 and growth are measured in terms of total assets, Profit
represents profitability measured by operating return, PD is a dummy indicating negative
operating return, Tobin′sQ is calculated as the ratio of total assets and market value of
common equity minus book value of common equity to assets, leverage is calculated
as the ratio of long-term debt to the book value of common equity, liquidity is the
ratio of current assets to current liabilities, Ind and T represent vectors of industry and
time dummies respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged to avoid endogeneity
problems.
The marginal effects for the pooled logit with firm cluster robust standard errors
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are displayed. Findings from the equivalent panel model suggest that unobserved firm
heterogeneity does not have a significant effect in this data and therefore the results
remain consistent. The time and industry dummies are jointly significant. The results
show a positive significant effect for R&D intensity suggesting that acquired firms are
more likely to have higher R&D intensity than non-acquired firms. The effect of the
accumulated patent stock is positive and significant, implying that acquired firms tend
to have greater stock of patents than non-acquired firms. Whereas, the effect of patent
intensity at t − 1 is not significant. Acquired firms are more likely to have zero patent
intensity at t− 1.
To test the robustness of the results they split the data into two sub-periods. The
results suggest that the determinants of the probability of being acquired change overtime.
This may relate to stock market valuation waves. Robustness is also tested by using
sales rather than total assets to calculate the explanatory variables. The results are not
sensitive to this change.
Differences between acquiring firms and targets are investigated using a univariate
analysis. The disadvantage of this technique is that it does not account for interactions
between explanatory variables. Median values of each explanatory variable are obtained
for targets, acquirers and target minus acquirer. These are then repeated using control
adjusted targets and acquirers, which are calculated as the difference between the target
or acquirer and its matched control. The control firms are taken from the sample on non-
target and non-acquiring firms. The results imply that targets are more R&D intensive
than acquirers, but this may be due to industry or firm size effects rather than acquisition
patterns. Targets are likely to have lower patent stock than acquirers and have poorer
economic performance than acquirers.
In summary, this paper adds to the literature by investigating innovation based mo-
tives for acquisition. The results suggest that acquirers target firms that are under
performing in terms of patent intensity during t − 1 compared to non-targets and their
own previous performance, despite having higher R&D intensity. Patent stock is higher
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compared to non targets but generally lower than the acquirer. Furthermore, targets
tend to have poorer economic characteristics than their counterparts. These findings
support the search for inferiority hypothesis, where managers with superior capabilities
are motivated by the aim to reorganise failing firms.
The methodology used in this literature has progressed from simplistic models to more
complex survival models. The empirical findings indicate that motivations for mergers
have changed over time. Financial characteristics are generally found to be important in
determining the likelihood of takeover, therefore this consideration must be incorporated
into my analysis.
3.4.2 Post-M&A Innovation Outcomes
Cloodt et al. (2006) focus on high-tech industries in their analysis. They distinguish be-
tween technological and non-technological motives for M&A by assuming that a techno-
logically motivated acquisition is observed when the target firm has engaged in patenting
activity during the 5 years prior to acquisition. They test how post-M&A innovative
outcomes differ between the group of technological and non-technological M&As.
The international sample is taken from the Securities Data database and additional
data on firm characteristics, R&D expenditure and patents were taken from various
sources including Amadeus, Compustat, Worldscope and the US Patent and Trademark
Office database. Patents are measured as the number of granted applications. This pro-
vides a balanced panel of 347 firms over the period 1985-1994. They identify 2429 M&As
within the sample and no entry or exits occur.
The model takes the form of a random effects negative binomial model. The nega-
tive binomial model is considered to be appropriate because the dependent variable is
measured using the number of patents which takes non-negative integer values.
Pit = exp(αXi,t + β1Ai,t−1 + β2Ai,t−2 + β3Ai,t−3 + β4Ai,t−4) (3.73)
Pit represents post-M&A innovation measured by number of patents obtained by firm
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i in year t, Xi,t is a vector of firm characteristics and Ai,t−year is a vector of lagged firm
characteristics. Firm characteristics include number of non-technological acquisitions,
absolute size of the acquired knowledge base, relative size of the acquired knowledge
base, relatedness of the acquired knowledge base, relatedness of the acquired knowledge
base squared and cultural distance.
The absolute size of the acquired knowledge base is the number of patents obtained by
the acquired firms from t−5 to t. Relative size is calculated by dividing the absolute size
of the acquired knowledge base by the absolute size of the acquiring firm’s knowledge base.
Technologically related is measured by the number of identical patent codes between the
acquired and acquiring firm, then divided by the absolute size of the acquired knowledge
base. Cultural distance is a measure to control for differences between acquired and
acquiring firms in international M&A.45 R&D expenditure, log number of employees and
an acquisition dummy are also included as control variables.
The results show that non-technological M&As may have a negative impact on inno-
vation outcomes, whereas technological M&As exhibit an initial positive impact followed
by a negative impact. This is indicated by the coefficient on the absolute size of acquired
knowledge base. The relative size coefficients are negative and significant, suggesting that
integrating a relatively large knowledge base into the existing operating activities of the
firm can lead to organisational disruptions leaving less opportunity to focus on improving
innovation and utilising synergies. A U-shaped relationship is found between innovation
outputs and technological relatedness. This suggests that there must be some overlap of
innovation activity between acquired and acquirer to improve innovation outcomes post-
M&A. But if the relationship is too close the benefits diminish. Furthermore, the cultural
distance variable displays a positive coefficient, suggesting that international M&A in-
creases innovative output. Also, the number of patents is less economically meaningful
than the value of patents.
Bertrand (2009) investigates the impact of foreign acquisitions on the R&D activities
45This is measured using the Hofstede Index.
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of domestic target firms. They use a firm level panel of French manufacturing firms. The
data is taken from the LiFi (Enqueˆtes Liason Financie`re) and covers the period 1994-
2004. They contribute to the literature by looking at the changes in the type of in-house
R&D - basic or applied- and differences in domestic and foreign outsourced R&D during
the period following a foreign acquisition. The methodological approach aims to estimate
the difference between the R&D expenditure following a acquisition by a foreign acquirer
and the expected R&D expenditure if the acquisition did not occur. This involves two
stages; firstly, an appropriate control group is determined using propensity score caliper
matching and secondly, the difference in difference method is applied.
The first stage requires estimation of the probability that a firm is taken over by a
foreign owner using the following equation:
P (FAcqit = 1) = f(Xi,t−1, Ii, Tt) (3.74)
Xi,t−1 provides a vector of firm characteristics. These include domestic market share
at the 4 digit industry level, profitability (return-to-sales ratio), profitability squared,
debt (EBITDA-to-interest), R&D intensity (R&D expenditure to total sales), R&D skill
intensity (wages of R&D workers divided by the number of R&D workers) and capital
intensity (productive assets divided by number of employees). The findings from this stage
show a positive significant relationship between foreign acquisition and all independent
variables, except capital intensity and debt and U-shaped relationship exists between
foreign acquisition and profitability. This implies that bidders appear to cherry pick the
best targets. The balancing properties of the sample are tested. Those targets with a
propensity score beyond the upper and lower limits of the control group propensity score
are removed to provide the balanced sample. The sample is composed of 123 matched
acquisitions.
The second stage uses the difference-in-difference method to obtain the net difference
in outcomes between the acquired and non-acquired after taking the initial pre-acquisition
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differences between groups into account. (See Blundell and Dias, 2000). Their estimating
strategy takes the following form:
∆R&D = β0 + β1FAcqi,t + β2FAcqi,t−1 + β3FAcqi,t−2 + β4FAcqi,t−3 + i (3.75)
where
∆R&D = R&Di1 −R&Di0 (3.76)
Various measures of R&D expenditure are used as the dependent variable including
total, internal, domestic external, foreign external, internal basic, internal applied, inter-
nal development, financed internally and financed externally. FAcqit is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 for foreign acquired firms and 0 for control group firms. Separate
dummies are included to indicate acquisition during the current time period t, also 1, 2,
and 3 years post-acquisition.
Results suggest that foreign acquisitions lead to an increase in R&D expenditure in
each post acquisition year. He finds nothing to suggest that more R&D is outsourced
abroad following foreign acquisition. Post-acquisition, domestic external R&D expendi-
ture increases in line with internal R&D expenditure. This implies complementarities
between these types of R&D. The findings imply that foreign firms may use acquisitions
as a strategy to access the expertise of external sources within the local economy of the
target firm. This suggests that foreign acquisitions could actually encourage R&D invest-
ment within the host economy. Furthermore, the results suggest that basic, applied and
development R&D are complements. Despite the usual assumption that basic research is
likely to be cut following acquisition in favour of less risky investments with short-term
returns, basic R&D expenditure increases post acquisition in line with other forms of
internal R&D. Internally financed and foreign financed R&D also rises post-acquisition
suggesting that R&D could provide a possible channel for foreign injections to be made
into the domestic economy. The results are also divided into subsamples of European
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and Non-European acquirers and by high-tech industry and low/medium-tech industries,
but no significant differences are found between groups.
Ornaghi (2009) investigates the impact of mergers and acquisitions on innovative
activity and the role that technological and product relatedness plays. The analysis
specifically focuses on the Pharmaceutical industry. This industry is characterised by a
large number of prominent mergers and has a high R&D intensity which plays a crucial
role in inter-firm competition.
Data from 6 sources is combined to provide detailed information on the firms. These
sources include Standard and Poor’s Compustat, the Bureau Van Dijk’s Osiris, Patent
data from NBER, British National Formulary, the Orange Book of Food and Drug Ad-
ministration and the Mergers Book. This provides a panel from 1998-2004 including 27
mergers and acquisitions. Each of these events involves 2 firms, where one is defined as
the acquirer and the other as the target.
The estimation strategy proceeds in 2 ways. Firstly, a control sample is defined
using propensity score matching and matching based on technological relatedness. Then
the difference-in-difference method is applied. This intital estimation strategy aims to
investigate the impact of merging on ex-ante innovation activity.
∆lnY = β1Acqi,t + β2Acqi,t−1 + β3Acqi,t−2 + β4Acqi,t−3 + γT + i (3.77)
Where ∆lnY is the percentage change in innovation. This is measured in various different
ways - R&D expenditure, R&D intensity, patents and research productivity (ratio of
patents to R&D expenditure). The pharmaceutical industry has a high propensity to
patent, therefore “important” patents are identified and used as an alternative patent
measure with less noise. Important patents are determined based on the number of
citations. Patents in each year are listed by number of citations and the top 40% are
considered to be important patents. The stock market value of the firm ∆lnV is also
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used as a dependent variable to investigate to impact on the value of the firm. Acq are
a set of acquisition dummies indicating if an acquisition takes place during the current
period t, previous period t− 1, etc.
The propensity score method aims to control for endogeneity by controlling for firm
characteristics. The explanatory variables of the logit include percentage of drugs ap-
proaching patent expiration, percentage of new drugs introduced into the market, concen-
tration of patents, stock market value, growth of stock market, concentration of products
and a set of time dummies. The findings of the logit model suggest that mergers are
more likely to take place if current patents will soon expire.46
The other approach used to establish a control group is based around technological
relatedness. The aim of this is to control for exogenous technological shocks. Firms with
a high level of technological relatedness are likely to experience similar shocks. The firms
are matched according to the largest overlap between the list of patents cited.
The results are presented for each dependent variable for both methods of control
group creation. Tables and graphical representations are used. The findings suggest that
innovation outcomes for the merged firms are worse than control group outcomes. But
he acknowledges the fact that this type of study is limited due to unobservable outcomes
and the assumption that the control group outcomes depicts the behaviour of the firm if
the merger did not take place. There is no way of testing the validity of this assumption.
The analysis is extended further by investigating how relatedness of merging partners,
in terms of techology and products, impacts post-merger performance. The Heckman
two-step method is used.
∆lnY = β1TR + β2PR + γ1λ(Xβ) + i (3.78)
Equation (3.78) is estimated on a sample containing only merging firms. Selection
46This agrees with another paper that focuses on the pharmaceutical industry Danzon et al. (2007).
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bias is controlled for by including the inverse Mills ratio λ(Xβ). This is created using the
probabilities estimated using the logit model. TR is technological relatedness and PR is
product relatedness.
The extent of technological relatedness between acquirers and targets is measured in
4 different ways; the overlap between the list of patents cited, the correlation between
patents’ technological classes, the importance of cross citations from acquirers to targets
and the importance of cross citations from targets to acquirers. Product relatedness is
defined according to the “Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical” Classification (ATC) and
depends on the correlation of products between acquirer and target. The results im-
ply that technological relatedness has a negative impact on post-acquisition outcomes,
whereas product relatedness has a positive effect. He suggests that these findings could
potentially be explained by managerial focus on product relatedness to please sharehold-
ers, yet neglecting technological aspects leads to negative R&D outcomes.
Desyllas and Hughes (2010) focus on high technology firms. Their paper specifically
aims to analyse the impact of acquisition on post-acquisition innovation performance and
assess if differences in these outcomes depend on the characteristics of the acquiring firm.
They hypothesise that post-acquisition R&D outcomes may depend on the acquirer’s
ability to identify, exploit and finance research synergies with the target firm. Given that
post-acquisition decisions are usually taken by the acquirer, it is likely that acquirers
with higher levels of absorptive capacity and lower financial leverage will be better po-
sitioned to reap the R&D advantages of an acquisition. Their analysis uses 2 measures
of innovation performance. R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure to assets) and
R&D productivity (patent applications to R&D expenditure). They suggest that R&D
productivity is the preferred measure of innovation because it combines innovation inputs
and outputs.
They use an unbalanced panel of US publicly traded high technology firms from
1984-1998. High technology firms are those in industries such as chemicals, computer
equipment, electronics equipment, transportation equipment, measuring, analysing and
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controlling instruments and communications. Their final sample includes 573 acquiring
firms with at least one acquisition and a control group of 850 firms. A total of 2624 acqui-
sitions are included in the 8949 sample observations. This data is taken from Standard
and Poor’s Compustat database. This dataset provides details of R&D expenditure and
financial data. Patent data is taken from the NBER database and the patent application
date for granted patents is used. This data is often given at subsidiary level, therefore it
is necessary to use Dun and Bradstreet “Who Owns Who” annual issues to establish the
parent firm to create a match between datasets. A large number of observations are lost
due to missing data or inability to match datasets, but the final sample size is sufficiently
large and more substantial than most other studies.
The control group is established using the propensity score matching method. The
dependent variable of the first stage is a binary indicator of acquisition. The independent
variables represent lagged firm characteristics and include firm size, growth, profitability,
leverage, R&D intensity, R&D productivity, knowledge base size and sets of industry and
time dummies. The results of the logit estimations are not reported.
Equation (3.79) is estimated using Weighted Least Squares (WLS) in order to identify
the impact of acquisition on acquirer R&D intensity and R&D productivity.
%∆R&D = α + β0Acqt + β1PSt + β2PCt + β3Lt + β4Lgrowtht
+ β5RelAcqt + β6PubAcqt + β7FAcqt + γweightt + t (3.79)
Two dependent variables are used; the percentage change in R&D intensity and per-
centage change in R&D productivity. The percentage change is calculated over various
different time windows, including t-1 to t+1, t-1 to t+2, t-1 to t+3 and t-1 to the average
of t+1 to t+3. This provides 8 different dependent variables. The explanatory variables
include Acqi,t, a binary dummy indicating the event of acquisition at time t and PSt is the
knowledge base size of the firm. This is measured using a perpetual inventory of patents.
PCt is a measure of knowledge base concentration by 3-digit patent classification. Lt is
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a measure of financial leverage given by the ratio of long-term debt to the book value
of common equity, Lgrowtht is the growth in leverage between pre and post-acquisition,
RelAcqt is a dummy variable that indicates when the acquirer and corresponding target
belong to the same 3-digit industry, PubAcqt is a dummy indicating if the target is a
publicly traded firm and FAcqt indicates if it is a cross-border acquisition. Weights are
generated using the propensity score. Observations are weighted as 1/p when an acqui-
sition occurs and 1/(1− p) if no acquisition occurs. This measure is taken to account for
endogeneity of acquisitions. Furthermore, interaction terms are allowed between Acqi,t
and the firm characteristics.
Findings show acquisition has a negative effect on R&D intensity in the post-acquistion
period. This is likely to be a result of post-acquisition restructuring. They note that OLS
provides biased positive coefficients during the first post-acquisition year when endogene-
ity is not controlled for. Their results also show that the size of the acquirer’s knowledge
base has a positive impact on the percentage change in R&D productivity. They sug-
gest this may be because firms with higher absorptive capacity have a greater ability
to exploit the potential of their target’s knowledge base and utilise synergies between
the firms. Furthermore, they find that firms with high pre-acquisition leverage leads to
greater post-acquisition R&D intensity and productivity.
Bandick et al. (2010) uses Swedish data to investigate how multinational take-over
impacts R&D activity. They suggest three potential outcomes; R&D activity could re-
duce, remain at consistent levels or increase. They suggest that the observed outcome will
depend on the extent that Swedish R&D complements existing R&D activity within the
multinational. A reduction in R&D activity will arise if Swedish R&D is less sophisticated
or replicates existing R&D activity within the multinational. Therefore diminishing the
level of high skill activity in Sweden. If Swedish R&D proves to be superior to existing
R&D and the type of activity complements the multinational’s existing operations, R&D
activity in Sweden is likely to be maintained or even increased.
The data used covers Swedish manufacturing firms for the period 1993-2002. They
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use a foreign ownership code to identify foreign owned firms and distinguish domestic
multinationals using a further dataset indicating Swedish owned firms with foreign owned
subsidiaries. This allows them to test if the effect of foreign acquisition is different for
pre-acquisition Swedish multinationals and pre-acquisition domestic firms.
In order to address their research question they employ difference-in-difference esti-
mation with propensity score methods. The difference-in-difference estimator assesses
the impact of foreign acquisition on the growth of R&D intensity.
β = (yAt+s − yAt−1)− (yCt+s − yCt−1) (3.80)
y represents R&D intensity, A denotes acquired firms and C denotes non-acquired firms.
β can be estimated using the following equation, where FAcq is a foreign acquisition
dummy, dt is a set of time dummies and µi captures industry specific fixed effects.
∆yit = yt+s − yt−1 = βFAcqit + dt + µi +  (3.81)
The β estimate gives the average percentage point change in the R&D intensity growth
rate arising from foreign acquisition. This assumes that acquired firms are selected at
random. Hence, the propensity score technique is required because there may be a rela-
tionship between firm characteristics and choice of acquisition target.
The probability of acquisition by a foreign multinational is estimated using a probit
model, where explanatory variables include productivity, wages and size. Findings sug-
gest that endogeneity may be a problem as positive selection is observed. These ‘good
performance’ characteristics are likely to be correlated with R&D activity. The proba-
bilities are used to create a matched sample using the nearest-neighbour approach and
the balancing properties of the sample are tested. The sample includes 227 observations
of foreign-acquired firms. Difference-in-difference estimation is applied to the matched
sample. The results suggest that growth in R&D intensity is higher for foreign acquired
firms than the non-acquired control group.
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Guadalupe et al. (2012) investigate the selection of acquisition targets and the decision
to invest in innovation for foreign-owned firms. This paper is one of the minority that
relate this literature to innovation. They use a large panel of around 1800 Spanish
manufacturing firms for the period 1990-2006. The data distinguishes between product
and process innovation.
They initially test if multinational acquiring firms choose the most productive targets
or they choose less productive firms and transfer superior technology or organisational
structure. In the first stage of analysis they check for selection in the acquisition decision
using a probit model. The probability of acquisition, pˆ, is estimated as a function of firm
characteristics. This probability is estimated separately for each industry to allow the
relationship to vary. Their findings show that multinationals are more likely to acquire
the most productive firms.
The second stage of analysis asks if foreign-acquired subsidiaries invest more in in-
novation than if the firm had remained domestic? This question is addressed using the
following model.
Iit = α + γFit + dt + ηi + it (3.82)
Where Iit is the measure of product or process innovation, Fit is a Foreign ownership
dummy, dt is a year dummy, ηi is industry fixed effects and it is the error term. A
propensity score reweighting estimator is used to control for selection. Each acquired
firm is weighted by 1
pˆ
and each non-acquired firm is weighted by 1
1−pˆ . The sample is
restricted to firms with common support. They argue that this method is preferable to
the propensity score matching technique following Busso et al. (2009). The results show
that innovation is increased following acquisition for foreign-owned firms.
Garc´ıa-Vega et al. (2012) also assess the effect of foreign acquisition on R&D behaviour
at the firm level. They use annual Spanish data covering the manufacturing and service
sectors for the period 2004-2009. Their sample includes only R&D conducting firms. In
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the first stage of investigation they test for selection in the acquisition decision. They use
probit estimation with cluster robust standard errors on pooled cross-sectional data. The
dependent variable is a foreign acquisition dummy and explanatory variables include pre-
acquisition characteristics such as various R&D variables, number of employees, labour
productivity and an export dummy. Pre-treatment lagged values are used to ensure that
the characteristics are not influenced by acquisition, thus complying with the conditional
independence assumption.
The data provides information on internal and external R&D expenditures, where
external expenditures are divided into domestic and foreign47. A number of different
R&D variables are tested for significance in the model. Version (a) of the model includes
log total R&D expenditure and R&D intensity, version (b) includes log of internal and log
of external R&D expenditures and version (c) includes the ratio of external to internal
R&D and a dummy indicator of pre-acquisition foreign R&D.
Their findings suggest that acquiring foreign firms tend to select more productive,
medium size firms with higher R&D expenditures. Version (b) suggests that as exter-
nal R&D expenditure increases firms are less likely to be acquired, whereas increases
in internal R&D make firms more attractive to acquirers. This suggests that foreign
multinationals value knowledge generated through in-house R&D. The coefficient on the
dummy in version (c) of the model suggests that those with pre-acquisition foreign ex-
ternal R&D are more likely to be acquired. They suggest this indicates a preference for
Spanish owned multinationals.
From this first stage they conclude that evidence of cherry-picking prevails. This
implies that endogeneity poses a problem for the second stage in their analysis. To
address this problem they use the propensity score method to create a matched sample.
They pair each foreign acquired firm with the closest non-acquired firm in the same
year using caliper matching with replacement. Therefore some control group firms may
be matched to more than one foreign-acquired firm. The matched sample includes 295
47This is similar to the UK BERD data.
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firms, where 141 are non-acquired firms and 154 are acquired by foreign firms. They use
balancing tests to confirm the validity of their sample.
They estimate the impact of foreign acquisition on R&D activity using the following
equation.
Yit = δ + γFAcqit + λFAcqi,t−1 + φZit + it (3.83)
FAcqit and FAcqi,t−1 are foreign acquisition dummies representing acquisition in period
t and period t − 1 respectively. Zit is a set of control variables and Yit represents R&D
expenditure. The model is estimated using total, internal, external, external-foreign
and external-domestic R&D expenditure. They extend the analysis by using separate
acquisition dummies for foreign owners from frontier and non-frontier countries. The
initial frontier countries chosen are Japan, USA and Germany. They investigate this
further by testing different country groupings.
Their results suggest that firms acquired by foreign owners from leading frontier coun-
tries see an increase in foreign R&D transfers, but a decrease in in-house R&D expendi-
ture. Whereas, foreign acquired firms with non-frontier owners experience the opposite
trend.
Szu¨cs (2012) investigates the relationship between acquisition and ex-ante incentives
to allocate resources to innovation activities. This paper develops the approach used
by Ornaghi (2009) by distinguishing between acquirer and target outcomes, rather than
grouping both firms together. The data overs a broad range of industries and is geo-
graphically diverse, covering 38 2-digit sic codes and 25 nations.
The dataset is created based on acquisitions identified to the European Commission
(EC) or Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Therefore it only contains relatively large
M&A, where the deal-value exceeds $60 million (USD) to be registered by the FTC or
turnover over 5,000 million Euros to be registered by the EC. This acquisitions data is
combined with data on R&D expenditure, total assets, sales, debt and employees.
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Firms with more than one acquisitions during 4 year period and those without full
R&D expenditure data in the years directly before and after the acquisition are dropped.
Firms with zero R&D are included to prevent selection bias. This generates a sample
containing 265 acquiring firms and 133 targets.
Control groups are defined from a sample of more than 150,000 observations of non-
merging firms using 3 different propensity score matching methods. These include (1)
Nearest Neighbour Matching within the same year, (2) Mahalanobis Metric Matching
with same year and 2 digit sic and (3) global Caliper Matching. Separate estimations are
made for acquirers and targets. The dependent variable is a binary acquisition variable
and explanatory variables include R&D intensity, R&D growth, total assets, employees,
profitability, total debt, age and age2.
The standardized bias is calculated for each method which shows the bias that occurs
when comparing treated to non-treated. This is calculated by the difference in means
between the treated (T )and non-treated control group (C) divided by the standard de-
viation of the treated group (σT ).
x¯T − x¯C
σT
(3.84)
Difference-in-difference estimation is used in the analysis, where R&D expenditure
growth is the dependent variable, acquirer and target indicate the pre and post acquisi-
tion period from t− 3 to t+ 6.
∆R&Dexpij = α +
t=1∑
6
βtacquireri,j−t +
t=1∑
6
γttargeti,j−t + ηcontrols + ij (3.85)
The results from the propensity score stage show acquirers tend to be large and prof-
itable, whereas targets tend to have high R&D intensity and relatively low profitability.
This may suggest that acquirers may cherry pick firms with technology capabilities, with
the aim of improving their profitability through restructuring and exerting managerial
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knowhow. The second stage of the estimation reveals that R&D activity is diminished
during the post-merger period for both acquirer and target. There is little variation in
results between control group construction method.
This overview of the literature suggests that it is important to create a matched
dataset to control for endogeneity. Propensity score matching is a suitable method of
doing this. There may be differences in post-M&A outcomes between high-tech and
low-tech firms and between M&A by foreign and domestic firms. The literature also
suggests that it is preferable to measure innovation activity using a combination of R&D
expenditure and patent data. Unfortunately patent data cannot be obtained for use in my
study. This overview also identifies a gap in the literature. Each study investigates post-
event innovation outcomes, but does not investigate mergers and acquisitions separately
or compare outcomes of these different types of events.
3.4.3 Productivity and Foreign Acquisition
Conyon et al. (2002) suggest that the finding that foreign owned firms outperform domes-
tic firms may result from omitted variables and compositional factors, e.g. cross-sectional
studies. If the observed differences between performance of multinationals domestic firms
do solely arise from these factors, this would have serious implications for government
policy.
They suggest that many previous papers that perform cross-sectional studies omit
important explanatory variables such as firm size and capital vintage. Also, simultaneity
bias is problematic as multinational entrants are likely to be attracted to more profitable
and productive industries. In their paper they assume that industry and firm specific
characteristics remain the same during the observation period and therefore overcome
these difficulties by using panel data. This allows firm specific fixed effects to be controlled
for.
Multinationals looking to expand into developed countries such as the UK generally
opt for acquisition as their chosen expansion strategy, whereas expansion into less de-
150
veloped countries may occur through the creation of a greenfield start-up. Acquisition
as a method of breaking into new geographical territory presents less uncertainty than
alternatives. The acquisition target already possesses local market knowledge. The take-
over of an existing firm prevents the increase in market concentration that may occur by
creating a new enterprise. Also, the target firm can be seen as a stand alone unit that
can be divested if necessary.
Foreign multinational firms are generally considered to bring a set of intangible assets
with them that can potentially lead to advantages over domestic firms. These assets may
include organisational capabilities and technological knowledge.
The data is taken form the OneSource database of UK companies. The sample of
acquisitions considers firms with an ownership change between 1989 and 1994 and includes
only those with 5 consecutive years of data between 1987 and 1996. This creates a sample
with 331 domestic and 129 foreign acquisitions. Furthermore, they create an industry-
stratified random control sample of firms that did not incur an ownership change during
the observation period. This control group includes 642 firms.
They perform a multinomial logit estimation with a binary acquisition variable as the
dependent variable and firm characteristics a explanatory variables. This preliminary
analysis determines if there is a type of firm that is a more attractive acquisition target
to foreign or domestic acquiring firms. The findings show that foreign firms seem to
prefer targets with lower than average profitability and domestic firms prefer targets
with lower than average wages. This suggests a potential source of endogeneity in their
wage analysis.
They perform investigations into the impact of ownership change on labour productiv-
ity and on the wage rate. They use fixed effects panel analysis then control for endogeneity
using instrumental variables. The chosen instrument for the acquisition dummy is the
estimated probability of domestic and foreign acquisition in each year.
Balsvik and Haller (2010) suggest that the performance of the chosen target before
and after the acquisition takes place is likely to depend on the underlying motivations
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behind the acquisition. They provide an outline of three general motivations to acquisi-
tion. Firstly, performance is a secondary consideration if management is motivated by the
desire to increase firm size. Therefore no specific relationship with firm performance is
observed. Secondly, management may possess a comparative advantage in terms of organ-
isational capabilities. Firms will aim to acquire targets that provide the greatest marginal
payoff, therefore they are likely to show a preference for “lemons” and post-acquisition
performance should improve. Thirdly, a firm may be motivated by the desire to improve
current firm performance arising from complementarities with the target firm. This is
consistent with the technology sourcing hypothesis to gain access to specialist knowledge.
Under these circumstances targets are likely to be “cherries” and performance could be
unaffected, reduced or improved depending on the complementarity match between firm
and target.
In their empirical analysis they use Norwegian data taken from an annual census of
manufacturing plants for their sample period 1992-2004. Their initial sample is obtained
by dropping plants with less than 10 employees and plants that do not add to their
capital stocks during the sample period. This results in an unbalanced panel of 65,740
observations from 7158 plants. In this data, plants keep the same plant code for their
entire life. Acquisitions are recognised in the data through changes in the ownership code
for a given plant. Plants are considered to be domestically owned if less than 50% of
the plant’s assets are foreign owned. An acquisition is defined as a foreign acquisition
if the percentage of assets owned by foreigners increases to above 50% and the plant
was previously domestically owned before the ownership change. The data should cover
the entire population of Norwegian manufacturing plants, therefore entry and exit of a
plant should be illustrated through the inclusion and omission of plant codes. In their
initial sample they ignore the fact that multiple takeovers may take place during the
sample period. Observations do not necessarily exist for the two years before and after
acquisition and firms with missing observations are included.
They use the following estimating equation where controls include log employees,
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plant age, industry, year, foreign and domestic multinational dummies and industry-year
interactions.
yit =
t+2∑
t=t−2
αDtDomesticAcqit +
t+2∑
t=t−2
αFtForeignAcqit
+
t+2∑
t=t
αDtDomesticEntryit +
t+2∑
t=t
αFtForeignEntryit
+
t+2∑
t=t
αDtDomesticExitit +
t+2∑
t=t
αFtForeignExitit + controls+ it (3.86)
yit represents plant performance. They use log employment, log average wage, log
labour productivity and log total factor productivity (TPF)48 They firstly estimate their
model on the entire sample using OLS and plant fixed effects. The coefficients in the
OLS model show the deviation from the industry-year base group of non-multinationals
experiencing the event. Fixed effects looks at the deviation of firms from their own
average performance relative to the base group. The base group consists of firms in
regular operation, so deviation from the mean is likely to be small. Positive coefficients
on an event at time t suggest firms are doing better than usual and negative coefficients
imply that are doing worse than their own average.
Their results show a distinctly different picture for foreign and domestic acquisi-
tions. Domestically acquired plants see a fall in employment and labour productivity
post-acquisition, whereas foreign acquired plants show post-acquisition increases in em-
ployment, average wage and labour productivity. They find significant coefficients on the
entry and exit dummies in the initial results which suggests that plant performance differs
from the average close to entry and exit. They check the robustness of their acquisition
results by applying the model to various subsamples of the data.49
Sample 1 removes all firms that are close to entry and exit. Sample 2 removes all firms
48Estimates of TFP are the residuals from the OLS regression of a Cobb-Douglas production function
with controls for year, industry and year-industry interactions.
49Entry and exit dummies are no longer required in the model due to the restricted samples.
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with more than one ownership change during the sample period and all firms that are
domestic multinationals. This allows for performance comparisons of non-multinationals
acquired by foreign owners and wholly domestic owners over time. Sample 3 adds a
further restriction by only including firms with a full set of pre- and post- acquisition
dummies. Sample 4 includes single acquisition firms that were originally domestically
owned and taken over by domestic or foreign multinationals.
They provide OLS results for each of the samples and plot the coefficients on the
foreign and domestic acquisition dummies graphically for each period t. Samples 1-3 pro-
vide a consistent picture with the results from the entire sample. Firms prior to foreign
takeover tend to be larger, have higher labour productivity and higher average wages than
the reference group and firms taken over by domestic non-multinationals. This suggests
foreign firms “cherry pick” better performing acquisition targets. Firms acquired domes-
tically show diminishing performance in the pre-acquisition period, implying domestic
acquirers pick “lemons”. Post-aqcuisition performance generally improves for foreign ac-
quired firms but domestic firms fail to return firms to their pre-acquisition peak during
the 2-3 year post acquisition period.
Criscuolo and Martin (2009) investigate productivity differences between UK multi-
nationals, US subsidiaries and other foreign subsidiaries in the UK. They highlight three
potential effects that may lead to higher observed productivity of foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries. These include the “best firm effect”, “plant picking effect” and the “going
global effect”. The best firm effect occurs when foreign multinationals transfer superior
managerial or technological capabilities to subsidiaries. Plant picking effect refers to the
selection of more productive plants in the acquisition process and the going global effect
arises due to firm-level economies of scale and ability to hedge exchange rate risk.
They use plant-level data from the ARD and use the AFDI to establish multinational
status. Their initial sample includes multinationals and non-multinationals and covers
the period 1996-2000. They begin their regression analysis with a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function approach and apply OLS using the following estimating equation;
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log
Y
L
= β1log
K
L
+ β2log
M
L
+ β3logL+
∑
β4Multinational+
∑
β5controls+  (3.87)
Where Y is gross output, L is labour, K is capital and M is input materials. Var-
ious multinational dummies are included indicating general multinational status and if
the plant belongs to a US owner, other foreign owner, or EU owner. Controls include
quadratic plant age term, region and four digit industry time interaction dummies. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by establishment. The results show that multinationals are
more productive than non-multinationals plants. Furthermore US owned plants are more
productive than other foreign owned plants.
The model can be criticised in a number of ways. Firstly, Cobb-Douglas provides a
rather restrictive functional form; secondly, factor inputs may be endogenous; thirdly, the
model does not account for differences in production technology across industries; and
finally, competitive power could differ between multinationals and non-multinationals
and across sectors. They address these concerns by using a total factor productivity TFP
approach and placing restrictions on the data sample.
They apply two approaches to the calculation of TFP; method 1 follows Klette (1999)
and method 2 is a modified version of the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach. They use the
estimated TFP values as the dependent variable and include multinational, US and for-
eign ownership dummies as explanatory variables. They also include the log of capital
relative to median capital when the Olley-Pakes measure is used. This allows production
technology to vary. A coefficient of less than 1 implies differences in production tech-
nology between sectors exist, implying variations in market power. They perform tests
on subsamples of the data by sectors to address the issue that market power may vary
with industry sectors as well as between sectors, then interact the capital variable with
multinational, US and foreign owned to test for differences. These interactions suggest
that no differences in this variable exist between multinational sub-groups. The results
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with regards to multinational, US and foreign ownership dummies remain consistent with
the initial OLS findings.
To further study the US productivity leadership observed in the initial results, they
control for firm and plant specific fixed effects using a double fixed effects approach. 50
This approach involves two stages. The first stage uses productivity yit as the dependent
variable and controls for each firm-plant combination fixed effect to remove time invariant
firm and plant specific effects.
yit = αit + γj(it) + βMNEMultj(it) + it (3.88)
αit is the time invariant plant specific effect and γj(it) is the time invariant firm specific
effect. Multj(it) is a multinational dummy which captures the productivity effect of
becoming multinational. A positive significant coefficient on the multinational dummy
in this first stage will support the “going global effect”. This is because time invariant
firm and plant characteristics are removed therefore the βMNE coefficient is identified on
changes in multinational status.
In the second stage they use the fixed effects estimates from the first stage as the
dependent variable and include a series of dummies as explanatory variables. These
include a set of multinational dummies which indicate if the firm or plant was ever part of
a multinational, ever US owned or ever foreign owned and a set of greenfield dummies that
indicate domestic multinational, US or foreign owned greenfield set-ups during the sample
period. These greenfield dummies indicate the extent of the “best firm” relative to the
non-greenfield domestic reference group effect because any technological or managerial
advantage can be fully attributed to the parent firm. ‘Ever’ multinational dummies
provide evidence of the plant picking effect.
In the first stage of estimation they find no significant indications of the “going global
effect”. In the second stage they use the fixed effects estimates taken from the first stage
as dependent variable. Positive significant coefficients on the ‘ever multinational’ dum-
50This approach appear to be similar to Stochastic Frontier Analysis.
156
mies imply plant picking behaviour and positive significant coefficients on the ‘greenfield
multinational’ dummy suggests transfer of technological and managerial advantages via
the “best firm” effect. To check the robustness of these results they limit the sample
to include plants that have changed from domestic to multinational during the sample
period. Their results see a drop in size and significance of the multinational dummy
implying that “best firm” transfers may take time to manifest for newly multinational
plants51.
They develop stage one of the model further by accounting for endogeneity arising
from correlation between time varying shocks and likelihood of multinational takeover.
This is done by controlling for the probability of multinational selection estimated using a
logit binary dependent variable model. They find evidence to suggest that multinational
firms select targets that were more productive in the period before takeover.
A criticism of this study is that they do not control for or compare with firms that
experience non-multinational ownership changes, or consider the adjustment period once
a takeover has occurred, yet this is due to the limitations of the data. The sample
period is short covering only 4 years. The number of matches between AFDI and ARD is
relatively low in 1996 and 1997 and the ARD only contains production and construction
industries pre-1997.
Harris (2009) seeks to answer the following questions: Firstly, do foreign owners prefer
high performance plants as acquisition targets, and secondly, how does a change to foreign
ownership impact post-acquisition performance? He investigates this using a number
of different measures of performance including total factor productivity, profitability,
employment and wages. He also looks at the probability of post-acquisition plant closure.
The propensity score methodology is used.
The data is taken from the ARD, covering the manufacturing sector for the period
1985 to 2005 and service sector data form 1997-2005. ARD data is recorded at reporting
unit level. An enterprise may possess a number of plants and may group its activity
51Those firms that became multinational pre-1996 are removed from the sample
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into various reporting units, but reporting units do not necessarily correspond to plants.
Harris believes it is important to use plant level data, particularly for the calculation of
capital stock. Therefore he calculates estimates of plant level observations using local unit
employment data from the BSD. Acquisitions are defined as any change in ownership,
therefore mergers and acquisitions are grouped together. The foreign ownership code is
used to distinguish between UK, US, EU and other foreign acquisitions. The data is split
into 6 manufacturing sub-groups and 7 service sector sub-groups.
The investigation of the impact of foreign acquisition on productivity involves a num-
ber of steps. Firstly, a dynamic cobb-douglas production function is estimated on the
entire sample using the system GMM approach. This technique is used to control for
endogeneity of factor inputs and outputs. Harris favours this approach of deriving TFP
estimates over the frequently used Olley-Pakes method because it controls for fixed ef-
fects. The inputs are instrumented using lagged levels and lagged first differences, which
reduces finite sample bias according to Blundell and Bond (1998).
Various ownership dummies are included to capture the impact of ownership sub-
groups. One set of ownership dummies indicate the period of ownership by UK, US, EU
or other foreign owner. The coefficients on these dummies indicate if intrinsic productivity
benefits are derived from foreign ownership. A further dummy is included to control for
foreign greenfield investment. These dummies are interacted with the input variables
to allow for differential effects. A set of acquisition dummies and lagged acquisition
dummies are included to identify the year of acquisition and UK, US, EU or other foreign
owner. Another set of ownership dummies indicate if the plant has a foreign owner at
any time during the sample period. These dummies are used to test if plants acquired by
foreigner owners have further productivity advantages that are not attributed to foreign
ownership status. Therefore they are used to test the cherry picking hypothesis when
the full sample is used. The results show that in most industries foreign owners opt for
less productive firms, but cherry picking does occur in some industries,including metals,
mechanical engineering and extraction of minerals & chemicals.
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Secondly, a matched sample of foreign owned acquired and non-acquired plants is
created using the propensity score approach. This involves using a cross-sectional probit
model to calculate the propensity score for each plant. The use of a fixed effects probit
is avoided to prevent bias resulting from the incidental parameters problem.
P (ACQit = 1) = φ(lnLPit−1, lnAGE, lnKLit−1, lnILit−1, sizeit−1, singleplant,
lnDiversification, lnaglomeration, lnHerfindahl,%FO, industry, region) (3.89)
The dependent variable is an acquisition dummy ACQit recorded as 1 if the plant is
acquired at time t during 1995-2000. The explanatory variables include LPit−1 labour
productivity, KLit−1 capital-labour ratio, sizeit−1 a set of 4 size dummies and %FO
measures the importance of FDI within the given industry. Plants are then matched
year-by-year using the calculated propensity scores and the nearest-neighbour, one-to-
one common support approach (PSMATCH command in STATA).
Thirdly, the initial cobb-douglas production function is re-estimated using the matched
sample. These results do not show evidence of cherry picking because the acquired and
non-acquired plants in the matched sample display similar characteristics. The results
show in some industries acquisition by foreign owners leads to higher total factor produc-
tivity beyond the expected outcome of the non-acquired plants with matched character-
istics.
Fourthly, total factor productivity estimates are derived from the re-estimated pro-
duction function. Results are presented in the form of cumulative distribution diagrams
by industry, where the distributions for acquired plants generally lie to the right of the
non-acquired plants suggesting that acquired plants dominate the non-acquired plants in
terms of TFP. Although there is some cross over of the distributions at higher levels of
TFP. They use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the validity of the graphical results.
The main strengths of this paper arise from the data and methodology used. The
sample covers a long time-period and foreign acquisitions can be distinguished by country.
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A criticism of the study is that no distinction is made between acquisitions and mergers,
thus assuming no differences exist between the two event types.
In summary, this section emphasises the importance of distinguishing between do-
mestic and foreign M&A. Post-event productivity differences can exist between the two
groups because incentives may differ.
3.4.4 Pre-Divestment Characteristics and Post-Divestment Innovation Out-
comes
Markides (1995) describes corporate refocusing as a reduction in diversification that usu-
ally occurs through divestiture. The study aims to determine if reductions in diversifica-
tion lead to increases in profitability. A stratified sample of 200 firms is taken from the
Fortune 500 list over the period 1981-1987 and variables are obtained from Compustat
and TRINET. The estimating equation is given as follows:
∆Profit87−81 = α+β1Refoc+β2Aint85−81+β3R&Dint85−81+β4C485−81+β5MCh86−81+
β6DE86−81 + β7For87−82 + β8Emp87−81 + β9Cap87−81 + β10Risk87−81 +  (3.90)
The dependent variable ∆Profit87−81 is change in profitability over the period 1981
to 1987. Profitability is measured in three different ways to ensure the results are not
sensitive to the measure used. These include the industry weighted return on sales, indus-
try weighted return on equity and industry weighted return on assets. Aint85−81 repre-
sents industry-weighted industry advertising intensity, R&Dint85−81 represents industry-
weighted industry R&D intensity, C485−81 is the industry-weighted four firm concen-
tration ratio measured using a Herfindahl index, MCh86−81 is a dummy variable that
indicates a change in CEO during the period 1981 to 1986, DE86−81 is the debt to share-
holder equity, For87−82 indicates the firm’s foreign sales as a proportion of total sales52,
521982 is used because 1981 data is unavailable.
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Emp87−81 represents sales per employee, Cap87−81 is capital expenditure as a percent of
sales, Risk87−81 is risk measured by the standard deviation of the return on sales during
the 1981-1987 period and Refoc is a measure of refocusing. It is defined in five different
ways to ensure that the results are not sensitive to the definition.
Method 1 identifies refocusing firms as those that announced their intention to refocus
in the Wall Street Journal and actually divest at least 10% of their assets. Method 2
follows Rumelt (1974) by classifying those that reduce the number of strategic categories
engaged in between 1981 and 1987. Method 3 calculates an entropy index of diversification
following Palepu (1985). A decrease in the measure indicates refocusing. Method 4
classifies refocusing firms as those that reduced the number of industries they competed
in by at least three. Method 5 uses a broader definition which distinguishes restructuring
firms of two types; unrelated-business firms and related-link firms. The related DR
and unrelated DU components of the diversification index are obtained and the ratio of
these components to the total diversification index DT are calculated. The unrelated-
business firms are defined as those which increase diversification to exploit interal capital,
where DU/DT is increasing and DR/DT is decreasing. Related-link firms decrease
diversification to improve control systems, where DU/DT is decreasing and DR/DT is
increasing.
Furthermore, it is also necessary to distinguish over-diversified firms. Again, five
different methods are used to identify these firms and verify the robustness of the results.
Method (a) firms in the sample were ranked in order of their initial diversification level as
defined by the entropy measure. The 70 most diversified firms were selected to represent
highly diversified firms. The sensitivity of this dividing point was tested. Method (b)
firms were grouped by core industry. Those with higher diversification than the industry
median were considered to be over-diversified. Method (c) Unrelated business firms as
defined by Rumelt (1974) are identified as over-diversified firms. Method (d) firms that
have higher than median diversification within the unrelated business, related business
and dominant business groups are classified as over-diversified. Method (e) those firms
161
that have above median related diversification or above median unrelated diversification
are defined as over-diversified.
The regressions are run on the sub-samples of over diversified firms. The results show
a positive and significant coefficient on the refocusing variable. This indicates that for
over-diversified firms, refocusing of activities is associated with increasing profitability.
This finding is robust across the different methods of defining over-diversification and
refocusing. The results also remain consistent when the dependent variable ∆Profit87−81
is measured using return on sales, equity or assets. When refocusing is split by time
period, findings show that refocusing is only significant in the first period. This suggests
that the benefits of refocusing may take time to impact profitability. When the sample
is split into groups of early, middle and late refocusing firms, the early refocusers achieve
higher than industry average profitability, whereas middle and late refocusers are below
industry average.
Mata and Portugal (2000) investigate the likelihood of market exit and divestiture
following foreign entry. Entry can occur by acquisition or through greenfield investment.
They use a competing risks model with two latent durations. These durations are time
until divestment and time until closure.
h(m) = exp(βXm)γm (3.91)
where γm represents the hazard rate for the time interval m, Xm is a vector of ex-
planatory variables at time m and β is the vector of corresponding coefficients. A flexible
non-parametric specification is used and the model is estimated using maximum likeli-
hood methods. The explanatory variables Xm include a greenfield entry dummy, where
greenfield entry is indicated by 1 and acquisition is indicated by 0, proportion of col-
lege graduates in the firms work force, log number of employees, fully owned subsidiary
dummy indicating firms with 100% of foreign capital, majority joint venture dummy in-
dicating firms with less than 100% but more than 50% foreign capital, limited liability
162
dummy, log number of plants, diversification measured as 1 minus the herfindahl index of
firm specialisation calculated using the shares of firm activities in different industries, in-
dustry concentration, log of estimated minimum efficient scale calculated following Lyons
(1980) to capture scale economies, industry growth, ratio of employment in new firms to
total employment in the industry, ratio of employment in foreign owned firms to total
employment in the industry.
The study uses data from the Portuguese Ministry of Employment to create a sample
of 1033 foreign firms that entered during the 1983-89 period. The results show distinct
differences in characteristics between those subsidiaries that exit through divestiture and
those that exit through closure. Greenfield investments are more likely to be closed firms
than enter through acquisition, whereas entrants through acquisition are more likely to
divest than greenfield entrants. The divestiture coefficients on the majority foreign and
fully owned foreign subsidiary dummies are negative. This indicates that subsidiaries
with a higher proportion of foreign ownership are less likely to be divested than major-
ity domestic owned firms. The coefficients in the closure equations indicate that foreign
owned subsidiaries are more likely to close than majority domestic owned firms. With
regards to legal ownership form, limited liability firms are least likely to close but more
likely to be divested than unlimited liability firms. This may reflect difficulties associ-
ated with selling an unlimited liability firm. The negative and significant size coefficient
indicates that larger firms are less likely to exit through closure but the size coefficient
for divestment is not significant.
The estimates of the baseline hazard parameters are obtained and depicted graphically.
Both hazard rates are similar to the pattern observed when covariates are not controlled
for. The closure hazard rate and divestment hazard rate evolve differently over time.
The closure parameters decrease over time suggesting that continued learning takes place
following entry; firms get better at surviving the longer they have existed. The divestment
parameters remain relatively consistent overtime, despite a peak during year 2.
In summary, this paper investigates the likelihood of exiting the market for foreign
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entrants. The competing risks model is appropriate because it accounts for the fact that
a firm faces the risk of closure and divestment simultaneously. The results show that
it is not appropriate to group these two forms of exit together. The model differs from
others by using mostly ownership explanatory variables rather than financial variables.
The study may have benefited from the inclusion of these variables if they were available.
Haynes et al. (2002) investigate the impact of divestment on performance using an
unbalanced panel of 132 UK quoted companies from 1985 to 1993. They identify various
motives for divestment. It can act as a means of correcting over-diversification, when
growth has been misdirected or occurs at a faster rate than the organisation can manage.
This idea ties in with Markides (1995). Firms with excessive free-cash flow and limited
growth opportunities may undertake negative net present value investments. Divestment
may act to reduce the risk of total failure of an organisation. This could be achieved be-
cause divesting the least profitable parts of the firm may reduce losses and may provide
financial value to the divestor in terms of the purchase price. The motivations behind
divestment are likely to impact post-divestment performance. They suggest that divest-
ment as a means of reducing diversification to focus on core competencies is likely to lead
to improved performance.
The model is specified as follows and estimated using GMM.
∆(Π/K)it = α1∆(Π/K)it−1 + α2∆CONit + α3∆MSit
+ α4∆(MS ∗ CON)it + α5∆LEVit +
3∑
r=0
δrDIVit−r +
T∑
t=1
γtYt + eit (3.92)
First differencing is used to remove fixed effects. The dependent variable (Π/K)it
represents profitability measured by return on capital. Other measures of profitability
are also used to test the sensitivity of results to the measure used. These include the
ratio of profit before interest, tax and gains to losses on disposals relative to net assets,
the ratio of profit before interest, tax and gains to losses on disposals relative to sales
turnover and the ratio of trading profit before interest, tax, depreciation and operating
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provisions to net assets. The explanatory variables include a lagged dependent variable
to capture the persistence of profitability. MSit represents market share of firm i, CONit
is market concentration using a Herfindahl index, LEVit is firm leverage measured using
the debt to asset ratio, DIVit−r represents a set of divestment variables to capture lagged
effects of divestment, Yt is a set of year dummies to control for macroeconomic effects
and eit is an error term.
The results show the lagged dependent variable ∆(Π/K)it has a positive and signifi-
cant effect implying that persistence in profitability exists. Market concentration ∆CONit
also has a positive and significant coefficient, whereas the coefficients on market share
∆MSit and leverage ∆LEVit are not significant. The sets of divestment variables take a
different form in each version of the model, including number of divestments, proportion
of assets divested and divestment dummies. The coefficients on these variables are mostly
positive and significant.
To test the validity of the Markides (1995) argument, the divestment dummies are
interacted with complex and noncomplex dummies. These dummies aim to identify firms
with complex and non-complex organisational structures according to size and the extent
of diversification. Companies with above median (size*diversification) are classified as
complex and those below are defined as non-complex. Three definitions of size are used to
ensure robustness. The findings show all coefficients on complex-divestment interactions
are positive and significant, although two non-complex-divestment interaction coefficients
also have a positive significant effect for the t− 2 and t− 3 lags. Wald tests confirm that
it is appropriate to distinguish between the two categories. Therefore some support is
provided for the idea that the performance impact is more substantial for over-diversified
firms, yet it is not conclusive.
In addition, strong and weak governance dummies are defined. Three definitions
are used depending on the extent of management’s equity stake in the company and
the existence of blockholders with at least 5% equity. Strong governance implies that
management will be more likely to conform to shareholder value maximisation policies
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rather than pursue their other objectives. The interaction with divestment terms show all
coefficients on the weak governance interactions are positive and significant, indicating
that the performance impact for weak governed companies is greater. This could be
because they are more likely to over-diversify.
In summary the findings conform to the notion of an optimal diversification level as
they show that divestment has an positive impact on profitability, particularly for larger,
more diversified firms with weak governance. Although these findings are not robust to
all measures and therefore cannot be deemed entirely conclusive.
Haynes et al. (2003) investigate the determinants of divestment using an unbalanced
panel of 144 UK firms over the period 1985-1991. The firms were taken from the top
500 firms in the Times 1000 list 1988-89. Corresponding divestment data was taken
fom the Centre for Management Buy-out Research CMBOR database, financial statistics
from Datastream and data on takeover-threat rumours from Acquisitions Weekly and the
Financial Times. The sample excluded foreign owned and trading companies. 91% of
firms in the sample had at least one divestment during the sample period.
Divestit = β0 + α0Perfit−1 + α1LEVit−1 + α2Threatit−1 + α3NewMDit−1
+ α4DIVit−1 + α5sizeit−1 + α6CONit−1 + α7MSit−1 + α8ACQit−1 + uit (3.93)
The dependent variable Divest is measured in two different ways; the number of di-
vestments and the proportion of assets divested. The model is estimated using Poisson
and negative binomial distribution regressions when the number of divestments is used
as the dependent variable and estimated using a log-linear specification with random and
fixed effects when proportion of assets divested is the dependent variable. Explanatory
variables are lagged by a year as performance in the previous period will impact the likeli-
hood of divestment at time t. The Poisson and negative binomial distribution regressions
model the non-negative integer property of this dependent variable. These models are
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estimated with maximum likelihood.
The explanatory variables include Perf is a measure of accounting performance in-
cluding return on capital employed, return on equity, operating profit margin and the
trading profit margin, LEV is leverage measured using the debt to assets ratio or debt to
equity, Threat is a dummy variable indicating a threat of takeover, NewMD represents
a change in management, DIV is an entropy measure of the level of diversification, size
is measured by total sales, total assets or number of employees, CON measures market
concentration using a Herfindahl index, MS is market share, ACQ is a dummy variable
indicating if the firm has made any acquisitions during the sample period.
The results remain consistent regardless of the specification. Performance has a nega-
tive and significant coefficient, indicating that divestment is more likely when performance
is poor. The pressure on managers of over-diversified firms to divest increases when per-
formance deteriorates. This finding is supported by Markides (1995). The coefficient on
the leverage variable is positive and significant. High levels of debt constrain manage-
ment’s ability to engage in unprofitable investments and as leverage increases firms are
more likely to divest assets as a means of paying off debts. The threat of takeover variable
has a positive and significant coefficient suggesting that divestment is more likely when a
firm faces the threat of takeover. This implies that there is an interrelationship between
takeover and divestment, where downsizing may act as a managerial response to prevent
takeover. The threat of takeover puts pressure on managers to refocus firm activities.
There is no evidence to suggest that a change in management has any effect on the like-
lihood of divestment because the coefficient on the NewMD variable is not significant.
Firm size and diversification both have positive and significant coefficients indicating that
divestment is more likely for larger firms experiencing control problems. Furthermore,
there is a positive significant coefficient on the ACQ variable suggesting that the firm is
more likely to divest if acquisition is undertaken during the sample period. This may be
because these firms have more units available to divest or part of a corporate restruc-
turing plan. Market share has a positive significant coefficient in most specifications of
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the model. This suggests that the larger the core industry market share, the greater the
incentive to refocus on core activities. The coefficient on market concentration variable
is surprisingly negative. This could indicate that high concentration in core activities re-
duces the opportunity for within market growth. Although firms may choose to diversify
into other markets, the core activities are likely to be profitable therefore reducing any
pressures to divest.
Weak and strong governance dummies are interacted with the performance and lever-
age variables to further investigate the influence of governance regimes on divestment.
The governance dummies are defined in the same way as Haynes et al. (2002). The find-
ings show that firms with strong governance are more likely to react to poor performance
with divestment than firms with weak governance. The leverage-governance interactions
indicate that high levels of debt encourages divestment for firms with weak governance,
whereas the coefficient on the leverage interaction term in not significant for strong gov-
ernance. Firms with weak governance are more responsive to debt as an encouragement
to refocus as management have more scope to pursue their own goals and are therefore
more likely to engage in riskier projects. Divestment can be used as a means of raising
cash to repay loans and correct for over-diversification.
In summary, this paper looks at the determinants of divestment and distinguishes
between strategy and governance motives. Both sets of motives are found to have a
significant influence on the likelihood of divestment. The results are rigorously tested
across different specifications of the model and different definitions of variables. The
findings are robust. The sample includes 144 firms which is reasonably small and contains
only large firms, therefore it is debatable how far these conclusions can be generalised to
population level.
Van Beers and Dekker (2009) also recognise the interrelationship between acquisition
and divestment. They examine the determinants of acquisition and divestment and the
impact of these events on innovation. Firms expand through acquisition and may re-
structure through divestment as part of a wider strategy. Divestment may be motivated
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by a desire to focus on core activities or to correct for over-diversification. Resources
freed up by divestiture may be used to pursue alternative projects through acquisition.
This could involve expansion of innovation activity if the strategy aims to draw upon the
innovative capabilities of the acquisition target.
The technology-searching motive may have direct and indirect effects on innova-
tive performance. Direct effects impact R&D inputs, processes and innovative outputs,
whereas indirect effects of innovation occur through enhanced performance and prof-
itability generating funds to reinvest into the R&D process. Acquistions motivated by
the desire to spread risk through diversification may also create indirect effects on inno-
vation performance. The outcome of the acquisition-divestment strategy on innovation
will depend on the initial motivation behind restructuring, the ability to create synergies
with acquired resources and derive value from divestments.
They suggest that innovative firms are more likely to engage in acquisition and di-
vestment than non-innovative firms because they are involved in a dynamic environment.
These firms have more incentive to exert control to obtain technological advancement and
reduce competitive threats. Furthermore, innovative firms that face knowledge barriers
are even more likely to acquire and this should have a positive impact on innovation
performance. Also, innovative firms that lack available finance are more likely to divest
and this should impact innovation performance positively.
They use data taken from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the Nether-
lands to test the relationship between acquisition, divestment and innovation. The sample
includes 5 waves of the survey covering the period 1996 to 2004. The model consists of
two stages. The first stage involves logit equations to determine pre-event characteristics.
Acqt = α0 + α1ln(size)t−n + α2Exportt−n + α3Innovationt−n + α4Divt−n+
α5KnowLackt−n + α6FinLackt−n + α7OtherLackt−n + α8Sector + α9T (3.94)
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Divt = α0 + α1ln(size)t−n + α2Exportt−n + α3Innovationt−n + α4Acqt−n+
α5KnowLackt−n + α6FinLackt−n + α7OtherLackt−n + α8Sector + α9T (3.95)
The dependent variables are binary indicators of acquisition and divestment at time t
respectively. size is measure using number of employees at time t−n, where n is a lag of
2 or 4 year, Export is a binary export variable indicating if a firm is an exporter at t−n,
innovation is a binary variable indicating if a firm is an innovator at t−n, Sector is a set
of sector dummies and T is a set of time dummies. The Div and Acq binary explanatory
variables indicate if a divestiture or acquisition occurs at time t−n, KnowLack, FinLack
and OtherLack are binary variables indicating constraints to innovation identified in the
CIS survey. KnowLack indicates lack of specialist knowledge and qualified personnel,
FinLack indicates lack of financial resources and high innovation costs compared to the
initial budget and OtherLack indicates any other innovation barriers.
The second stage equation is specified as follows.
ln(InnPerf)t = γ0 + γ1ln(size)t−n + γ2ExportIntt−n + γ3Coopt−n + γ4ContR&Dt−n
+γ5Acqt−n+γ6Divt−n+γ7(Acqt−n∗InnConst−n)+γ8(Divt−n∗InnConst−n)+γ9Sector+γ10T
(3.96)
The dependent variable ln(InnPerf)t represents innovative performance measured by
the ratio of ‘new to the market’ product sales to number of employees. ExportInt is ex-
port intensity measured by the ratio of exports to total sales, Coop is a dummy indicating
if the firm engaged in any cooperative innovation projects in t− n, ContR&D indicates
if a firm consistently engaged in R&D over the sample period, InnCons represents the
set of innovation constraints described previously, KnowLack, FinLack and OtherLack.
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Each of these innovation constraints are interacted with the acquisition dummy Acq and
divestment dummy Div to test their hypotheses.
The positive significant coefficients on the Acqt−n and Divt−n in the first stage re-
gressions show that firms are more likely to engage in acquisition following divestment
and divestment following acquisition. This implies that acquisition and divestment are
interrelated and are used together as part of a restructuring strategy. There is more
robust support for the acquisition following divestment finding, suggesting that firms free
up resources through divestment prior to acquiring.
The coefficient on KnowLack is not significant in the acquisition equation. Therefore
no support is provided for the notion that innovating firms constrained by lack of knowl-
edge are more likely to acquire to obtain technological advancement. The KnowLack
coefficient in the divestment equation is positive and significant at the 10% level. This
suggests that firms faced with knowledge constraints may free up resources through di-
vestment in order to invest in internal R&D. The positive and significant coefficient on
FinLack in the divestment equation provides further support for this idea. Firms facing
financial constraints to innovation are more likely to sell off assets through divestment.
The coefficients on ln(size) is positive and significant in both equations suggesting
that large firms are more likely to engage in restructuring. Coefficients on Exports are
positive and significant in the acquisition equation implying that exporting firms are more
likely to acquire than non-exporters. The coefficient on the innovation variable in the
acquisition equation is positive and significant, whereas in the divestment equation it is
negative and significant. Acquiring firms are likely to have innovated in t − n, whereas
divestors are likely to be non-innovators.
The second stage of the investigation uses a Heckman correction for sample selection
because the dependent variable is only defined for innovating firms and therefore may
create selection bias. The selection equation takes the form of a probit with a binary
dependent variable PosNTMS that records positive ‘new to the market’ sales as 1 and
no ‘new to the market sales’ as 0. Explanatory variables include those included in the
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second stage equation except Coop and ContR&D because these are undefined for non-
innovators. A binary product innovation variable ProdInn is additionally included to
indicate if the firm reports a new product innovation.
PosNTMSt = γ0+γ1ln(size)t−n+γ2ExportIntt−n+γ3ProdInnt−n+γ4Acqt−n+γ5Divt−n
+ γ6(Acqt−n ∗ InnConst−n) + γ7(Divt−n ∗ InnConst−n) + γ8Sector + γ9T (3.97)
This equation identifies the determinants of a positive probability of sales of ‘new
to the market’ innovations. The results of this equation show export and ln(size) have
positive and significant coefficients. In the 2 year lag version, Acq has a negative coef-
ficient, whereas the Acq ∗KnowLack interaction and Acq ∗ OtherLack interaction have
positive and significant coefficients. This implies acquisition by firms with no innovation
barriers has a negative impact on the probability of positive ‘new to the market’ sales,
but acquisition has a positive impact on the probability of positive ‘new to the market
sales’ for firms constrained by lack of knowledge.
The estimated probability from the selection equation is included to control for selec-
tion bias in the second stage equation (3.96). The results show ExportInt and ContR&D
have positive and significant coefficients. Other explanatory variables have no significant
effect on the dependent variable. This implies acquisition, divestment and the barriers
to innovation have no significant effect on innovative performance.
This paper is novel because it looks at both divestment and acquisition. Other papers
tend to focus on one event and ignore the interrelationships. It discusses motivations
behind acquisition in detail, although does not describe divestment motives in depth.
The paper could be improved by testing the robustness of the results with different
measures of innovative performance, such are R&D intensity or a patent measure.
Kaul (2012) suggests that divestment can be seen as a firm strategy with reactive or
proactive motives. The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel of 1290 US manu-
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facturing firms from 1982 to 2002. A set of hypotheses are created in order to test which
motivation dominates. The data is taken from Compustat, SDC PLatinum and NBER
patent database. Propensity score matching is used to correct for endogeneity. The first
step is a probit model with binary divestment as the dependent variable. An indicator of
divestment by other firms within the same industry as firm i is included as an instrumen-
tal variable. This should control for ‘bandwagon’ effects increasing the likelihood that
firm i makes a divestment but is uncorrelated with the innovation performance of firm i.
The second stage equation is estimated using fixed effects and is specified as follows.
InnProdt = α + β1Divi,t−3 to t−1 + β2Divi,t−3 to t−1.Mit + β3InnProdi,t−3 + β4Mit+
β5Controls+ ηt + γi + it (3.98)
InnProd is the ratio of patent stock to stock of R&D spending which captures inno-
vation productivity. The stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method with
a depreciation rate of 15% to control for the accumulation of knowledge. Furthermore,
patents are weighted to account for differences in importance of patents. Div is a divest-
ment dummy indicating if divestment has taken place during the previous three years.
M is a vector of independent variables including performance measured by the return
on assets, an entropy measure of diversification, core and non-core divestment dummies,
absorbed slack given by the ratio of ‘sales and administration’ to total sales and available
slack measured as the ratio of current assets to total assets. These variables are also
interacted with the divestment dummy. InnProdi,t−3 is a lagged dependent variable in-
dicating the level of innovation productivity prior to divestment. Controls is a vector of
control variables including stock of R&D expenditure, firm size in terms of assets, the debt
to asset ratio, total value of divestment transactions, stock of advertising expenditure,
acquisition experience, alliance experience and change in performance and diversification
over the previous three years. Industry mean of Tobin’s Q, rival R&D expenditure and
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rival productivity are also included to control for industry characteristics.
An alternative dependent variable measuring technological diversity TechDiv is also
used. This is measured as 1 minus the Herfindahl index of firm patenting, where the
index is calculated using the ratio of patents by firm i at time t in patent class j to
total patents by firm i at time t. This dependent variable is used to test how divestment
impacts the diversity of technology projects.
TechDivit = 1−
∑ Pijt
Pit
over all j (3.99)
Results of the first stage probit shows divestment is more likely for highly diversified
firms with high R&D stock, high pre-divestment R&D productivity and high debt to
asset ratios. Furthermore, divestment is more likely following recent acquisitions and
when the firm’s industry has high levels of divestment.
The second stage model reveals a positive coefficient on the divestment dummy, in-
dicating that on average innovation productivity increases following divestment as both
theories predicted. The interaction between pre-divestment profitability has a positive
coefficient. This supports the proactive view, as it indicates the firm’s with higher pre-
divestment profitability benefited most in terms of R&D productivity from divestment.
The negative coefficient on the divestment and pre-divestment diversification interaction
indicates that the impact on R&D productivity is greater for less diversified firms, again
supporting the proactive view. The binary indicators of core and non-core divestments
indicate that firms benefit in terms of R&D productivity following both types of divest-
ment. Robustness checks using alternative measures of innovation support the original
findings. The alternatives include firms’ citation-weighted patent stock unadjusted for
R&D expenditure, unweighted patents to R&D expenditure ratio and patents to R&D
expenditure ratio where patents are weighted by non-self citations.
In summary the majority of the findings of this study support the proactive motivation
for divestment. This suggests that divestment is mostly motivated by external conditions
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and the desire to free up resources in order to embark on new opportunities by pursuing
technological innovation.
3.5 Summary
This section has outlined the main motivations behind restructuring events and discussed
the implications of these events. Strategic, synergistic, refocusing and managerial motiva-
tions for joining and separating events were identified in the discussion of the theoretical
literature. Strategic motivations concern the industry supply and demand conditions,
market share and industry concentration. This provides mixed conclusions in terms of
profitability outcomes. Synergistic motivations arise from potential economies of scale
and technology transfer opportunities for joining events and refocusing motivations result
from dis-economies of scale from over-diversification and excessive growth for separating
events. Improved performance is the anticipated outcome following events motivated
by these considerations. Managerial motivations occur when the manager pursues al-
ternative objectives to profit maximisation, such as growth or streamlining if these are
favourable with shareholders. Managers of firms with high levels of debt may be more
inclined to act in the shareholders’ interests because they may be at greater risk of being
replaced. Various outcomes could occur as a result of this scenario.
Empirical studies in the event motivation literature predominantly use probit, logit
or competing risk survival models. The explanatory variables in these models typically
include market share, industry concentration, firm size measured using total assets and
number of employees, innovation performance, profitability, leverage, liquidity, a measure
of diversification and indicators of involvement in previous events. The evidence suggests
that differences in pre-event characteristics exist between different event types. Acquisi-
tion and divestment are more likely following a previous acquisition or divestment. Some
interesting results are found when a distinction is made between foreign and domestic
events. These ideas can be investigated in more detail in this study.
Empirical evidence on post-event outcomes show that an initial negative impact in
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innovation and performance is often incurred during the immediate post-event period.
This is likely to be due to the disruption of reorganisation. Overall, post-event innovation
outcomes are mixed. Firm performance is generally found to increase following foreign
acquisition and refocusing events have a positive impact on profitability.
The main criticism of these papers is that a clear distinction is not always made
between different event types. The terms ‘merger’ and ‘acquisition’ are often used inter-
changeably. Most papers place emphasis on the ‘acquirer’ or ‘acquired’ firm and do not
make comparisons between them or with other events. The number of studies investi-
gating separating events is limited and distinctions between different types of separating
event are not considered. Firm restructuring events should be clearly defined because dif-
ferences in motivations can exist between event categories. The data used in this study
allows restructuring events to be clearly defined.
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n
ova
tio
n
d
u
m
m
y,
in
n
ovation
sto
ck
,
size,
size
2,
g
row
th
,
to
tal
assets,
log
(T
obin ′sQ
),
levera
g
e,
liq
u
id
ity
ra
tio
,
in
d
u
stry
a
n
d
tim
e
d
u
m
m
ies.
A
cq
u
ired
fi
rm
s
are
m
ore
likely
to
h
ave
h
igh
er
R
&
D
in
ten
sity
an
d
p
aten
t
sto
ck
th
an
n
on
-acq
u
ired
fi
rm
s,
b
u
t
p
o
orer
fi
-
n
an
cial
ch
aracteristics.
B
ertra
n
d
(20
0
9)
P
ro
b
it
(P
S
m
atch
)
L
iF
i
F
ren
ch
m
an
u
fa
ctu
rin
g
fi
rm
s
1
9
9
4
-2
0
0
4
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
F
o
reig
n
a
cq
u
isition
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
m
a
rket
sh
a
re,
p
rofi
tab
il-
ity,
p
ro
fi
ta
b
ility
2,
d
eb
t
ra
tio,
R
&
D
in
-
ten
sity,
ca
p
ita
l
in
ten
sity
F
oreign
acq
u
isition
is
m
ore
likely
for
fi
rm
s
w
ith
a
larger
m
arket
sh
are,
h
igh
er
R
&
D
in
ten
sity
an
d
R
&
D
sk
ill
in
ten
sity.
T
h
ere
is
a
U
-sh
ap
ed
relation
sh
ip
w
ith
p
rofi
tab
ility.
O
rn
a
gh
i
(2
009
)
L
o
git
(P
S
m
atch
)
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
a
n
d
P
o
o
r’s
C
o
m
p
u
sta
t,
B
u
rea
u
V
a
n
D
ijk
’s
O
siris,
P
a
ten
t
d
a
ta
fro
m
N
B
E
R
,
B
ritish
N
a
tio
n
a
l
F
o
rm
u
la
ry,
th
e
O
ra
n
g
e
B
o
o
k
o
f
F
o
o
d
a
n
d
D
ru
g
A
d
m
in
istra
tio
n
a
n
d
M
erg
ers
b
o
o
k
.
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
a
cq
u
isitio
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
-
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
d
ru
g
s
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
in
g
p
aten
t
ex
p
ira
tio
n
,
p
ercen
ta
g
e
o
f
n
ew
d
ru
gs
in
-
tro
d
u
ced
in
to
th
e
m
a
rk
et,
con
cen
tra-
tio
n
o
f
p
a
ten
ts,
sto
ck
m
arket
valu
e,
g
row
th
o
f
sto
ck
,
m
a
rket
co
n
cen
tration
,
tim
e
a
n
d
in
d
u
stry
d
u
m
m
ies
M
ergers
are
m
ore
likely
to
o
ccu
r
if
cu
r-
ren
t
p
aten
ts
are
lik
ely
to
ex
p
ire.
D
esy
lla
s
a
n
d
H
u
g
h
es
(201
0
)
L
o
g
it
(P
S
m
atch
)
U
S
p
u
b
licly
tra
d
ed
h
igh
-tech
fi
rm
s
198
4
-1
9
9
8
fro
m
C
o
m
p
u
sta
t,
N
B
E
R
an
d
D
u
n
a
n
d
B
rad
street
‘W
h
o
O
w
n
s
W
h
o
’
D
atab
a
se
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
a
cq
u
isitio
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
-
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
F
irm
size,
g
row
th
,
p
rof-
ita
b
ility,
levera
g
e,
R
&
D
in
ten
sity,
R
&
D
p
ro
d
u
ctiv
ity,
k
n
ow
led
g
e
b
ase
size,
in
-
d
u
stry
a
n
d
tim
e
d
u
m
m
ies
N
ot
rep
orted
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T
ab
le
3.
1
(c
on
ti
n
u
ed
):
L
it
er
at
u
re
O
ve
rv
ie
w
2
A
u
th
o
r
M
e
th
o
d
o
lo
g
y
D
a
ta
K
e
y
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
R
e
su
lt
s
B
an
d
ic
k
et
al
.
(2
01
0)
P
ro
b
it
(P
S
m
at
ch
)
S
w
ed
is
h
m
a
n
u
fa
c-
tu
ri
n
g
1
9
9
3
-2
0
0
2
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
fo
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
la
b
o
u
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y,
p
la
n
t
a
g
e,
a
g
e2
,
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
em
p
lo
ye
es
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
m
ea
n
,
R
&
D
a
n
d
sk
il
l
in
te
n
si
ty
,
ex
p
o
rt
in
te
n
si
ty
a
n
d
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
fo
re
ig
n
p
re
se
n
ce
in
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
M
o
re
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
e
fi
rm
s
a
re
li
ke
ly
to
b
e
ta
ke
n
ov
er
G
u
ad
al
u
p
e
et
al
.
(2
01
2)
P
ro
b
it
(P
S
m
at
ch
)
18
0
0
S
p
a
n
is
h
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
fi
rm
s
1
9
9
0
-2
0
0
6
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
D
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
re
p
re
se
n
t-
in
g
fo
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
in
g
iv
en
ye
a
r
o
r
fo
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
a
n
y
ti
m
e
d
u
ri
n
g
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
lo
g
la
b
o
u
r
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
a
n
d
lo
g
re
a
l
fi
rm
sa
le
s
a
t
va
ri
o
u
s
la
g
s
T
h
e
re
su
lt
s
su
g
g
es
t
ev
id
en
ce
o
f
“
ch
er
ry
p
ic
k
in
g
”
.
F
o
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
ir
er
s
se
le
ct
th
e
m
o
st
p
ro
d
u
ct
iv
e
ta
rg
et
s.
G
ar
c´ı
a-
V
eg
a
et
al
.
(2
01
2)
P
ro
b
it
(P
S
m
at
ch
)
S
p
a
n
is
h
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
fi
rm
s
2
0
0
4
-2
0
0
9
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
F
o
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
p
la
n
to
ry
:
si
ze
,
si
ze
2
,l
a
b
o
u
r
p
ro
d
u
c-
ti
v
it
y,
ex
p
o
rt
d
u
m
m
y,
R
&
D
va
ri
a
b
le
s
F
o
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
ir
er
s
se
le
ct
m
o
re
p
ro
d
u
c-
ti
ve
,
m
ed
iu
m
si
ze
d
fi
rm
s
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
in
te
rn
a
l
R
&
D
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
S
zu¨
cs
(2
01
2)
P
ro
b
it
or
L
og
it
(P
S
m
at
ch
)
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
,
F
ed
er
a
l
T
ra
d
e
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
w
it
h
26
5
a
cq
u
ir
in
g
fi
rm
s
an
s
1
3
3
ta
rg
et
s
fr
o
m
a
cr
o
ss
2
5
n
a
ti
o
n
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
a
cq
u
ir
er
d
u
m
m
y
o
r
a
c-
q
u
ir
ed
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
R
&
D
in
-
te
n
si
ty
,
R
&
D
g
ro
w
th
,
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s,
em
-
p
lo
ye
es
,
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y,
to
ta
l
d
eb
t,
a
g
e
a
n
d
a
g
e2
A
cq
u
ir
er
s
te
n
d
to
b
e
la
rg
e
a
n
d
p
ro
f-
it
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
ta
rg
et
s
te
n
d
to
h
av
e
h
ig
h
R
&
D
in
te
n
si
ty
a
n
d
re
la
ti
ve
ly
lo
w
p
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
C
on
yo
n
et
al
.
(2
00
2)
M
u
lt
in
om
ia
l
L
og
it
O
n
eS
o
u
rc
e
U
K
co
m
p
a
n
ie
s
19
8
7
-1
9
9
6
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
C
a
te
g
o
ri
ca
l
va
ri
a
b
le
w
it
h
n
o
ev
en
t,
U
K
a
cq
u
ir
ed
a
n
d
fo
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
ir
ed
a
s
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
W
a
g
es
,
p
ro
fi
t,
si
ze
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
F
D
I
S
m
a
ll
fi
rm
s
a
re
m
o
re
li
k
el
y
to
b
e
ta
r-
g
et
s.
F
o
re
ig
n
fi
rm
s
se
ek
ta
rg
et
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
th
a
n
av
er
a
g
e
p
ro
fi
t
w
h
er
ea
s
U
K
fi
rm
s
h
av
e
se
ek
ta
rg
et
s
w
it
h
lo
w
er
th
a
n
av
er
a
g
e
w
a
g
es
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T
ab
le
3.1
(con
tin
u
ed
):2
L
iteratu
re
O
verv
iew
2
A
u
th
o
r
M
e
th
o
d
o
lo
g
y
D
a
ta
K
e
y
V
a
ria
b
le
s
R
e
su
lts
H
a
rris
(2
0
09)
P
rob
it
(P
S
m
a
tch
)
A
R
D
U
K
m
an
u
fa
ctu
rin
g
p
lan
ts
1
9
8
5
-2
0
0
5
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
a
cq
u
isitio
n
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
-
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
la
b
o
u
r
p
ro
d
u
ctiv
ity,
cap
ital-
la
b
o
u
r
ra
tio
,
size
p
ercen
ta
ge
of
foreign
ow
n
ersh
ip
in
in
d
u
stry
N
ot
rep
orted
M
ata
a
n
d
P
o
rtu
ga
l
(2
000
)
C
o
m
p
etin
g
R
isk
s
su
rv
iva
l
m
o
d
el
D
ata
fro
m
P
ortu
g
u
ese
M
in
istry
o
f
E
m
p
loy
m
en
t
198
3
-8
9
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
C
a
teg
o
rica
l
variab
le
w
ith
n
o
ev
en
t,
d
iv
estm
en
t
a
n
d
closu
re
as
th
e
ca
teg
o
ries
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
G
reen
fi
eld
d
u
m
m
y,
p
ro
p
o
rtio
n
o
f
co
llege
grad
u
-
a
tes
in
w
o
rk
fo
rce,
lo
g
em
p
loyees,
for-
eig
n
su
b
sid
ia
ry
d
u
m
m
ies,
lim
ited
liab
il-
ity
d
u
m
m
y,
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
la
n
ts,
d
iversi-
fi
ca
tio
n
m
ea
su
re,
lo
g
o
f
m
in
im
u
m
ef-
fi
cien
t
sca
le,
in
d
u
stry
g
row
th
,
ratio
of
em
p
loy
m
en
t
in
fo
reig
n
ow
n
ed
fi
rm
s
to
in
d
u
stry
to
ta
l
D
iff
eren
ces
b
etw
een
ch
aracteristics
of
th
ose
fi
rm
s
th
at
ex
it
th
rou
gh
closu
re
an
d
d
ivestm
en
t.
F
oreign
ow
n
ed
su
b
-
sid
iaries
are
m
ore
likely
to
close.
L
im
-
ited
liab
ility
fi
rm
s
are
less
lik
ely
to
close
b
u
t
m
ore
likely
to
b
e
d
ivested
th
an
u
n
-
lim
ited
liab
ility
fi
rm
s.
L
arger
fi
rm
s
are
less
lik
ely
to
ex
it
H
ay
n
es
et
al.
(2
003
)
N
eg
ative
B
in
om
ia
l
an
d
P
oisson
m
o
d
els
U
K
fi
rm
s
198
5
-1
9
9
1
D
atastrea
m
C
en
tre
for
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
B
u
you
t
R
esea
rch
D
atab
a
se
a
n
d
F
in
an
cia
l
T
im
es
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
D
ivestm
en
ts
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
rtio
n
o
f
a
ssets
d
iv
ested
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
P
ro
fi
ta
b
ility
m
easu
res,
levera
g
e,
p
resen
ce
o
f
ta
keover
th
reat,
ch
a
n
g
e
in
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t,
d
iversifi
cation
,
m
a
rket
co
n
cen
tra
tio
n
,
m
arket
sh
are,
p
rev
io
u
s
a
cq
u
isitio
n
s.
P
rofi
t
an
d
m
arket
con
cen
tration
h
ave
n
egative
an
d
sign
ifi
can
t
co
effi
cien
ts.
F
irm
size,
m
arket
sh
are,
leverage,
d
i-
vestm
en
t,
th
reat
of
takeover,
an
d
d
iver-
sifi
cation
h
ave
a
p
ositive
an
d
sign
ifi
can
t
im
p
act
on
th
e
p
rob
ab
ility
of
d
iv
estm
en
t
V
an
B
eers
a
n
d
D
ek
ker
(2
009
)
lo
git
(P
S
m
atch
)
C
o
m
m
u
n
ity
In
n
ova
tio
n
S
u
rvey
(C
IS
)
fro
m
th
e
N
eth
erla
n
d
s
(1
9
96
-2
0
0
4
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
A
cq
u
isitio
n
d
u
m
m
y
or
d
i-
vestm
en
t
d
u
m
m
y
E
x
p
la
n
a
tory
:
N
u
m
-
b
er
o
f
em
p
loyees,
ex
p
o
rt
d
u
m
m
y,
in
-
n
ova
tio
n
d
u
m
m
y,
‘co
n
stra
in
t
to
in
n
o-
va
tio
n
’
d
u
m
m
ies,
p
rev
io
u
s
acq
u
isition
d
u
m
m
y,
p
rev
io
u
s
d
ivestm
en
t
d
u
m
m
y,
in
d
u
stry
a
n
d
tim
e
d
u
m
m
ies
P
ositive
an
d
sign
ifi
can
t
im
p
act
of
p
re-
v
iou
s
acq
u
isition
an
d
d
iv
estm
en
t
d
u
m
-
m
ies
in
d
icate
th
at
acq
u
isition
s
an
d
d
i-
vestm
en
ts
m
ay
o
ccu
r
as
p
art
of
b
road
er
restru
ctu
rin
g
p
olicies
K
au
l
(201
2
)
P
ro
b
it
(P
S
m
atch
)
C
om
p
u
sta
t,
S
D
C
P
latin
u
m
,
N
B
E
R
p
aten
t
d
a
ta
b
a
se
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
b
in
a
ry
d
ivestm
en
t
variab
le
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
d
iversifi
ca
tio
n
,
leverage,
p
rev
io
u
s
a
cq
u
isitio
n
,
level
o
f
d
ivestm
en
t
w
ith
in
in
d
u
stry,
R
&
D
sto
ck
an
d
R
&
D
p
ro
d
u
ctiv
ity
D
ivestm
en
t
is
m
ore
likely
for
d
iversifi
ed
fi
rm
s
w
ith
h
igh
R
&
D
sto
ck
,
h
igh
d
eb
t
to
asset
ratios,
follow
in
g
p
rev
iou
s
acq
u
i-
sition
an
d
w
ith
in
in
d
u
stries
w
ith
h
igh
levels
of
d
ivestm
en
t
180
T
ab
le
3.
2:
L
it
er
at
u
re
O
ve
rv
ie
w
3
A
u
th
o
r
M
e
th
o
d
o
lo
g
y
D
a
ta
K
e
y
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
R
e
su
lt
s
C
lo
o
d
t
et
al
.
(2
00
6)
R
an
d
om
eff
ec
ts
an
d
n
eg
at
iv
e
b
in
om
ia
l
S
ec
u
ri
ti
es
D
a
ta
b
a
se
,
A
m
a
d
eu
s,
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t
W
o
rl
d
sc
o
p
e
a
n
d
U
S
P
a
te
n
t
O
ffi
ce
19
8
5
-1
9
9
4
,
3
4
7
fi
rm
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
te
n
ts
E
x
-
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
si
ze
o
f
a
cq
u
ir
ed
k
n
ow
l-
ed
g
e
b
a
se
,
re
la
ti
ve
si
ze
o
f
a
cq
u
ir
ed
k
n
ow
le
d
g
e
b
a
se
,
re
la
te
d
n
es
s
o
f
a
cq
u
ir
ed
k
n
ow
le
d
g
e
b
a
se
,
cu
lt
u
ra
l
d
is
ta
n
ce
T
ec
h
n
ic
a
l
M
&
A
s
h
av
e
in
it
ia
l
p
o
si
ti
ve
im
p
a
ct
o
n
in
n
ov
a
ti
o
n
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
fo
l-
lo
w
ed
b
y
a
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
im
p
a
ct
.
N
o
n
-
te
ch
n
ic
a
l
M
&
A
s
h
av
e
a
n
eg
a
ti
ve
im
p
a
ct
o
n
in
n
ov
a
ti
o
n
.
B
er
tr
an
d
(2
00
9)
P
ro
p
en
si
ty
sc
or
e
m
at
ch
in
g
an
d
d
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n
-
d
iff
er
en
ce
F
re
n
ch
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
fi
rm
s
fr
o
m
L
iF
i
19
9
4
-2
0
0
4
D
ID
D
ep
en
d
en
t:
C
h
a
n
g
e
in
R
&
D
ex
-
p
en
d
it
u
re
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
-
a
b
le
s
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
fo
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
a
t
ti
m
e
t,
t-
1
,
t-
2
a
n
d
t-
3
F
o
re
ig
n
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
le
a
d
s
to
a
n
in
cr
ea
se
in
R
&
D
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
in
ea
ch
p
o
st
-
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
ye
a
r
O
rn
ag
h
i
(2
00
9)
P
ro
p
en
si
ty
sc
or
e
m
at
ch
in
g,
d
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n
-
d
iff
er
en
ce
an
d
H
ec
k
m
an
2-
st
ep
C
o
m
p
u
st
a
t,
O
si
ri
s,
N
B
E
R
,
B
ri
ti
sh
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
F
o
rm
u
la
ry
,
th
e
or
a
n
g
e
b
o
o
k
a
n
d
th
e
m
er
g
er
s
b
o
o
k
D
ID
d
ep
en
d
en
t:
C
h
a
n
g
e
in
lo
g
in
n
ov
a
-
ti
o
n
E
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
:
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
a
t
t,
t-
1
,
t-
2
a
n
d
t-
3
In
n
ov
a
ti
o
n
o
u
tc
o
m
es
d
ec
li
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4 An Investigation into Pre-Events Motivations and
Firm Characterisitics
4.1 Introduction
The restructuring of firm organisation is an important part of corporate strategy. Mo-
tivations behind these actions are not directly observable. This chapter distinguishes
between various different types of restructuring event. These include “acquirer”, ‘ac-
quired’, ‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’, ‘break-up’, ‘divested’, ‘divestor’ and ‘trade sale’.
The aim is to investigate the determinants of these restructuring events by identifying
the characteristics of the firms involved. A key distinction is made between domestic
and foreign events. Further analysis is undertaken on events in high-tech industries since
motivations are likely to differ from events involving other manufacturing firms. This will
allow inferences to be drawn about the motivations driving the events. A contribution
to the literature is made by using detailed data to distinguish between many different
event types and considering these restructuring events simultaneously. The majority of
prior papers overlook the fact that these events may be interrelated as part of a wider
restructuring strategy.
Events may be motivated by different considerations and therefore the characteristics
of firms in each group are likely to be different. For example, joining events may be
undertaken due to technology seeking motives or as a method of quickly increasing market
share (Desyllas and Hughes, 2009). When the acquirer seeks to derive technological
benefits from its target, the acquired firm is likely to have strong performance in terms of
innovation performance or productivity. This behaviour is described as “cherry-picking”.
Alternatively, firms may choose lemons as acquisition targets with the aim of reorganising
and improving the performance of these failing firms (Balsvik and Haller, 2010). The
acquisition of these targets could be motivated by the aim of quickly expanding the firm’s
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current operations to increase market share or a competitive strategy to gain the upper
hand over rival firms. This is more likely when the industry is growing (Hay and Liu,
1998). Acquirers are expected to have a good performance record and available finance.
Dickerson et al. (2003) find that acquisition acts as a form of defence against becoming
a takeover target. This implies that events may be strategically interlinked. Mergers
differ from acquisitions because they tend to involve mutual agreements. Firms will
seek acquisitions partners to gain from technology synergies and complementarities. A
change in ownership can represent a firm changing ownership to a newly created domestic
enterprise but also represents new foreign entry into the the UK. There is likely to be
distinct differences between domestic and foreign change of ownership.
Separating events may be motivated by the decision to refocus on core activity to
either improve productivity or pursue new opportunities in the market (Kaul, 2012).
Depending on the motives, divestors will either have poor performance and use divestment
to salvage the firm through refocusing or medium to strong performance and aim to divest
to free up funds to reinvest as part of a broader strategy. In these circumstances events are
interrelated. A breakup is likely to be motivated by the decision to refocus and become
independent. The characteristics of firms undertaking this type of event may differ from
divested firms. Tradesales and acquirer-divestor describe different type of restructuring
events involving simultanteous joining and separating events.
This study uses UK data covering the period 2000-2007. Samples are created by
combining the Business Structure Database (BSD), Annual Respondent Database (ARD)
and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). Data on R&D expenditure is taken from
the Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) data. The enterprise and
enterprise group reference codes in the BSD are used to identify the occurrence of events.
These are established based on changes in the codes between time periods.
This chapter contains a description of the methodology used in section 4.2, the data
used and identification of events in section 4.3, descriptive statistics in section 4.6, results
are explained in section 4.7 and section 4.8 concludes the study. The results from this
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chapter inform the following chapter as selection into different event types is observed.
4.2 Methodology
The aim of this analysis is to identify differences in characteristics between the types of
firm that undertake restructuring events. Inferences about the motivations to engage in
each event can be drawn from this. Events are categorised in 9 different ways, including
no event, acquired, acquirer, merger, change of ownership, break-up, divestor, divested,
trade-sale or acquirer-divestor. Acquirer-divestor describes the situation where the a firm
acts as an acquirer and a divestor during the same period. Events are mutually exclusive
and observations are case-specific; one alternative is observed for each firm in each time
period.
4.2.1 Discrete Outcome Models
A discrete outcome model is a form of analysis that models the probability of outcome
events based on characteristics. The outcome event is chosen from a set of qualitative
alternatives. The simplest case offers two outcomes and is estimated with a binary
choice model. The binary outcome variable y can take the values of 0 or 1 and x is
a vector of characteristics. If y was modelled as a linear function of x, the standard
errors and t-statistics would be invalid because the error terms would not be normally
distributed and the predicted probabilities may be less than 0 or greater than 1. Therefore
it is necessary to base the model around an underlying regression, which includes an
underlying continuous latent variable, y∗ (Greene, 2000).
y∗ = βx′ +  (4.1)
βx′ is the index function and the error terms  are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed. y∗ is not observable and meets with the following criteria.
y = 1 if y∗ > 0
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y = 0 if y∗ ≤ 0
Therefore if y∗ exceeds zero, the binary outcome equals 1 and if y∗ is less than or
equal to zero, the binary outcome takes the value of zero. This allows the latent variable
y∗ to take any value from negative to positive infinity, yet the outcome variable remains
binary. Given the normalising assumption of the zero threshold and assuming that the
distribution of the error term is known, the probability that y = 1 is as follows.
Prob(y∗ > 0|x) = Prob( > −x′β|x) (4.2)
A symmetric distribution for the error terms, such as normal or logistic, ensures that
Prob(y∗ > 0|x) = Prob( < x′β|x) = F (x′β) (4.3)
where F (ψ) is the cumulative density function of the random variable. The following is
implied to obtain predictions that are consistent with this theory.
lim
x′β→+∞
Prob(y = 1|x) = 1 (4.4)
lim
x′β→−∞
Prob(y = 1|x) = 0 (4.5)
This can be represented using the logistic distribution as follows to obtain the logit model,
Prob(y = 1|x) = exp(x
′β)
1 + exp(x′β)
= Λ(x′β) (4.6)
or using the normal distribution to obtain the probit model.53
Prob(y = 1|x) =
∫ x′β
−∞
φ(t)dt = Φ(x′β) (4.7)
The choice of distribution may have an impact on the results depending on the character
of the sample. The logistic and normal distribution are similar, although the logistic
53Other distributions can be used, but these are the most common.
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distribution has heavier tails. This implies that the logit model will provide larger prob-
abilities for y = 1 than the probit when x′β is very small and smaller probabilities when
x′β is very large. Differences in results may also be observed if there are few observa-
tions in an outcome category or an explanatory variable with a large variation across
observation.
These models are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. Each observation
is treated as a single draw from the Bernoulli distribution. The likelihood function is
given by
Prob(Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn|X) =
∏
yi=0
(1− F (x′iβ))
∏
yi=1
F (x′iβ) (4.8)
where X represents [xi]i=1,2...n. For a sample of n observations, the likelihood function
becomes
L(β|sample) =
n∏
i=1
(F (x′iβ))
yi(1− F (x′iβ))(1−yi) (4.9)
Logs are taken to give the following.
lnL =
n∑
i=1
(yilnF (x
′
iβ) + (1− yi)lnF (1− x′iβ)) (4.10)
The first order conditions for maximisation are obtained, where fi is the density, dFi/d(x
′
iβ).
∂lnL
∂β
=
n∑
i=1
[
yifi
Fi
+ (1− yi) −fi
1− Fi
]
xi = 0 (4.11)
The first and second order conditions for the logit model are specified as follows.
∂lnL
∂β
=
n∑
i=1
(yi − Λi)xi = 0 (4.12)
∂2lnL
∂β∂β′
= −
∑
i
Λi(1− Λi)xix′i = 0 (4.13)
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Whereas first and second order conditions for the probit model are given by the following,
where qi = 2yi − 1.
∂lnL
∂β
=
n∑
i=1
[
qiφ(qix
′
iβ)
Φ(qix′iβ)
]
xi =
n∑
i=1
λixi = 0 (4.14)
∂2lnL
∂β∂β′
=
n∑
i=1
−λi(λi + x′iβ)xix′i (4.15)
Due to their non-linear nature, these models are solved using iterative methods.
4.2.2 Multiple Discrete Outcome Models
The binary model can be expanded for multiple alternatives, where the event variable has
discrete responses with unordered categories. The multinomial logit (MNL) is computa-
tionally less burdensome than the multinomial probit (MNP) because the MNP requires
the evaluation of multiple integrals. The multinomial logit model can be specified as
follows.
Prob(Yi = j|wi) = exp(w
′
iαj)∑J
j=0 exp(w
′
iαj)
′ (4.16)
Where j is one of J + 1 alternative events for firm i, therefore j = 0, 1, 2, ..., J . The
ordering of events is arbitrary. Prob(Yi = j|wi) shows the probability that the outcome
for firm i is event j, conditional on the explanatory variables wi. The model ensures
0 < Prob(Yi = j) < 1 and
∑J
j=1 pij = 1. Only J probabilities can be freely specified. αj
represents the corresponding coefficients and is set to zero for the base category to ensure
identification, α0 = 0 where j = 0. Therefore the model becomes
Prob(Yi = j|wi) = exp(w
′
iαj)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp(w
′
iαk)
′ (4.17)
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The model relies on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives. This
states that the relative odds of events occurring will not be influenced by the inclusion
of additional event categories. It seems reasonable to assume that this will hold in this
case.
The log-likelihood equation can be obtained by setting dij = 1 if firm i incurs outcome
j and dij = 0 if firm i incurs the base outcome. This is completed for each of the J + 1
alternatives so each firm has only one dij = 1.
lnL =
n∑
i=1
J∑
j=0
dijlnProb(Yi = j|wi) (4.18)
The first derivatives are given by
∂lnL
∂αj
=
n∑
i=1
(dij − Pij)wi for j = 1, 2, ...J (4.19)
Second derivatives are given as follows, where 1(j = l) is equal to 1 if j = l and 0 if j 6= l.
∂2lnL
∂αj∂α′l
= −
n∑
i=1
Pij[1(j = l)− Pil]wiw′i (4.20)
The results for the estimated coefficients can be interpreted with respect to the base
category, as the multinomial logit is equivalent to a set of pairwise binary logit models. A
positive coefficient implies that with an increase in the corresponding explanatory variable
the likelihood of event j increases relative to the base event. Relative risk ratios show
the risk of an event j occurring relative to the risk of the base event occurring. They can
be obtained as follows.
Prob(yi = j)
Prob(yi = 1)
= exp(w′iαj) (4.21)
Results can also be obtained in terms of marginal effects. Due to the non-linear
form of the logit model, the marginal impact of a change in an explanatory variable is
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not constant. Marginal effects depend upon the point of evaluation. They are usually
evaluated at the sample mean of the regressors x = w¯, at a representative value w = w∗,
or the average of the marginal effects at each w = wi.
∂pij
∂wi
= pij(αj − α¯i) (4.22)
α¯i =
∑
l pilαl is the probability weighted average of the αl coefficients, pij varies with
the point of evaluation in terms of wi. The signs on the regression coefficients may differ
from the signs on the corresponding marginal effects. The marginal effect on variable w
will be positive if αj > α¯i.
4.2.3 The Estimating Equation
The multinomial logit estimating equation can be specified as follows.
Eventit = α + βXit−1 + ΨIi + λTt + it (4.23)
Eventit is a categorical dependent variable for firm i at time t. Each category indicates
an occurrence of a type of event at time t. The main analysis uses a dependent variable
with 10 event categories. These events include ‘no event’, ‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’, ‘merger’,
‘change of ownership’, ‘break-up’, ‘divested’, ‘divestor’, ‘tradesale’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’.
‘No event’ is the base category. The number of categories is increased to 20 in order to
distinguish between foreign and UK events, where ‘UK no event’ is the base category.
X is a vector of firm and industry characteristics, I is a vector of industry dummies at
the 1-digit level54, T is a vector of time dummies, β, Ψ and λ are the corresponding
parameters, α is the intercept and  is the error term. Events occur between t− 1 and t,
therefore explanatory variables at t− 1 are used to ensure that pre-event characteristics
are captured. The following section describes the data used in this analysis, including
the definitions of events and characteristics.
54The 1-digit industry level was used to prevent multinomial logit convergence problems.
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4.3 Data
The sample used in this analysis is created by merging four datasets. The Business Struc-
ture Database (BSD) contains a register of all firms and therefore can be used to identify
demographic ownership events. The Annual Respondents Database (ARD) provides de-
tails on firm characteristics and Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD)
contains data on R&D. Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) includes financial data
on firms in the UK. See Chapter 1 and the following subsections for a more detailed
discussion of the datasets and the identification of demographic events.
4.4 Definition of Events
The first stage of creating the dataset involves creating event dummies using the BSD.
The BSD exists at enterprise level and local unit (plant) level. For this analysis it
is appropriate to use enterprise level observations because BERD data is provided at
reporting unit level, therefore plant level observations cannot be directly observed. It is
more appropriate to aggregate the reporting unit BERD data upwards to enterprise level
because the creation of plant level observations requires assumptions about the division of
reporting unit R&D activity between plants. Any assumptions imposed would be unlikely
to accurately reflect reality.
The BSD provides a register of all enterprises within the UK. Each enterprise has an
enterprise code and an enterprise group code, where the enterprise group is the owner
of the enterprise. Demographic events are identified when the enterprise group reference
code for a given enterprise changes. These changes in enterprise group references are
classified into different groups according to the nature of the change and the number of
enterprises involved pre and post change.
It is necessary to generate event indicators using enterprise and enterprise group refer-
ence codes because the demvar variable provided within the BSD seems to be unreliable.
Inconsistencies are revealed when specific events are observed within the data. The type
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of event recorded in demvar often differs from the type of event observed based on enter-
prise and enterprise group codes. Furthermore, the demvar variable is only available for
the period 1998-2005.
The following figures provide examples of the structural changes over 2 periods. The
event column on the right hand side provides an example of the event variable coding for
the enterprise in period 2.
Figure 1: Takeover
Period 1
Ent A Ent group 1
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Event
acquired
acquirer
acquirer
A takeover is identified when 2 or more enterprise groups integrate and one enterprise
group retains its enterprise group code. N enterprise groups exist before the event and 1
enterprise group after the event. The ‘acquirer’ retains the same enterprise group code
and the ‘acquired’ enterprise changes from its original enterprise group code to the code
of the ‘acquirer’.
Figure 2: Merger
Period 1
Ent A Ent group 1
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 3
Event
merger
merger
merger
A ‘merger’ is identified when 2 or more enterprise groups integrate and neither enter-
prise group retains its enterprise group code. N enterprise groups exist before the event
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and 1 enterprise group after the event. A new enterprise group code is created that did
not previously exist.
Figure 3: Change of ownership
Period 1
Ent A Ent group 1
Period 2
Ent A Ent group 2
Event
change of
ownership
A ‘change of ownership’ occurs when an enterprise changes enterprise group, the
enterprise group code did not previously exist and no other enterprises are involved. 1
enterprise group before the event and 1 enterprise group after the event.
Figure 4: Break-up
Period 1
Ent A
Ent B
Ent group 1
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent group 2
Ent group 3
Event
break-up
break-up
A ‘break-up’ occurs when an enterprise group splits into two or more enterprise groups
and new enterprise group codes are created that did not previously exist. 1 enterprise
group before the event and n enterprise groups after the event.
Figure 5: Divestment
Period 1
Ent A
Ent B
Ent group 1
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent group 1
Ent group 2
Event
divestor
divested
A split-off or divestment occurs when an enterprise group splits into two or more
enterprise groups. At least one enterprise group retains previous enterprise group code
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and the other enterprise group(s) is (are) given a new code that did not previously exist.
1 enterprise group before the event and n enterprise groups after the event. The ‘divestor’
retains the original enterprise group code, whereas the ‘divested’ enterprise splits off from
the enterprise group and a new enterprise group code is created.
Figure 6: Trade Sale
Period 1
Ent A Ent group 1
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 1
Ent group 2
Event
acquirer
trade sale
divestor
A ‘trade sale’ occurs when an enterprise from one enterprise group is transfered to
another enterprise group. Both enterprise groups continue to exist after the event. This
involves n enterprise groups before the event and n enterprise groups after the event,
where n=n. Enterprise B switches from enterprise group 2 to enterprise group 1.
Figure 7: Acquirer-Divestor
Period 1
Ent A Ent group 1
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Period 2
Ent A
Ent B
Ent C
Ent group 2
Ent group 3
Event
acquired
acquirer-divestor
divested
The ‘acquirer-divestor’ event occurs when an enterprise group divests and acquires
during the same period. Enterprise group 2 acquires enterprise A and divests enterprise
C. Enterprise B remains in enterprise group 2. A new enterprise group code is created
for the divested enterprise C .
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Table 4.1: List of Variables
Variable Description
logY log of gross value added output
logC log of capital stock
logL log of the number of employees
R&D dummy Dummy variable indicating if a firm performs R&D
logKR log of in-house R&D stock
logKTF log of knowledge transfer stock from foreign sources
logKTUK log of knowledge transfer stock from UK sources
Market Share Market share owned by firm
HHI HirshmanHerfindahl Index measure of market concentration
No. Firms Number of firms within the enterprise group
Div. Ratio Diversification measure calculated as the ratio of the number of
industies that an enterprise group is active in to the number of
firms within the enterprise group
log D log of dividend payments to shareholders
log TA log of total assets
log ROTA log of the rate of return on total assets
log DAR log of the debt-to-asset ratio
log LR log of the liquidity ratio
log Age Age of the firm
Previous. event Previous event dummy indicating if an event has occured at an earlier
time within the sample
Industry Dummies Set of industry dummies
Time Dummies Set of time dummies
Zeros and negative values of variables are converted to very small positive numbers to allow logs to be taken.
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4.5 Definitions of Firm and Industry Characteristic Variables
Innovation Performance
The R&D dummy is a binary variable where 1 indicates an R&D performing firm and 0
indicates otherwise. The stock of R&D variables are calculated in the same way as de-
scribed in chapter 2. These variables are included in the models as an attempt to capture
the synergistic technology transfer motivation for joining events and the refocusing motive
for separating events. Joining events may be motivated by a desire to transfer technology
from one joining partner to another to improve performance. Separating events may be
motivated by a desire to refocus on core activity, therefore R&D performing firms may
be divested to focus on other core activities or other firms may be divested to reinvest
funds into R&D activities.
Market Share
This variable is calculated using the turnover variable in the BSD. The BSD covers the
entire population of UK firms, therefore industry turnover can be obtained by aggregating
turnover for all firms within the industry. The following equation represents market share
for firm i, where firm i operates in industry j. Industries are defined at the 5-digit level.
MarketSharei,t =
Turnover for firm i at time t
Turnover for industry j at time t
(4.24)
Market Concentration
The Hirshman-Hirfindahl Index HHI provides a measure of industry level concentration.
It is defined for industry j as follows, where N is the number of firms in the industry.
HHIj,t =
N∑
i=1
(MarketShare2i,t) (4.25)
The HHI ranges from 1 to 1/N and is calculated at the 5-digit industry level. A market
becomes more concentrated if market power is shared amongst a small number of domi-
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nant firms. A higher HHI indicates higher market concentration. The advantages of the
HHI over other measures of market concentration is that it considers all firms within the
industry and gives a greater weighting to the largest firms.
Diversification
The diversification ratio acts as a measure of enterprise group level diversification and is
calculated using the BSD as follows;
Diversification Ratiom =
(Number of Firms in Enterprise group m) -1
Number of Industries engaged in by Enterprise group m
(4.26)
Highly diversified enterprise groups may be more likely to be involved in a separating
event because diversification increases the complexity of an organisation. Over-diversified
firms may seek to refocus on core activities. Diversified enterprise groups may also be more
likely to engage in joining events as diversification may indicate a trend of managerial
growth motives.
Enterprise Group Size
The number of firms variable indicates the number of firms within the firm’s enterprise
group. If firm i belongs to enterprise group m, this variable records the total number
of UK-based firms within enterprise group m at time t. It is identified using the BSD.
Firms from larger enterprise groups may be more likely to be involved in a restructuring
event due to the size of the enterprise group.
Firm Workforce Size
Firm workforce size is measured using the number of employees. This variable is taken
from the ARD.
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Assets
Total assets are defined in FAME as fixed assets plus current assets, where fixed assets
include investments, tangible and intangible assets. The ARD does not provide a measure
of total assets, therefore the capital stock measure as defined in chapter 2 is used as a
measure of tangible fixed assets and investment.
Profitability
The rate of return on total assets is a measure of profitability provided in FAME. It is
defined as follows;
Return on total assetsi,t =
Profits before taxi,t
Total Assetsi,t
(4.27)
The ARD does not provide a measure of profitability, therefore gross value added is
used as a proxy. Gross value added is given by the value of final output minus the
value of inputs. The impact of this variable on the likelihood of events depends on the
predominant motive behind the event. Joining events may be motivated by synergistic
technology transfer motives where a less profitable firm joins with a more profitable
firm. The acquired firms may be less profitable and the acquirer may be more profitable.
Less profitable firms are likely to be divested from an enterprise group when refocusing
strategies are pursued.
Liquidity
The liquidity ratio is a measure of liquidity taken from the financial ratios in FAME.
liquidity Ratioi,t =
Current Assetsi,t-(Stock and W.I.P)i,t
Current Liabilitiesi,t
(4.28)
Current assets include stock, work in progress (W.I.P), trade debtors, bank deposits, in-
vestments and other current assets. Current liabilities include trade creditors, short-term
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loans, overdrafts, corporation tax, dividends, social security and other current liabilities.
Leverage
The debt-to-asset ratio is a measure of leverage calculated using the financial data from
FAME.
Debt-to-Asset Ratioi,t =
Long Term Liabilitiesi,t+Current Liabilitiesi,t
Net Assetsi,t
(4.29)
Long term liabilities includes long term debt, hire purchase, leasing, pension liabilities
and other liabilities. Net assets is total assets minus longterm liabilities. In circumstances
of high debt, managers are more likely to act in the interests of shareholders as their
position may be at risk. The literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of leverage
on joining events, but suggests that higher leverage increases the likelihood of separating
events.
Dividends
The dividends variable is taken from FAME and represents dividend payments made to
shareholders during the financial year.
Previous Events
The previous event dummies indicate at least one previous occurrence of an event. Dum-
mies are included for each event type. These variables aim to capture the interrelation-
ships between events.
Control Variables
The firm age variable is calculated using the year of birth given in the BSD and acts as a
control variable. Sets of industry and time dummies are included to control for industry
and macroeconomic effects.
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Creation of the Sample
BSD
Events are defined at enterprise level using enterprise and enterprise group reference
codes for each observation in the BSD. A categorical ‘event’ variable is created where
the categories include ‘no event’, ‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’, ‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’,
‘break-up’, ‘divested’, ‘divestor’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’. These event cate-
gories are mutually exclusive.
Enterprise group codes are available in the BSD for the period 1997 to 2007. Although
later years are available for the BSD, enterprise group codes are missing in 2008. If an
event occurs between time t− 1 and time t, the event is recorded at time t in the event
variable, therefore events can be defined during the period 1998 to 2007. Table (4.2)
shows the number of events taking place by year using the entire BSD sample.
The pattern of events occurring in 1999 appears to differ from other periods. There are
far more change of ownership events, mergers and break ups and far fewer acquisitions,
divestments and trade sales. This could have arisen due to changes in the recording of
enterprise group codes during this year, as it is unlikely that this is the result of a macroe-
conomic shock during this period. Criscuolo and Martin (2003) report similar problems.
It seems sensible to truncate the sample to 2000-2007 to avoid these irregularities in the
data.
BSD, ARD and BERD Sample
The BSD data is then merged together with the ARD and BERD. Merging the ARD
with the BSD is relatively straight forward because observations exist at enterprise level
in both datasets. The number of matches provided by the merging process is shown
in table (4.3). The observations with common enterprise references between the ARD
and BSD are kept in the sample and unmatched observations are dropped. Over the
2000-2007 period 17,238,323 observations from the BSD and 12,794 from the ARD are
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Table 4.3: BSD and ARD Merge
Year Not Matched Matched Total
From BSD From ARD BSD-ARD
2000 2,037,303 1,724 50,604 2,089,631
2001 2,063,819 2,081 54,772 2,120,672
2002 2,080,170 1,803 51,638 2,133,611
2003 2,099,259 1,802 51,016 2,152,077
2004 2,156,710 1,708 50,714 2,209,132
2005 2,204,416 1,759 49,396 2,255,571
2006 2,261,458 933 40,171 2,302,562
2007 2,335,188 984 43,925 2,380,097
Total 17,238,323 12,794 392,236 17,643,353
Table 4.4: BSD-ARD and BERD Merge
Year Not Matched BSD-ARD-BERD
From BSD-ARD From BERD Matched Keep
2000 47,963 5,950 2,641 50,604
2001 52,354 6,222 2,418 54,772
2002 48,434 7,577 3,204 51,638
2003 48,538 7,292 2,478 51,016
2004 47,675 8,773 3,039 50,714
2005 46,341 9,415 3,055 49,396
2006 36,789 13,163 3,382 40,171
2007 39,955 14,862 3,970 43,925
Total 368,049 73,254 24,187 392236
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unmatched. There are 392,236 matched observations between the BSD and ARD. Merg-
ing the BERD data is a little more complex because observations are only given at
reporting unit level. The corresponding enterprise reference code for each reporting unit
is not included in the BERD data. The look-up table created by Richard Harris is used
to provide the corresponding enterprise reference codes for the appropriate reporting
units. The data is then aggregated to the enterprise level and merged with the BSD.
The matches between the data sets are shown in table (4.4). BERD should include data
for all R&D performing firms in the UK, but not all firms perform R&D. Unmatched
observations between the BSD-ARD and BERD indicate that no R&D was performed by
the enterprise during the year. This assumption is likely to hold in most cases, therefore
missing R&D values for these unmatched BSD-ARD observations are replaced with zero.
All observations from the BSD-ARD sample are kept and only the unmatched observa-
tions from BERD are dropped. The number of observations that are dropped due to
the merging process are shown in the “Not Matched From BERD” column in table (4.4).
The final sample is obtained by dropping observations with missing lagged variables. The
number of observations lost is 73,127. Table (4.5) describes the number of events in the
final BSD-ARD-BERD sample.
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UK and Foreign Events
Events can be distinguished into UK and Foreign events using the country of ultimate
ownership codes available in the BSD. These codes are not available for all observations;
208,767 observations from the BSD-ARD-BERD 2000-2007 sample have missing country
of ownership codes. Table (4.6) shows the number of foreign and UK owned enterprises
in t + 1 by year. The foreign-UK event variable indicates the type of event that occurs
and foreign or UK ownership following the event. Event motivations may differ between
firms that become foreign owned and UK owned as a result of the event. Table (4.7)
shows the number of foreign and UK events in the BSD-ARD-BERD sample by year.
Table 4.6: UK and Foreign Ownership by Year in BSD-ARD-BERD Sample
Year UK Foreign Total
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2000 10325 75.43 3363 24.57 13688
2001 10010 74.56 3416 25.44 13426
2002 10300 72.10 3985 27.90 14285
2003 10170 72.31 3894 27.69 14064
2004 10240 72.21 3941 27.79 14181
2005 10289 72.19 3964 27.81 14253
2006 10152 71.84 3980 28.16 14132
2007 8728 70.88 3585 29.12 12313
Total 80214 72.70 30128 27.30 110342
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BSD-ARD-BERD R&D Performing Firms Subsample
Table (4.8) shows the number of observations by event for a subsample of the BSD-ARD-
BERD dataset containing R&D performing firms only. R&D performing firms are defined
as those that engage in R&D activity during at least one period within the sample time
frame, therefore the number of observations within this subsample exceeds the number
of matches between BSD-ARD and BERD shown in table (4.4).
Table 4.8: Number of Foreign and UK Events in R&D Performing Firms Subsample
Event UK Foreign Total
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
No Event 10663 40.24 5435 20.51 16098 60.75
Acquired 464 1.75 211 0.80 675 2.55
Acquirer 1859 7.02 849 3.20 2708 10.22
Merger 332 1.25 134 0.51 466 1.76
Change of Owner 1087 4.10 472 1.78 1559 5.88
Breakup 382 1.44 138 0.52 520 1.96
Divested 570 2.15 294 1.11 864 3.26
Divestor 1141 4.31 472 1.78 1613 6.09
Tradesale 145 0.55 53 0.20 198 0.75
Acquirer-Divestor 1380 5.21 416 1.57 1796 6.78
Total 18023 68.02 8474 31.98 26497 100
Joining and Separating Events
Some events can be grouped together as ‘Joining’ and ‘Separating’ events. The‘Joining’
events group includes ‘Acquired’, ‘Acquirer’ and ‘Merger’. The‘Separating’ events group
includes ‘Breakup’, ‘Divested’ and ‘Divestor’. The data can also be analysed in reference
to these aggregated events. Tables (4.9) and (4.10) show the number of observations by
year for each of these events. ‘Change of Ownership’, ‘Tradesale’ and ‘Acquirer-Divestor’
events are not included in this sample.
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Table 4.9: Joining and Separating Events BSD-ARD-BERD Sample
Year No Event Joining Separating Total
2000 34447 1986 1399 37832
2001 34540 2138 1361 38039
2002 35673 3129 1660 40462
2003 35099 2347 1658 39104
2004 35643 1916 1412 38971
2005 34271 2515 1198 37984
2006 35045 1794 659 37498
2007 27377 1780 842 29999
Total 272095 17605 10189 299889
Percent 90.73 5.87 3.40 100.00
Table 4.10: UK and Foreign Joining and Separating Events BSD-ARD-BERD Sample
Year No Event Joining Separating Total
UK Foreign UK Foreign UK Foreign
2000 6651 2485 1239 306 1119 258 12058
2001 6265 2579 1380 315 1102 245 11886
2002 5547 2568 1860 491 1228 376 12070
2003 6364 2674 1385 400 1236 387 12446
2004 6923 2818 1173 369 1075 329 12687
2005 6644 2846 1518 451 887 305 12651
2006 7820 3164 1160 400 452 201 13197
2007 6294 2755 1115 358 570 249 11341
Total 52508 21889 10830 3090 7669 2350 98336
Percent 53.40 22.26 11.01 3.14 7.80 2.39 100.00
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FAME
As identified in the literature review, the likelihood of an event occurring will be partly
influenced by the financial characteristics of a firm. This includes variables such as
profitability, leverage etc. Unfortunately data on these variables are not available in
the ARD. The failure to include these variables could result in omitted variable bias,
therefore an additional sample is created to include financial variables taken from the
FAME database.
The Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) Database contains data on firms reg-
istered at Companies House in the UK. The data is mainly sourced from government
statistics and compiled by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). It contains information taken from
company records including profit and loss accounts, balance sheets, number of employ-
ees and industry codes. This data is available for the period 2004-2008 and the original
FAME sample contains 670,883 observations. The Secure Data Service (SDS) used a
lookup table to match the BvD company reference with the IBDR enterprise reference
code. 127,974 observations were linked to the corresponding Entref. There may be a
number of reasons why some of the matches were not successful. Enterprise references
cannot be obtained if the company is not included in the IDBR database. This would
occur if the company is too small or not operating at the time of the survey. Table (4.11)
shows the number of FAME observations with an identifiable IDBR enterprise reference
number by year.
Table 4.11: Number of Observations in FAME by Year
year Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percentage
2004 24,247 18.95 18.95
2005 24,992 19.53 38.48
2006 25,652 20.04 58.52
2007 26,373 20.61 79.13
2008 26,710 20.87 100
Total 127,974 100
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Table (4.12) shows the number of matches between the BSD and FAME. Although
the IBDR lookup table provided enterprise reference codes for 127,974 observations, only
67% of these observations could be matched to the BSD. This indicates that IDBR and
BSD codes are not entirely consistent with each other. Table (4.13) shows that 17% of
the FAME sample can be matched with the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. A large number
of observations are lost due to the small overlap of the two samples and others may be
lost due to inconsistencies between the IDBR and BSD codes.
Table 4.12: BSD and FAME Merge
Year Not Matched Matched Total
From BSD From FAME BSD-FAME
2000 2,087,907 0 0 2,087,907
2001 2,118,591 0 0 2,118,591
2002 2,131,808 0 0 2,131,808
2003 2,150,275 0 0 2,150,275
2004 2,187,042 3,865 20,382 2,211,289
2005 2,232,751 3,931 21,061 2,257,743
2006 2,279,983 4,006 21,646 2,305,635
2007 2,356,755 4,015 22,358 2,383,128
Total 17,545,112 15,817 85,447 17,646,376
Table 4.13: BSD-ARD-BERD and FAME Merge
Year Not Matched Matched Total
From BSD-ARD-BERD From FAME BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME
2000 50,604 0 0 50,604
2001 54,772 0 0 54,772
2002 51,638 0 0 51,638
2003 51,016 0 0 51,016
2004 45,164 18,697 5,550 69,411
2005 43,812 19,408 5,584 68,804
2006 34,941 20,422 5,230 60,593
2007 37,989 20,437 5,936 64,362
Total 369,936 78964 22,300 471,200
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Table 4.14: Number of Foreign and UK Events in BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME (2005-2007)
Event UK Foreign Total
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
No event 4,741 40.06 2,984 25.22 7725 65.28
Acquired 138 1.17 60 0.51 198 1.67
Acquirer 1,098 9.28 453 3.83 1551 13.11
Merger 138 1.17 49 0.41 187 1.58
Change of Owner 403 3.41 198 1.67 601 5.08
Breakup 98 0.83 33 0.28 131 1.11
Divested 210 1.77 123 1.04 333 2.81
Divestor 302 2.55 168 1.42 470 3.97
Tradesale 45 0.38 24 0.20 69 0.58
Acquirer-Divestor 437 3.69 132 1.12 569 4.81
Total 7610 64.31 4224 35.69 11,834 100
The final BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample is obtained by dropping observations with
missing lagged variables. Lagged variables were created in the FAME sample prior to
matching to minimise the number of observations dropped. 8085 observations are dropped
from the 4 year sample to create a 3 year sample of lagged variables. Table (4.16) shows
the number of observations for each event by year in the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample
and distributions of the events. Table (4.14) shows the distribution of foreign events in
the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample. The distribution remains fairly consistent with the
distribution of events in the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. Table (4.15) shows the number
of joining and separating events in the sample.
Table 4.15: Joining and Separating Events BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME Sample
Year No Event Joining Separating Total
2005 2,986 800 370 4156
2006 3,495 651 233 4379
2007 3,169 641 339 4149
Total 9,650 2092 942 12684
Percent 76.08 16.49 7.43 100.00
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics
The data section describes the creation of 3 samples; BSD-ARD-BERD sample, BSD-
ARD-BERD R&D performing firms sample and BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample. This
section provides descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the model for each of
the data samples.
Table (4.17) provides an overview of pre-event descriptive statistics for the BSD-
ARD-BERD sample for ‘no event’, ‘joining events’ and ‘separating events’. ‘Joining
events’ include ‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’ and ‘merger’. ‘Separating events’ include ‘breakup’
‘divested’ and ‘divestor’. Comparisons across these groups reveal that events tend to
involve larger firms than the ‘no event’ group. This is illustrated by the larger mean
and median values for gross value added, capital stock and number of employees. The
larger standard deviations for ‘joining’ and ‘separating’ events imply that there is a larger
variation within these groups. Furthermore, events tend to be experienced by firms that
belong to larger enterprise groups. Single firm enterprise groups are less inclined to engage
in events. The mean and median values for the number of firms within the enterprise
group are higher for the joining and separating events groups than for the no event
group. These values are particularly high for separating events, which ties in with the
idea that separating events may be motivated as a response to over-diversification. The
relatively high diversification ratios for separating events provides further support for
this notion. The descriptive statistics for market share and HHI reveal a tendency for
firms with a larger market share and within more concentrated industries to engage in
‘joining’ or ‘separating’ events. Firm age remains relatively consistent regardless of event
involvement.
Table (4.18) provides descriptive statistics by event for the BSD-ARD-BERD sample.
Dividing the joining events into ‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’ and ‘merger’ reveals that the mean
values for each type of ‘joining event’ are consistently higher than the ‘no event’ group.
In particular, acquirers are generally larger than acquired and merging firms with higher
mean and median gross value added, capital stock and number of employees. They enjoy
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a larger market share and belong to larger more diversified enterprise groups.
Splitting the ‘separating events’ into ‘breakup’, ‘divested’ and ‘divestor’ shows that
mean and median values for each type of ‘separating event’ are consistently higher than
the ’no event’ group and each ‘joining event’ group. On average, ‘divested’ firms are
smaller than breakups and divestors, but come from larger enterprise groups.
The ‘change in ownership’ group has the smallest mean and median values in terms
of gross value added, capital stock and number of employees compared to the other event
types. Firms involved in a ‘change of ownership’ mostly come from small enterprise
groups. ‘Tradesale’ is the combination of ‘divested’ and ‘acquired’ in one event. The
mean and median values for gross value added, capital stock and number of employees is
similar to the values for the divested and acquired group. The average values for number
of firms within the enterprise group and the diversification ratio are much higher than
the ‘acquired’ group and more in line with the mean and median values for the‘divested’
group. The ‘acquirer-divestor’ group has the largest average and median values compared
with the other event groups. Firms that acquire and divest during the same period, on
average, have larger gross value added, capital stock and number of employees, a greater
market share, come from more concentrated industries and very large enterprise groups.
Table (4.19) displays the descriptive statistics for the BSD-ARD-BERD R&D per-
forming firms sample. The sample contains 33,936 observations. R&D performing firms
tend to be larger. Comparisons of the descriptive statistics for the total samples reveals
that, on average, R&D performing firms are larger with a larger market share, from larger
and more diversified enterprise groups and operate in more concentrated industries than
the average firm within the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. This finding is reflected in the
descriptive statistics for each event. Events are more frequent for larger firms, therefore
66.27% of observations incur ‘no event’ in the R&D performing sample, compared to
85.27% of observations in the full BSD-ARD-BERD sample.
Table (4.20) shows the descriptive statistics for the total BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME
sample. FAME contains publicly listed firms therefore firms within this sample tend to
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Table 4.17: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD Joining and Separating Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
No Event (N=272095)
Gross Value Added 5299.79 61344.03 497 64.9 6104.85
Capital Stock 2207.06 32460.2 32.26 62.27 5525.66
Number of Employees 155.27 1342.97 19 62.56 6801.45
Market Share 0 0.02 0 20.07 568.59
Age 17 9.58 16 0.18 1.75
HHI 0.04 0.07 0.01 4.85 40.05
Number of firms in enterprise group 1.46 2.13 1 22.01 1338.65
Diversification Ratio 0.12 0.31 0 2.33 6.63
Joining Event (N=17605)
Gross Value Added 40158.23 440295.2 4986 80.78 8518.06
Capital Stock 17941.37 202786.7 988.81 57.8 4638.82
Number of Employees 785.96 4505.66 133 26.18 930.54
Market Share 0.02 0.05 0 7.82 82.18
Age 17.91 9.29 16 0.12 1.8
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.88 24.8
Number of firms in enterprise group 6.03 8.97 2 3.43 18.78
Diversification Ratio 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.14 1.38
Separating (N= 10189)
Gross Value Added 43176.77 235217.4 6061.81 18.82 507.52
Capital Stock 23838.84 202307.7 1518.66 40.47 2483.91
Number of Employees 884.56 4212.61 167 21.46 733.39
Market Share 0.02 0.07 0 7.12 68.97
Age 18.78 8.81 18 0.06 1.78
HHI 0.05 0.09 0.02 3.83 23.94
Number of firms in enterprise group 12.55 17.62 7 5.32 48.08
Diversification Ratio 0.69 0.27 0.71 -0.7 2.96
Total (N= 299889)
Gross Value Added 8633.06 129548.6 605.15 196.81 67364.36
Capital Stock 3865.71 69196.14 42.92 126.13 26601.64
Number of Employees 217.08 1862.42 22 51.94 4227.83
Market Share 0 0.03 0 16.1 356.1
Age 17.11 9.54 16 0.17 1.75
HHI 0.04 0.07 0.01 4.73 37.8
Number of firms in enterprise group 2.11 4.94 1 14.51 404.61
Diversification Ratio 0.16 0.34 0 1.83 4.6
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Table 4.18: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
No Event N=272095
Gross Value Added 5299.79 61344.03 497 64.9 6104.85
Capital Stock 2207.06 32460.2 32.26 62.27 5525.66
Number of Employees 155.27 1342.97 19 62.56 6801.45
Market Share 0 0.02 0 20.07 568.59
Age 17 9.58 16 0.18 1.75
HHI 0.04 0.07 0.01 4.85 40.05
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 1.46 2.13 1 22.01 1338.65
Diversification Ratio 0.12 0.31 0 2.33 6.63
Acquired N= 3808
Gross Value Added 16510.2 55773.97 3905.64 12.58 244.11
Capital Stock 7837.97 61008.62 712.74 35.8 1603.78
Number of Employees 401.5 1423.57 106 17.14 437.62
Market Share 0.01 0.04 0 9.52 120.3
Age 16.27 9.5 15 0.25 1.85
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.57 20.2
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 2.19 4.28 1 13.24 251.96
Diversification Ratio 0.23 0.39 0 1.22 2.67
Acquirer N= 10251
Gross Value Added 55848.42 571873.7 6850.74 63.2 5133.6
Capital Stock 23592.47 255373.4 1581.32 48.96 3156.55
Number of Employees 1030.11 5431.36 181 22.75 694.91
Market Share 0.02 0.06 0 7.08 67.5
Age 19.14 8.95 18 0.06 1.77
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 4.05 27.77
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 8.59 10.44 5 2.69 12.13
Diversification Ratio 0.59 0.36 0.67 -0.47 1.92
Merger N= 3546
Gross Value Added 20195.34 109679.6 2537.14 15.39 306.92
Capital Stock 12454.68 106842.6 362.75 19.76 483.33
Number of Employees 493.03 3594.87 71 26.94 869.91
Market Share 0.01 0.04 0 8.74 98.26
Age 16.13 9.48 14 0.27 1.85
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.01 3.67 20.52
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 2.75 4.31 1 4.14 27.44
Diversification Ratio 0.23 0.37 0 1.22 2.74
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Table 4.18 (continued): Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
Change of Ownership N=13148
Gross Value Added 10735.16 54254.85 2129.84 19.98 562.73
Capital Stock 4726.75 42843.43 258.15 35.49 1655.04
Number of Employees 274.45 1286.72 60 21.2 667.92
Market Share 0.01 0.03 0 11.68 185.96
Age 16.38 9.45 15 0.27 1.83
HHI 0.04 0.07 0.01 4.2 27.69
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 1.76 2.38 1 8.03 107.4
Diversification Ratio 0.2 0.38 0 1.42 3.17
Breakup N=2030
Gross Value Added 50425.5 304127.1 6041.37 20.36 547.98
Capital Stock 33027.04 348162.8 1450.25 34.19 1360.11
Number of Employees 939.67 6259.44 175 23.63 659.99
Market Share 0.02 0.07 0 8.08 84.28
Age 18.31 8.79 17 0.07 1.78
HHI 0.06 0.1 0.02 4.21 26.53
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 10.8 14.72 5 3.42 17.99
Diversification Ratio 0.7 0.29 0.75 -0.78 2.86
Divested N=3018
Gross Value Added 24785.44 121223.2 4596.09 22.6 665.55
Capital Stock 12389.8 97751.97 1044.49 27.1 850.43
Number of Employees 576.78 2153.46 128 11.85 190.74
Market Share 0.02 0.05 0 8.13 96.02
Age 18.14 9.05 17 0.14 1.82
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.67 22.11
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 15.73 25.48 7 4.76 32.41
Diversification Ratio 0.67 0.28 0.69 -0.65 2.82
Divestor N=5141
Gross Value Added 51111.05 253465.8 7283 14.37 274.49
Capital Stock 26931.85 165968.3 2007.22 17.17 388.23
Number of Employees 1043.48 4111.46 195 11.72 191.32
Market Share 0.02 0.07 0 6.16 51.01
Age 19.34 8.63 18 0.02 1.76
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.58 21.46
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 11.37 11.83 7 2.63 13.59
Diversification Ratio 0.7 0.26 0.71 -0.68 3.07
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Table 4.18 (continued): Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
Tradesale N=626
Gross Value Added 21447.76 56731.07 5443.52 7.27 75.16
Capital Stock 12898.86 88409.86 1606.45 20.44 466.78
Number of Employees 558.24 1633.15 175.5 10.04 138.31
Market Share 0.01 0.03 0 5.32 41.7
Age 18.31 9.03 17 0.15 1.83
HHI 0.05 0.09 0.02 4.18 28.47
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 16.15 23.89 8 4.49 32.08
Diversification Ratio 0.67 0.27 0.68 -0.59 2.8
Acquirer-Divestor N=5446
Gross Value Added 92980.85 475818.5 12200.23 13.15 218.12
Capital Stock 57337.1 521699.3 3023.15 26.56 858.98
Number of Employees 1906.56 10032.84 289.5 15.03 280.62
Market Share 0.03 0.08 0 5.93 48.06
Age 19.04 8.84 18 0.05 1.73
HHI 0.06 0.09 0.02 3.97 25.56
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 30.33 32.99 21 3.27 17.06
Diversification Ratio 0.57 0.21 0.55 0.17 2.64
Total N=319109
Gross Value Added 10184.31 141004.5 675 152.42 45605.12
Capital Stock 4831.46 96347.25 50.19 116.83 19408.06
Number of Employees 248.94 2258.03 24 50.77 3773.14
Market Share 0.01 0.03 0 15.12 313.45
Age 17.12 9.53 16 0.17 1.76
HHI 0.04 0.07 0.01 4.69 37.07
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 2.6 7.52 1 13.38 285.47
Diversification Ratio 0.17 0.34 0 1.73 4.24
219
Table 4.19: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD R&D Performing Firms Sample
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
Total N=33936
Gross Value Added 39232.15 273266.9 5117.11 21 576.03
Capital Stock 25265.5 273172.4 1762.79 46.26 2784.54
Number of Employees 687.65 4764.76 147 29.6 1132.05
Market Share 0.02 0.07 0 6.55 58.46
Age 20.04 8.76 19 -0.06 1.78
HHI 0.06 0.09 0.03 3.37 19.87
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 5.36 11.71 2 8.01 109.12
Diversification Ratio 0.4 0.43 0 0.3 1.33
Table 4.20: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME Total Sample
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
Total N= 14215
Gross Value Added 75775.72 542817.9 12595.71 54.89 4568.24
Capital Stock 33444.18 318401.1 2462.56 45.17 2582.86
Number of Employees 1308.9 6396.01 256 19.4 507.45
Market Share 0.02 0.07 0 6.11 51.14
Age 22.33 9.3 22 -0.23 1.79
HHI 0.05 0.09 0.02 3.74 21.9
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 5.38 12.63 2 9.14 125.38
Diversification Ratio 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.28 1.35
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.86 5.97 1.26 41.93 2167.05
Dividends 2398.58 71964.36 0 69.18 5737.22
Total Assets 1444002 29600000 30856.01 41.19 1982.52
Rate of Return on Total Assets 14.28 34.84 6.71 16.25 437.43
Liquidity Ratio 1.55 2.68 1.06 14.65 372.47
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be the larger firms from the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. The statistics show larger mean
and median gross value added, capital stock, number of employees, market share, greater
market concentration, number of firms within the enterprise group and level of diversi-
fication. These trends remain consistent across the different event types. The financial
statistics provided by FAME are displayed in table (4.21). The median debt-to-asset ratio
remains relatively stable across groups, although mean values are slightly higher for ‘ac-
quirer’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’. The mean dividend values fluctuate dramatically across
groups, whereas the median values remain consistently at zero. ‘Acquirer’, ‘breakup’,
‘divestor’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’ have high mean dividend values, whereas ‘acquired’,
‘change of ownership’ and ‘tradesale’ have low mean dividends. The distribution of to-
tal assets across the event groups is similar to the distribution of capital stock in the
BSD-ARD-BERD sample, where the groups with the largest total assets are ‘divestor’,
’breakup’, ‘acquirer’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’. The ‘acquirer-divestor’ group has highest
average pre-event profitability indicated by the rate of return on total assets. The ‘join-
ing event’ group has a higher average rate of return on total assets than the ‘separating
event’ group. The average liquidity ratio values are lowest for ‘merger’ and highest for
‘acquirer-divestor’.
Table (4.22) shows descriptive statistics for the BSD-ARD-BERD sample by foreign
and UK ownership status. The values indicate that foreign owned firms tend have greater
value added output, capital stock and market share than UK owned firms. The mean
number of employees is slightly lower for foreign owned firms, but the median is higher.
UK owned firms tend to come from larger UK-based enterprise groups and are more
diversified within the UK.
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Table 4.21: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
No Event N= 9650
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.81 3.15 1.28 29.66 1396.63
Dividends 911.67 26992.61 0 53.64 3124.48
Total Assets 717500 20300000 22172.51 59.44 3776.98
Rate of Return on Total Assets 12.54 26.57 6.39 14.8 392.54
Liquidity Ratio 1.52 2.54 1.04 15.77 450.68
Acquired N= 269
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.77 3.67 1.22 13.29 199.21
Dividends 606.8 4932.6 0 11.64 153.49
Total Assets 848795.9 8491572 40301 14.82 230.04
Rate of Return on Total Assets 16.66 36.06 6.62 5.89 45.55
Liquidity Ratio 1.63 3.61 1.15 13.85 213.61
Acquirer N= 1561
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 2.12 13.07 1.22 25.6 685.48
Dividends 2583.55 27191.95 0 23.27 660.73
Total Assets 2368103 30700000 73869.01 25.43 718.98
Rate of Return on Total Assets 18.12 34.91 8.11 6.92 81.02
Liquidity Ratio 1.66 2.94 1.07 8.78 104.35
Merger N= 262
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.47 0.96 1.22 2.35 10.68
Dividends 1039.96 9860.36 0 14.42 221.45
Total Assets 397365.1 1611974 43340.52 9.03 101.02
Rate of Return on Total Assets 20.79 86.17 7.63 13.71 205.52
Liquidity Ratio 1.26 0.96 1.05 2.81 15.13
Change of Ownership N = 893
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.82 3.46 1.25 19.27 475.04
Dividends 153.18 1240.81 0 13.08 201.44
Total Assets 762495.6 10700000 26632.99 21.01 454.69
Rate of Return on Total Assets 15.04 26.71 7.37 5.62 47.23
Liquidity Ratio 1.68 3.77 1.06 15.86 343.10
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Table 4.21 (continued): Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME Events
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
Breakup N= 133
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.37 0.95 1.18 2.76 14.54
Dividends 4106.17 40873.94 0 11.33 129.84
Total Assets 8167076 83600000 63376.02 11.36 130.36
Rate of Return on Total Assets 13.84 21.08 4.72 2.55 10.25
Liquidity Ratio 1.54 2.39 0.97 5.64 41.09
Divested N= 338
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.77 2.36 1.26 9.28 116.79
Dividends 646.81 6962.33 0 16.87 299.43
Total Assets 1454338 14600000 65844.99 16.94 300.38
Rate of Return on Total Assets 13.69 34.88 5.64 8.98 99.09
Liquidity Ratio 1.59 2.46 1.08 9.01 111.47
Divestor N= 471
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.77 3.04 1.22 8.78 92.8
Dividends 6279.32 68038.98 0 16.48 301.9
Total Assets 2800445 29900000 104799 20.17 425.23
Rate of Return on Total Assets 16.54 38.19 6.89 9.37 130.51
Liquidity Ratio 1.48 2.14 1.07 8.09 88.80
Tradesale N= 69
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 1.6 1.5 1.2 4.13 24.83
Dividends 551.59 2247.4 0 4.8 26.15
Total Assets 522825.6 2736409 57440.98 7.58 60.73
Rate of Return on Total Assets 13.91 24.63 7.71 4.84 32.04
Liquidity Ratio 1.48 1.37 1.11 3.49 18.70
Acquirer-Divestor N= 569
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 2.65 14.65 1.23 15.1 240.01
Dividends 29758.22 331770.1 0 16.79 309.92
Total Assets 10500000 97200000 161739 15.03 256.9
Rate of Return on Total Assets 26.6 86.66 9.61 9.76 115.15
Liquidity Ratio 1.75 2.84 1.13 9.48 124.55
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Table 4.22: Descriptive Statistics for BSD-ARD-BERD Foreign and UK Owned
Mean Standard Median Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation
UK Owned N= 80214
Gross Value Added 23950.81 188378.80 3268.00 31.52 1347.76
Capital Stock 12223.98 182328.60 581.12 67.52 5998.29
Number of Employees 628.30 4166.59 99 29.77 1233.83
Market Share 0.01 0.04 0.00 10.62 155.96
Age 19.69 8.83 19 -0.02 1.76
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 4.25 30.22
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 6.11 13.45 2 8.02 99.37
Diversification Ratio 0.51 0.43 0.60 -0.12 1.31
Foreign Owned N= 30128
Gross Value Added 34530.45 335614.30 5564.50 104.42 14660.28
Capital Stock 16219.98 96061.53 1398.34 16.77 373.00
Number of Employees 602.31 2466.64 156 25.71 1063.98
Market Share 0.02 0.06 0.00 7.26 72.32
Age 19.91 8.86 19 -0.03 1.71
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.63 22.02
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 4.18 7.75 1 4.73 32.46
Diversification Ratio 0.32 0.41 0.00 0.66 1.68
Total N= 110342
Gross Value Added 26839.49 237851.40 3752.00 91.51 16262.15
Capital Stock 13315.05 163368.90 739.91 69.15 6775.54
Number of Employees 621.21 3779.11 112 30.96 1378.24
Market Share 0.01 0.05 0.00 9.28 118.43
Age 19.75 8.84 19 -0.02 1.75
HHI 0.05 0.08 0.02 4.05 27.48
Number of Firms in Enterprise Group 5.58 12.19 2 8.24 109.67
Diversification Ratio 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.08 1.27
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4.7 Results
The literature review in chapter (3) identified four broad motivations for restructur-
ing events. These are strategic, synergistic, refocusing and managerial motivations. In
this section the results from the multinomial logit model are analysed in reference to
these motivations. The results are reported as average marginal effects (AME) in table
(4.25) to table (4.29). Three different dependent variables are used in the estimations.
These dependent variables include the ‘Joining and Separating Event’ variable with ‘no
event’, ‘joining event’ and ‘separating event’ categories, ‘Event’ variable with ‘no event’,
‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’, ‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’, ‘breakup’, ‘divested’, ‘divestor’,
‘tradesale’, and ‘acquirer-divestor’ categories and ‘UK and Foreign Event’ variable which
distinguishes between foreign and UK post-event ownership status in each event category.
The estimations are performed on three different samples. These are the BSD-ARD-
BERD sample, BSD-ARD-BERD R&D performing firms sample and the BSD-ARD-
BERD-FAME sample. The variables included in the specification for each dataset are
indicated in table (4.23).
Profitability is proxied by gross value added in the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. The
results in table (4.24) are derived using the ‘Joining and Separating’ event dependent
variable. They show a negative AME on the gross value added variable for ‘no events’.
This finding is consistent with other tables. ‘Joining’ events demonstrate a positive
relationship with profitability indicating that more profitable firms are more likely to
engage in ‘joining’ events. Tables (4.25) and (4.26) indicate that this effect is mostly
driven by ‘acquirers’. This supports the findings by Dickerson et al. (2003) and Szu¨cs
(2012). The return on total assets is the measure of profitability used in the BSD-
ARD-BERD-FAME sample. Table (4.28) shows that the AME and coefficients on the
log return on total assets for ‘acquirer’ and ‘merger’ are positive and significant giving
further support to this viewpoint. More profitable firms are in a better financial position
to engage in growth through merger and acquisition. This may act as an indication
of managerial incentives for growth. Profitability has little impact on the likelihood
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Table 4.23: List of Specifications
Variable BSD-ARD-BERD BSD-ARD-BERD BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME
R&D Performing
logY X X
logC X X X
logL X X X
R&D dummy X X
logKR X
logKTF X
logKTUK X
Market Share X X X
HHI X X X
No. Firms X X X
Div. Ratio X X X
log D X
log TA X
log ROTA X
log DAR X
log LR X
log Age X X X
Previous. event X X X
Industry Dummies X X X
Time Dummies X X X
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of a ‘separating’ event occurring, indicated by a AME of zero (to 3 d.p) on the gross
value added variable in table (4.24). This finding is supported by the results in table
(4.25) with no significant AMEs on gross value added for each of the separating events.
This remains consistent when the ‘Foreign and UK events’ dependent variable is used.
Results for the R&D performing firms and the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample indicate
a negative significant AME on the profitability variable for ‘divested’ firms. This implies
that lower profit R&D performing and publicly-listed firms have a higher risk of becoming
divested for. This is consistent with Haynes et al. (2003) and provides an indication of
managerial motives. Managers may be endeavor to keep shareholders happy by divesting
less profitable enterprises.
The labour, capital stock and total assets variables capture the impact of firm size on
the likelihood of incurring a restructuring event. The AME of capital stock and labour
on the probability of ‘no event’ occurring are consistently negative across samples. This
implies that smaller firms are less likely to experience an event. The results in table
(4.24) show that capital stock and labour have a positive impact on the probability of
‘joining’ and ‘separating’ events occurring. The AME for ‘joining’ events is greater than
for ‘separating’ events. Table (4.25) shows that the ‘divestor’ is driving the positive
significant AME on firm size, whereas the AME on ‘divested’ and ‘breakup’ are zero (to
3 d.p.). Total assets are used in the analysis of the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample
as an alternative measure to capital stock. In this sample of publicly listed firms, the
probability of being an ‘acquirer’, ‘merger’, ‘divestor’ or ‘acquirer-divestor’ increases as
total assets increase. This ties in with the idea that ‘acquirers’ and ‘acquirer-divestors’
are more likely to be larger financially stable firms.
Firms belonging to a smaller enterprise group are less likely to experience an event,
indicated by the negative significant AME of the number of firms within the enterprise
group on ‘no event’. The AME and coefficients are positive and significant for other events
in the BSD-ARD-BERD sample.55 This implies the likelihood of an event occurring
55Except ‘acquired’, which is not significantly different from zero.
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increases with the number of firms within the enterprise group. The results from the
R&D performing firms sample and the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME sample present negative
and significant coefficients and AME of number of firms within the enterprise group for
‘acquired’ and ‘change of ownership’. These samples are more inclined to contain larger
firms. This suggests that larger firms that belong to enterprise groups with few other firms
are at more risk of becoming an acquisition target or changing ownership. The result that
acquiring and merging events are more likely for large enterprise groups gives support for
the notion of managerial motivated joining events. Managers may be motivated by the
prestige of managing large enterprise groups. The result that separating events are also
more likely for large enterprise groups provides an indication of the refocusing motivation
in action for these events.
Table (4.24) displays positive and significant AME on each of the ‘previous event’
dummies for ‘joining’ and ‘separating’ events. The magnitude of the AMEs on ‘joining’
events are larger than for ‘separating’ events. Negative and significant AME are found
on the ‘previous event’ dummies for ‘no event’, implying that it is more likely that a
firm will not be involved in a restructuring event if it has not previously been involved in
restructuring events. These findings are supported by the ‘previous event’ dummy results
displayed in table (4.25) continued using the ‘event’ dependent variable. The results
provide strong evidence that restructuring events are interrelated and involvement in
restructuring events is habit forming. Some managers may be more inclined to repeatedly
engage in reorganisation. This finding is consistent with Dickerson et al. (2003), which
finds that acquisition is habit forming.
The theoretical literature and empirical studies suggest that market share and mar-
ket concentration provide strategic motivations for restructuring, although there is no
consensus on the expected influence of the impact. The results in table (4.25) show that
the AME on market share is positive for ‘no event’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’, implying that
the probability of ‘no event’ or ‘acquirer-divestor’ occurring increases as market share
increases once firm size is controlled for. The coefficients and AME are negative and
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significant for ‘joining’ events, ‘change of ownership’, ‘divested’ and ‘tradesale’. There is
no significant impact on ‘break-up’ or ‘divestor’. The Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (HHI)
measures market concentration at the 5-digit industry level. The AME of HHI on ‘no
event’ is negative and significant, therefore a lower market concentration increases the
probability of ‘no event’ occurring. The coefficients and AME on HHI for ‘acquired’,
‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’, ‘breakup’ are positive and significant. This implies that
these events are more likely to occur within industries where market power is concentrated
amongst a small number of firms.
The AME on log age is positive and significant for no event and AME and coefficients
are negative and significant for all other events in the BSD-ARD-BERD sample. These
findings are reflected in other samples, with less significant marginal effects and coeffi-
cients due to fewer observations. Younger firms are far more likely to engage in joining
events, particularly as ‘acquired’ firms or through ‘merger’.
The coefficients and AME on log dividends are positive and significant for ‘acquirer’
and ‘acquirer-divestor’, there is also a positive and significant coefficient for‘divestor’. A
negative significant effect for log dividends is found for ‘change of ownership’. These
findings remain consistent when the ‘UK and Foreign Event’ dependent variable is used.
The distinction between UK and foreign no event reveals that the probability of ‘UK no
event’ to occur increases as dividends increase, whereas a ‘Foreign no event’ is more likely
to occur as dividends fall.
The debt-to-asset ratio is a measure of leverage. The AME on the leverage variable
is positive and significant at the 10% level for ‘no event’ and negative and significant at
the 10% level for ‘acquirer’ and ‘change of ownership’. This implies that an increase in
debt relative to assets increases the probability that ‘no event’ occurs, whereas a lower
debt-to-asset ratio increases the probability of being an ‘acquirer’ or incurring a ‘change
of ownership’. The finding for ‘acquirers’ is consistent with the results from the Meeks
Data 1949-70 sample in Dickerson et al. (2003).
The AME on the liquidity variable is positive and significant for ‘change of ownership’
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and negative and significant at the 10% level for ‘merger’ and ‘acquirer-divester’. The
AME on the liquidity variable are negative and significant for ‘merger’, ‘divestor’ and
‘acquirer-divestor’. This implies that the probability of these events increases when the
liquidity ratio is lower. Enterprise groups may divest to generate funding for investment
elsewhere. Merger may be the preferable joining event when liquidity is low because
acquisition may require larger cash investments.
The diversification ratio aims to quantify the level of diversification within the en-
terprise group. It is calculated as the number of industries engaged in by the enterprise
group divided by the number of enterprises within the enterprise group. The findings are
consistent across samples. The AME on the diversification ratio for ‘no event’ is neg-
ative and significant, the AME and coefficients for ‘acquired’ and ‘merger’ are negative
and significant and positive and significant for ‘breakup’, ‘divested’, ‘divestor’, ‘tradesale’
and ‘acquirer-divestor’. This shows support for the refocusing motivation to correct for
over-diversification and supports assertions by Markides (1995).
The R&D dummy variable is included to distinguish between R&D performing and
non-R&D performing firms when using the BSD-ARD-BERD and BSD-ARD-BERD-
FAME samples. This aims to capture synergistic motives for joining and refocusing
motives for separating. The marginal effects for a binary variable shows how the prob-
ability of the outcome event is predicted to change as the explanatory variable changes
from 0 to 1, holding other things constant. The ‘Joining and Separating’ event results
in table (4.24) show that the AME on the R&D dummy are not significantly different
from zero for ‘no event’ and ‘joining events’, whereas the AME is positive and significant
for ‘separating events’. This implies that probability of a separating event occurring is
higher for R&D performing firms, implying the presence of a refocusing motivation.
The results in table (4.25) suggest that the AME on the R&D dummy are positive
and significant for ‘divested’ and ‘divestor’. The AME for ‘divested’ and ‘divestor’ are
smaller in magnitude than the positive significant AME for ‘no event’. This implies
that performance of R&D increases the likelihood that‘no event’ occurs or the firm is
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involved in a divestment event. The coefficients and AME are negative and significant for
‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’ and ‘breakup’. The positive impact of performing R&D
on ‘divested’ and ‘divestor’ must offset the negative impact on ‘breakup’, resulting in an
overall positive coefficient for separating events. This implies it is important to distinguish
between events because differences exist. The coefficients and marginal effects on the
performing R&D dummy for ‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’, ‘tradesale’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’ are
not significantly different from zero.
The findings from the R&D performing firms subsample in tables (4.26) support these
results. The AMEs on the log of in-house R&D stock are negative and significant for
‘acquired’, ‘acquirer’, ‘merger’, ‘change of ownership’, ‘breakup’ and ‘acquirer-divestor’.
This suggests that an increase in the stock of in-house R&D expenditure reduces the
probability of these events occurring for R&D performing firms, suggesting that joining
events do not appear to be motivated by innovation synergies. This finding contrasts with
studies by Desyllas and Hughes (2009) and Szu¨cs (2012), that find that firms with a high
R&D stock are more likely to be involved in a joining event. A positive AME is reported
for ‘divested’ but the AME on ‘divestor’ is no longer significant in the R&D performing
firms subsample. This implies that although performing R&D increases the chance of
being a ‘divestor’, the amount of R&D performed has little impact. These result ties
in with the study by Kaul (2012), which identifies a positive relationship between R&D
stocks and divestment. The AME and coefficients on the knowledge transfer variables
are not significant. This implies that expenditure on R&D from external sources has no
impact on the probability of an event occurring.
The results in table (4.27) use the ‘UK and Foreign Events’ dependent variable. Dis-
tinguishing between foreign and UK events makes a considerable difference to the coeffi-
cients and AME on the R&D dummy for each event. Positive significant coefficients and
AME are found for ‘foreign no event’, ‘foreign acquirer’, ‘foreign merger’, ‘foreign change
of ownership’, ‘foreign divested’ and ‘foreign divestor’ suggesting that involvement in for-
eign events is more likely for R&D performing firms. This finding concurs with French
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and Spanish studies by Bertrand (2009) and Garc´ıa-Vega et al. (2012), which find pos-
itive relationships between pre-event R&D and foreign acquisition. This suggests that
foreign joining events may be motivated by innovation synergies and foreign separating
events may consider refocusing in innovation as a motive. The results from the BSD-
ARD-BERD-FAME sample with the ‘UK and Foreign Events’ dependent variable agree
with these findings, although there are fewer significant coefficient and AME due to the
smaller sample size.
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Table 4.24: Multinomial Logit Results using BSD-ARD-BERD Sample
No Event Joining Event Separating Event
AME Coefficient AME Coefficient AME
log Yt−1 -0.003*** 0.068*** 0.003*** 0.037*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
log Ct−1 -0.007*** 0.151*** 0.006*** 0.111*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
log Lt−1 -0.006*** 0.129*** 0.005*** 0.078*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
R&D dummy -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 0.082*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001)
Market Sharet−1 0.079*** -1.947*** -0.078*** -0.629*** -0.001
(0.009) (0.202) (0.008) (0.236) (0.005)
HHIt−1 0.001 -0.031 -0.001 0.025 0.001
(0.005) (0.116) (0.005) (0.152) (0.003)
No. Firmst−1 -0.007*** 0.125*** 0.004*** 0.179*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Div. Ratiot−1 -0.062*** 0.567*** 0.005*** 2.711*** 0.057***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001)
log Aget−1 0.017*** -0.368*** -0.014*** -0.234*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000)
Previous Acquired -0.042*** 0.812*** 0.029*** 0.856*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.038) (0.002) (0.043) (0.001)
Previous Acquirer -0.030*** 0.624*** 0.023*** 0.508*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.025) (0.001) (0.029) (0.001)
Previous Merger -0.046*** 0.890*** 0.031*** 0.908*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001)
Previous ChangeOwner -0.019*** 0.463*** 0.018*** 0.176*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.034) (0.001)
Previous Breakup -0.046*** 0.893*** 0.032*** 0.927*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.036) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001)
Previous Divested -0.036*** 0.764*** 0.028*** 0.568*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.057) (0.001)
Previous Divestor -0.032*** 0.634*** 0.023*** 0.609*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001)
Previous Tradesale -0.043*** 0.830*** 0.029*** 0.844*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.099) (0.004) (0.117) (0.002)
Previous Acq-Div -0.034*** 0.749*** 0.028*** 0.483*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.037) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001)
constant - - - - -4.307 - - - - -6.268*** - - - -
0.050 0.082
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4.8 Conclusion
This analysis aims to investigate the motivations behind firm restructuring events by
focusing on pre-event characteristics of the firms engaging in this activity. A contribution
to the literature is made by distinguishing between distinct restructuring events. The
benefit of the careful identification of these events is that motivations may differ between
groups. Although the differences between groups may appear to be subtle, it is important
to establish if differences in motivations exist between groups to improve understanding
of restructuring behaviour.
The study uses a multinomial logit model to obtain the average marginal effects of
the explanatory variables on the probability of a restructuring event occurring. Other
papers in the literature have employed competing risk models. Although these methods
are sometimes favoured, in this case the multinomial logit model is preferred for a number
of reasons. Firstly, the duration to the event is not of particular interest for this study.
Secondly, the data has a large cross-sectional dimension, but the time period available is
relatively short, particularly when using the BSD-ARD-BERD-FAME dataset. Thirdly,
the large number of event types involved in the analysis and the fact that firms can
experience an event in each time period would result in an extremely computationally
burdensome competing risk model.
The literature review highlights four main motivations for restructuring events. These
are strategic, synergistic, refocusing and managerial motivations. These motivations are
not mutually exclusive. The analysis uses a range of variables to indicate the presence
of these motives. The finding that higher profits increases the likelihood of acquiring or
being involved in a merger suggests a role for managerial motivations. Managers may
choose to reinvest profits to pursue growth through external investment. Acquirers are
likely to be high dividend paying firms, suggesting that managers involved in these events
may aim to keep shareholders happy to provide more opportunity to pursue their own
goals. Mergers may be the preferred joining event when liquidity is low. Acquiring and
merging firms are more likely for large enterprise groups providing further evidence for
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managerial growth motives. Indications of managerial motives also exist for separating
events. Lower profit firms have a higher risk of becoming divested. Managers may feel
pressured by shareholders to divest less profitable enterprises in order to maintain their
managerial position. The findings suggest there is a strong relationship between the
probability of an event occurring and involvement in previous events. This indicates that
firm restructuring is habit forming. Some managers may be more inclined to repeatedly
engage in restructuring.
The refocusing motive arises from the desire to streamline an enterprise group when
excessive growth or diversification has occurred. The results show that separating events
are more likely to occur within larger, more diversified enterprise groups. Refocusing
motivations in terms of innovation are indicated for divestors and divested firms but
not presented for breakups. Further investigation indicates that this result is driven by
foreign- owned divestors and divested firms. Foreign firms are more likely to divest R&D
performing enterprises from their enterprise groups. The evidence suggests that foreign
joining events may be motivated by innovation synergies. This indicates that foreign firms
may engage in restructuring to absorb new knowledge and provides evidence of “cherry
picking” in terms of innovation. There is no evidence with regards to other forms of
synergy motivations. The findings reveal no significant evidence of “cherry” or “lemon”
picking in terms of profitability of acquisition targets.
As in previous empirical studies, the results regarding strategic motivations are less
conclusive. This could be due to fact that supply and demand characteristics and other
intricacies of the industry cannot be observed. Although the market concentration and
market share variables are calculated at the 5-digit industry level, products within these
industries may not be substitutable.
It would also have been preferable to use measures of innovation productivity to
consider the effectiveness of a firm’s innovation performance. Innovation productivity
measures require data on R&D inputs and outputs, such as patent citations. Unfortu-
nately data on R&D outputs were unobtainable for this study due to secure data merging
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considerations and time constraints.
This study focused on identifying motivations behind restructuring events and found
differences between the types of firms involved in these events. These results can be
used to inform the analysis in the following chapter which investigates the impact of
restructuring events on post-event innovation activity and productivity outcomes.
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5 The Impact of Ownership Events on Productivity
and R&D Activity
5.1 Introduction
The reorganisation of firm structure is likely to have an impact on outcomes in terms
of productivity and innovation. The outcomes may depend on the type of restructuring
and motives. The impact of joining events on productivity and innovation has been
previously examined in the literature, although little attention has been paid to the
impact of separating events. This chapter distinguishes between various different types
of ownership events and uses propensity score matching to establish the impact on post-
event productivity outcomes and innovation activity.
The impact of joining events on innovation is ambiguous. Positive outcomes may
be observed if the aim of the merger or acquisition is to enhance the firm’s knowledge
or asset base. This method of expansion may be deemed preferable by management
because it provides an immediate expansion, rather than the slower process of growth
from within (Cloodt et al., 2006). Speed may be particularly important in high tech
industries, where new products are continually developed and innovation is an important
part of competition. Innovation and productivity is particularly likely to improve if the
joining firms have complementary knowledge bases, where similarities exist but their
knowledge is not identical. This provides opportunities to create synergies.
Another motive for joining events is to take advantages of economies of scale and scope.
R&D projects often require large investments and are indivisible. By combining resources
firms are able to undertake larger scale R&D projects or spread risk across numerous
projects. These circumstances are likely to induce a positive impact on post-joining
innovation in terms of outputs per unit of R&D expenditure, but may not necessarily
lead to increased R&D expenditure because there will be a reduction of duplication.
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Negative impacts on post-joining outcomes may be observed if the event causes disrup-
tions to production or to the R&D process during reorganisation. Differences between the
organisational structures of joining firms or lack of technological relatedness may present
integration problems. Managerial efforts may be diverted away from R&D, leading to
reduced incentives for R&D workers to come up with new inventions. Job uncertainty
surrounding joining events may encourage key employees to seek alternative employment,
taking their accumulated R&D knowledge with them.
Separating events can be seen as a reactive response to poor performance or as a
proactive response to opportunities in the market (Kaul, 2012). Separating events can
correct for over-diversification by reducing bureaucracy and freeing up resources. If di-
vestment acts to refocus towards core activities, it is likely that firms may invest more in
innovation activity and increase productivity as managerial burden is reduced. Separat-
ing events can be part of a wider strategy involving acquisition or internal investment.
Alternatively, innovation investment activity may reduce following divestment if the event
was the result of poor performance. Managerial effort may be directed away from R&D
towards the short-term survival of the firm.
This chapter aims to address the following questions. Firstly, does productivity and
innovation activity increase following a restructuring event? Secondly, do differences in
post-event outcomes exist between foreign owned firms and domestic firms? This chapter
contributes to the literature by considering different events simultaneously and allowing
comparisons to be drawn across groups. Furthermore, the data used is very detailed and
provides larger samples than most previous studies on UK data or elsewhere.
Propensity score matching (PSM) methodology is used to overcome the issue of sample
selection bias. A multiple treatment approach is employed following Lechner (2002).
Firms are matched with a partner that has similar characteristics during the pre-event
time period. This generates a control group allowing post-event outcomes to be compared
with estimated counterfactual outcomes.
The data used in this study is taken from the BSD-ARD-BERD sample described
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in the previous chapter and event definitions remain consistent. The methodology is
explained in section 5.2, descriptive statistics of the data are provided in section 5.3,
results in section 5.4 and conclusions in section 5.5.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Estimating Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
The aim of this study is to understand how ownership events impact R&D activity and
productivity outcomes. Ideally this question could be answered by looking at the differ-
ence between post-event outcomes for a firm and outcomes if no ownership event occurs,
for the same firm and time period. The problem lies in the fact that both scenarios
cannot simultaneously occur within the same firm. Firms that experience an event are
likely to exhibit different characteristics to groups of firms that experience other events or
no event, therefore direct comparisons between any two groups may suffer from selection
bias. Matching can be used to address this problem by identifying a control group of firms
with characteristics that match the event group. The simple single treatment group case
described by Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974) is expanded to the more complex multiple
treatment group case following Lechner (2002). The methodology and implementation of
these steps are explained in subsequent sections.
5.2.2 Multiple Treatment Groups Case
The single treatment framework describes a scenario where the group of firms experi-
encing the event are known as the treated group and the non-event firms are referred to
as the non-treated group. Lechner (2002) expands the single treatment model for the
multiple treatment case, where pairwise comparisons can be made between outcomes of
each treatment state. Assuming there are (M + 1) mutually exclusive states, potential
outcomes can be defined as Y 0, Y 1, ....Y M . Only one of these outcomes is observable for
each firm. The remaining M outcomes are counterfactuals for firm i.
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τi = Yi(m)− Yi(l) (5.1)
Yi(Si) is the potential outcome for firm i, where S indicates the treatment undertaken
by the firm, S  0, 1...M . Equation (5.1) indicates the pairwise comparison between the
outcomes of treated group m and comparison group l, where m 6= l. τi is the individual
treatment effect derived from the difference between the two outcomes for firm i. As
previously explained, one of these outcomes is unobserved. This unobserved outcome is
known as the counterfactual outcome.
The estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is required to
address the research question.
τATT = E(τ |S = m) = E[Y (m)|S = m]− E[Y (l)|S = m] (5.2)
The expected outcome Y(l) is unobserved when S=m, therefore assumptions must be
imposed to estimate the counterfactual mean E[Y (l)|S = m]. Non-random treatment
occurs when selection into the treatment group depends on pre-treatment characteristics.
Therefore average pre-treatment characteristics of the treated and comparison groups are
different. When treatment is non-random E[Y (l)|S = l] will provide a biased estimate of
E[Y (l)|S = m]. Hence, a naive comparison between the treated and non-treated groups
would result in a biased estimate of the ATT because selection bias is not accounted for.
E[Y (m)|S = m]− E[Y (l)|S = l]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observed difference
= τATT + E[Y (l)|S = m]− E[Y (l)|S = l]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection bias
(5.3)
The previous chapter indicates that the pre-event characteristics of firms differ across
event types, therefore it is necessary to invoke identifying assumptions to take account
for the problem of non-random selection. Matched samples must be obtained to pro-
vide unbiased estimates of counterfactuals. The sample must comply with the necessary
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assumptions in order to estimate average treatment effects on the treated.
5.2.3 The Conditional Independence Assumption
The conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that conditional on a set of vari-
ables X, the outcomes Y are independent of treatment S.
Y (0), Y (1), ...Y (M) ⊥ S|X (5.4)
The set of variables X should not provide any information to indicate which treatment
will occur. This suggests that when all variables influencing treatment and outcomes are
taken into account selection bias is removed and treatment S is considered exogenous.
This strong assumption is required to estimate the population-average treatment effect
(ATE).
Y (l) ⊥ S|X (5.5)
Equation (5.5) shows a weaker version of the CIA, sufficient to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). For a given set of characteristics X, the outcomes
for the comparison are independent of treatment.
5.2.4 The Common Support Assumption
The common support assumption states that the probability of being treated given X is
greater than 0 and less than 1.
0 < Pr[S = m|X] < 1 (5.6)
This ensures that treated and non-treated cases exist for each set of X values, creating
an overlap of treated and comparison group subsamples. For each treated firm there is a
corresponding comparison group firm with similar X values and those with the same X
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values have equal probability of experiencing event m.
Pr[S = m|X] < 1 (5.7)
The weaker assumption that the probability of being treated given X is less than 1 is
sufficient for identification of ATT.
5.2.5 Matching Procedure
The first stage of the estimation procedure involves creating matched samples which
comply with the conditional independence and common support assumptions described
in subsections (5.2.3) and (5.2.4). There are two methods of obtaining event probabilities
in the multiple treatment case; either by using a multinomial model or a series of pairwise
binary models. These models can be specified as follows.
Eventit = α + βXit−1 + ΨIi + λTt + it (5.8)
Eventit is a categorical variable in the multinomial logit case or a binary variable
where 1 indicates event group ‘m’ and 0 indicates event group ‘l’ in the binary logit case.
Xit−1 is a vector of pre-event characteristics and I and T are industry and time dummies.
Matching is performed on a year-by-year basis to ensure that a firm does not get matched
with itself in another year.
The multinomial method is described by Lechner (2002). A multinomial logit model is
used to estimate a set of probabilities conditional on pre-event characteristics using the full
sample P 0N(X), P
1
N(X), ...P
M
N (X). The conditional probability of l from the subsample
of m and l is denoted by P l|ml(X) and is calculated using the estimated conditional
probabilities to provide an estimated propensity score.
P l|ml(X) =
P lN(X)
P lN(X) + P
m
N (X)
(5.9)
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Propensity score matching can be performed using P l|ml(X) on pairwise samples for
each m and l event combination. Alternatively, mahalanobis matching can be performed
using PˆmN (X) and Pˆ
l
N(X).
The binary method involves performing binary logit estimations on each pairwise m
and l sample to obtain a propensity score estimate. Lechner (2002) shows that there is
little difference between probabilities derived from using the multinomial model on the
full sample and probabilities derived from using a binary model on each m and l sample.
Comparisons following the application of each of these methods suggest this is also true
for this study.
The psmatch2 command in stata provides a wide selection of matching options and
algorithms. The ‘common’ option is selected in stata to ensure that the common support
assumption is adhered to. Observations falling outside the common support region are
removed from the sample. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a detailed discussion of
alternative matching algorithms.
Nearest-neighbour matching takes the closest match from the comparison group in
terms of the propensity score for each observation within the treated group. One-to-one
matching obtains one match for each observation. This can be done with or without
replacement, where replacement allows observations from the comparison group to be
matched with multiple partners if they provide the closest propensity score. An advan-
tage of replacement is that the comparison sample contains only observations with the
closest propensity score to the treated group, therefore reducing bias. A problem with
replacement is that if an observation acts as a matched partner a large number of times,
the comparison group becomes smaller and the variance of the estimator will increase.
A caliper can be imposed to prevent bad matches occurring. The caliper places a
restriction on the difference between matched partners in terms of the propensity score
values to ensure that matches have close partners. Unmatched observations are removed
from the sample. Radius matching can be used as an alternative to nearest-neighbour
one-to-one matching, where all matches within the caliper radius are included in the
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control group. The difficulty with the radius method is identifying a suitable caliper
range.
5.2.6 Testing the Matched Samples
Tests can be performed to assess the quality of the matches within the matched samples.
Matching is performed using the propensity score therefore it is appropriate to check that
the matching procedure has successfully generated a balanced distribution of the control
variables in the comparison and treated groups. If matching is successful, there should
be no way that the comparison and treated groups can be distinguished based on the set
of characteristics X.
The standardised bias and t-tests for each of X can be obtained using the pstest com-
mand following psmatch2 in stata. The standardised bias was suggested by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985) and is calculated as follows, where X¯s is the mean value of the covariate
X in sample s and Vs(X) is the corresponding variance.
StandardisedBias = 100.
(X¯m − X¯l)√
0.5(Vm(X) + Vl(X))
(5.10)
The standardised bias is calculated before and after the matching procedure to identify
the reduction in bias resulting from matching.
The t-test approach compares the differences in the means of the two groups, where
the null hypothesis is that no differences exist between the comparison and treated group
in terms of X. Differences are expected in the pre-matched sample but not in the matched
sample. If p values are greater than 0.1, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Tests for joint significance of X variables can also be performed. These include the
pseudo-R2 and F-test. Following matching, equation (5.8) can be re-estimated on the
matched sample. A low pseudo-R2 and rejection of the F-test for joint-significance indi-
cate that the sample is balanced.
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5.2.7 Estimating ATT on Matched Samples
Identification of common support groups suggests that treatment can only occur for a
subsample of the population in most cases, therefore the average treatment effects for
the population cannot be estimated. Average treatment effects on the treated can be
estimated on the matched samples using difference-in-difference estimation.
∆t+nt−1Dependent = α + βEventDumt + φXt + t (5.11)
∆t+nt−1 indicates a change in the dependent variable over time periods from pre-event
(t− 1) to post-event (t+ n). The analysis is repeated for n = 0, 1, 2 for various different
dependent variables including log total factor productivity, log labour productivity, log
R&D expenditure and log R&D intensity. These variables are used to investigate the
impact of events on productivity and innovation outcomes. Changes are used because
they take into account pre-event levels of the variables. EventDumt is a binary variable
where 1 indicates observations from the treated group and 0 indicates observations from
the comparison group. The analysis is also performed with Xt a set of firm and industry
characteristics and dummies to control for other events. Although differences in char-
acteristics should be removed by the matching process, the matching tests reveal that
some differences between treated and comparison groups in terms of these variables still
remain in some samples. These variables are included to ensure that these differences are
controlled for and the ATT estimates are not biased by the differences.
5.2.8 Estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Total factor productivity is a measure of productivity derived from the production func-
tion. The production function can be specified as follows.
Yit = AitL
βL
it K
βK
it (5.12)
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Yit is value added output of firm i at time t, Lit is number of employees, Kit is capital
stock and Ait i s the unobservable Hicks neutral efficiency level of firm i at time t.
Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest that endogeneity may arise due to simultaneity of input
and output decisions, selection bias resulting from firm exit or unobserved differences
across firms. Estimation of TFP using OLS will result in biased estimates. They propose
an alternative framework to overcome these issues.
lnYit = β0 + βLlnLit + βK lnKit + ϕit + ηit (5.13)
ϕit is productivity and ηit is the true measurement error. Productivity is assumed to be a
determinant of input decisions and firm survival. Labour is assumed to be a fixed factor,
capital is related to productivity and investment is strictly increasing in productivity.
This implies the following, where I is investment.
ϕit = hit(Iit, Kit) (5.14)
Equation (5.14) can be substituted into equation (5.13) to give equation (5.15),
lnYit = βLlnLit + φit(Iit, Kit) + ηit (5.15)
where φit(Iit, Kit) = β0 + βK lnKit + hit(Iit, Kit) and φ is a polynomial function of in-
vestment and capital. This first stage of estimation attempts to correct for endogeneity
arising from simultaneity and obtain a consistent estimate of the coefficient on labour.
The following stages of estimation aim to remove the endogeneity from selection bias
which arises from firm exit. This is done by exploiting the firm dynamics. Productivity
is assumed to evolve as an exogenous Markov process.
E[lnYit − βLlnLit|lnKit, Xt = 1] = β0 + βK lnKit + E[ϕit|ϕit−1, Xt = 1]
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lnYit − βLlnLit = β0 + βK lnKit + E[ϕit|ϕit−1, Xt = 1] + it + ηit
lnYit − βLlnLit = βK lnKit + g(Pt−1, φt−1 − βK lnKit) + it + ηit (5.16)
 is the efficiency shock for surviving firms and is defined as follows.
it = ϕit− E[ϕit|ϕit−1, Xt = 1] (5.17)
In step 2 the probability of firm survival Pt−1 is estimated as a function of investment
and capital. Step 3 involves estimating equation (5.17) using Pt−1 from step 2 and
(φit−1−βK lnKit−1) from step 1. These 3 stages of estimation can be performed using the
opreg command in Stata and lnTFP can be obtained using the postestimation predict
command with the tfp option.
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 Matching
Various different matching algorithms were compared using the tests for match quality
described in subsection (5.2.6). Nearest-neighbour one-to-one matching with replace-
ment and a caliper of 0.005 was chosen as the prefered method. The ‘common’ option
was selected to ensure that the matched samples adhere to the common support assump-
tion. The chosen method reduces bias by selecting matches with the closest propensity
score, but variance may be increased if multiple observations from the treated group are
repeatedly matched with the same observation from the comparison group.
Tables (5.1) and (5.2) shows the number of treated and comparison observations in
each matched sample using the full BSD-ARD-BERD sample and the R&D performing
firms subsample respectively. The treated groups are indicated down the side of the table
and the comparison groups along the top. The number of observations in each matched
sample declines as the period of change investigated is extended from two periods, to
three or four. Some matched samples have similar numbers of observations in the treated
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and comparison groups, whereas others have far fewer comparison group observations
relative to the corresponding treatment group. When the ‘no replacement’ option is
applied without a caliper, the number of observations in the treated and comparison
groups are equal. This method results in a higher level of bias than with replacement,
but variance is reduced.
The quality of the matched samples was tested using the standardised bias, t-tests,
pseudo R2 and F-tests. Tables (5.3) and (5.4) provide pseudo R2 values for each matched
sample. These tests indicate how well the matched samples fulfill the conditional in-
dependence assumption. The values are low for each matched sample indicating that
the estimated model provides little explanation of the differences between treated and
control group in terms of pre-event characteristics. However, the F-tests for joint signif-
icance of the explanatory variables indicate that differences in pre-event characteristics
exist between comparison and treatment for some matched samples. F-test statistics are
provided in tables (5.5) and (5.6). Comparisons of matched samples indicate that this
method provides the greatest reduction in bias, but the bias is still present. In order to
account for these differences, a set of pre-event characteristics controls are included in the
second stage difference-in-difference estimation. This aims to reduce the bias incurred on
the average treatment effects on the treated estimates.
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5.3.2 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics
In this section, descriptive statistics in terms of the number of observations, mean, stan-
dard deviation and median values are presented for each dependent variable for time
periods t− 1, t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3. Events occur at time t, therefore t− 1 are pre-event
observations and t+ 1, t+ 2 and t+ 3 are post-event observations. The number of obser-
vations declines as the number of post-event years is extended due to attrition from the
sample. Attrition occurs if the firm was not included in the ARD sample. This is mostly
due to non-returned surveys, but also partly due to firm closure.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is derived using the Olley-Pakes Method, where in-
puts and outputs are deflated using industry deflators. Descriptive statistics are provided
in table (5.7). For ‘no event’ firms, the mean, median and standard deviation of TFP
remain relatively stable over time. TFP values are lower than the total sample averages.
This stability is to be expected for the ‘no event’ group as there is no observable restruc-
turing effect on TFP during this period. ‘Acquired’ and ‘acquirer’ firms have higher mean
and median TFP values and larger standard deviations than the ‘no event’ group. The
mean and median values decrease following the acquisition event for both event types.
This decline following an acquisition event is not expected, particularly for acquisition
targets that may experience technology transfer. This observation may be due to changes
in the composition of the sample as attrition occurs. In contrast to the other ‘joining’
events, the average values for‘merger’ firms remain relatively consistent over time.
The ‘change of ownership’ and ‘break-up’ subsamples both experience a declining
mean TFP between t− 1 and t+ 2 to below the average ‘no event’ TFP. Both groups of
firms experience an increase in mean TFP in t+ 3, but this remains below initial levels.
This trend is replicated by the median for ‘break-up’, whereas the median for ‘change of
ownership’ firms continually declines.
‘Divested’ firms show an increase in mean TFP in each period following the event,
but median values show a slight decline. The increasing standard deviations suggest that
there may be large differences in TFP outcomes following this event. ‘Divestor’ firms
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show an decline in TFP following the event. ‘Tradesale’ displays a decrease in mean from
t−1 to t+ 1 followed by an increase on initial levels in t+ 2 and t+ 3. The median peaks
at t + 2. The mean TFP values for ‘acquirer-divestor’ firms are initially high relative to
total sample averages and at a similar magnitude to ‘acquirer’ and ‘divestor’ firm groups.
The mean level remains high in period t + 1, but then falls in the subsequent periods.
Median values remain relatively stable during the post-event periods.
Table (5.8) provides descriptive statistics for labour productivity. This variable is
calculated as the ratio of value added output to number of employees, where output is
deflated using industry deflators. The patterns shown by labour productivity over time
for each event generally reflect the patterns exhibited by TFP.
R&D expenditure descriptive statistics for R&D performing firms sample are displayed
in table (5.9). Inflation is removed from the data using industry level deflators. The
statistics indicate the inconsistent volatile nature of R&D expenditure; fluctuations are
observed in the ‘no event’ category. Mean and medians appear to vary independently
overtime in most of the event categories without an apparent pattern. High standard
deviations indicate a high level of variability within the groups. The ‘acquirer-divestor’
group has greater mean and median R&D expenditure than other groups and displays
an increase in expenditure in each of the post-event periods.
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Table 5.7: TFP Descriptive Statistics by Event
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
No Event
n 272095 91588 37524 23377
mean 2.289 1.999 2.290 2.058
sd 36.544 24.616 41.606 34.520
median 1.099 1.066 0.990 0.984
Acquired
n 3808 2145 1194 798
mean 6.152 4.868 4.119 3.485
sd 86.392 82.755 54.512 48.754
median 1.188 1.138 1.084 1.080
Acquirer
n 10251 6550 3969 2756
mean 7.243 4.035 3.242 2.914
sd 179.049 68.381 31.835 24.331
median 1.212 1.172 1.136 1.155
Merger
n 3546 1962 1044 720
mean 2.858 2.435 2.212 2.265
sd 14.508 13.122 8.743 12.616
median 1.230 1.149 1.092 1.119
Change of Ownership
n 13148 7068 3532 2364
mean 3.628 2.845 1.878 2.457
sd 48.832 51.182 14.701 26.706
median 1.260 1.114 1.056 1.039
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Table 5.7 (continued): TFP Descriptive Statistics
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Break-up
n 2030 1249 797 614
mean 3.467 3.101 1.812 2.214
sd 27.544 28.502 3.405 8.091
median 1.143 1.137 1.101 1.140
Divested
n 3018 1810 1022 694
mean 4.181 4.331 5.156 7.753
sd 59.489 77.821 89.727 123.167
median 1.156 1.084 1.056 1.039
Divestor
n 5141 3355 2140 1616
mean 5.151 3.089 2.494 2.262
sd 90.121 37.345 11.855 8.861
median 1.144 1.110 1.082 1.082
Tradesale
n 626 388 213 152
mean 2.364 2.076 2.381 6.107
sd 9.510 6.392 11.262 46.089
median 1.096 1.086 1.117 1.080
Acquirer-Divestor
n 5446 3670 2464 1880
mean 5.167 6.096 2.454 2.378
sd 57.736 196.657 8.692 8.514
median 1.208 1.174 1.157 1.164
Total
n 319109 119785 53899 34971
mean 2.676 2.422 2.436 2.349
sd 49.390 48.202 39.035 35.610
median 1.113 1.082 1.021 1.019
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Table 5.8: Labour Productivity Descriptive Statistics by Event
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
No Event
n 272095 92951 38240 23882
mean 78.437 70.864 95.976 74.362
sd 2318.412 1603.415 2369.688 1469.082
median 24.373 26.525 27.358 28.078
Acquired
n 3808 2189 1221 819
mean 588.809 396.426 398.206 214.996
sd 10664.130 6996.233 6875.237 2816.786
median 33.235 33.617 32.193 32.591
Acquirer
n 10251 6667 4039 2808
mean 436.529 397.553 297.216 179.453
sd 12000.540 11554.550 7599.665 3064.524
median 35.018 34.592 34.849 35.825
Merger
n 3546 1991 1064 734
mean 116.618 148.602 173.018 140.379
sd 867.732 2384.304 2763.914 2439.388
median 33.018 32.367 31.749 33.016
Change of Ownership
n 13148 7217 3611 2429
mean 170.388 128.455 68.717 73.938
sd 3255.097 3548.655 683.362 870.507
median 32.000 28.776 29.176 30.316
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Table 5.8 (continued): Labour Productivity Descriptive Statistics
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Break-up
n 2030 1267 816 628
mean 307.128 472.065 66.566 85.941
sd 8097.330 12535.450 171.852 535.258
median 33.501 35.000 34.783 37.983
Divested
n 3018 1852 1039 706
mean 278.109 369.597 374.069 512.395
sd 5417.854 7087.764 6271.983 8259.929
median 33.119 32.859 33.723 34.360
Divestor
n 5141 3413 2196 1654
mean 464.468 227.481 200.076 183.731
sd 9808.920 3256.447 2746.832 2476.317
median 34.372 34.680 35.438 36.377
Tradesale
n 626 392 218 153
mean 86.830 87.417 167.043 548.882
sd 410.465 398.048 1504.177 6198.083
median 31.421 32.783 35.098 36.536
Acquirer-Divestor
n 5446 3734 2511 1915
mean 440.749 221.540 164.803 158.385
sd 8280.470 3426.075 1739.872 1589.969
median 37.154 36.103 36.808 36.824
Total
n 319109 121673 54955 35728
mean 116.006 117.105 129.589 107.631
sd 3663.026 3750.484 3252.273 2115.570
median 25.500 27.948 29.102 30.038
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Table 5.9: R&D Expenditure Descriptive Statistics by Event
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
No Event
n 16098 12694 11246 8352
mean 2027.51 1832.72 1657.29 1426.06
sd 15623.86 15409.87 15387.77 9229.89
median 133.85 113.45 76.61 74.68
Acquired
n 675 468 411 311
mean 1729.33 2040.94 1996.82 2198.30
sd 7879.29 12699.95 11447.06 13359.67
median 231.17 225.21 188.00 224.86
Acquirer
n 2708 1582 1350 1034
mean 5198.59 6400.55 5452.04 3986.08
sd 37630.73 50404.02 44892.02 24212.13
median 252.52 239.21 185.69 166.58
Merger
n 466 362 317 237
mean 4663.60 5613.80 6452.85 7843.28
sd 30304.92 36906.86 45929.80 50500.19
median 201.14 210.26 124.79 152.83
Change of Ownership
n 1559 1137 995 764
mean 1582.77 1748.26 1911.82 1463.68
sd 6359.87 15514.76 21123.48 6220.31
median 160.35 151.87 111.80 119.97
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Table 5.9 (continued): R&D Expenditure Descriptive Statistics
t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3
Break-up
n 520 302 258 208
mean 7562.53 6227.87 7393.94 10995.53
sd 43555.95 39015.18 44033.47 62728.21
median 332.21 281.66 288.56 342.76
Divested
n 864 525 456 351
mean 3076.29 2866.24 2830.66 3285.09
sd 14949.14 13855.20 15163.60 19487.57
median 270.02 260.79 194.73 212.27
Divestor
n 1613 962 833 665
mean 7708.04 8607.11 7606.21 9652.61
sd 43390.51 51823.11 48392.69 61197.90
median 327.97 300.46 253.30 292.75
Tradesale
n 198 122 98 72
mean 2880.10 2946.71 3074.92 1866.28
sd 11232.22 20936.80 19570.68 9405.93
median 229.00 238.34 187.64 171.50
Acquirer-Divestor
n 1796 1045 893 729
mean 10504.49 11791.75 12195.27 15770.05
sd 48140.13 66471.25 68646.82 83439.70
median 364.14 388.36 395.38 454.83
Total
n 26497 19199 16857 12723
mean 3433.77 3266.46 3054.68 3236.87
sd 24437.98 28715.13 28267.66 29005.11
median 168.90 145.40 106.41 109.13
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5.4 Results
The results of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) reported in this section
were performed on matched samples created using nearest-neighbour one-to-one matching
with a caliper of 0.005 with replacement. This caliper restriction level was decided on
after a number of trials with different levels. Other matching algorithms were compared,
but this method was preferred because it provides a greater reduction in bias.
In this data, restructuring events occur at enterprise group level and enterprise units
remain consistent before and after every type of event. For instance, when an acquisition
occurs, the effect on the acquired enterprise unit can be distinguished from the effect on
the acquirer. Post-acquisition capital or R&D stock of the acquired firm is not combined
with that of the acquirer; these values remain distinct and representative of the individual
enterprise. This applies to all forms of joining event. Similarly, pre and post-separation
event stock values are also representative of individual enterprises. This is a strong
advantage of this dataset over other sources, such as Compustat, where the post-merger
or acquisition firms combine into one unit and the individual effects cannot be observed.
The previous chapter indicates that joining events predominantly result from man-
agerial motives. These motivations do not lead to a clear theoretical post-restructuring
outcome. Managers may seek growth or re-invest profits to smooth dividend payments or
keep shareholders happy. These growth aims will not necessarily lead to improvements
in performance. This will be determined by managerial competence. The tables show
the coefficients on the binary EventDumt variable from equation (5.11) for each of the
matched samples. The corresponding treated groups are indicated down the side of the
table and comparison groups across the top. Table (5.10) show ATT using ∆lnTFP
over periods t− 1 to t+ 1. Column 1 contains ATT for each event relative to ‘no event’
comparison groups. The findings suggest that the impact of being ‘acquired’ relative to
the ‘no event’ comparison results in a 3% increase in TFP growth. This finding is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The reverse situation shown in row 1 concurs with this. When
‘no event’ is the treatment and ‘acquired’ is the comparison there is a decrease in TFP
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during the period, although this result is not statistically significant. The results also
suggest that the ‘acquired’ treatment relative to a ‘change of ownership’ results in an
increase in productivity. Labour productivity results for the same period shown in table
(5.12) also comply with these findings, although these results are also not statistically
significant. Table (5.11) shows ATT using ∆lnTFP over periods t− 1 to t+ 2 and indi-
cates that there is no significant effect of being ‘acquired’ relative to ‘no event’ after the
initial post-event adjustment period. Although the ATT coefficient is not significant, it
is negative suggesting that being acquired may reduce productivity growth in some cases.
This finding is also consistent when the period t− 1 to t+ 3 is considered.
Comparisons between the ‘acquirer’ and ‘no event’ groups in table (5.10) also show an
initial increase in productivity for an ‘acquirer’ over the period t− 1 to t+ 1. When ‘no
event’ is the treated group and ‘acquirer’ is the comparison, becoming an ‘acquirer’ results
in a 3% increase in TFP growth as a result of the acquisition. The results suggest that an
‘acquirer’ is worse off in terms of productivity by only acquiring, rather than acquiring
and divesting in the same period. This is indicated by the negative significant coefficient
on the ATT when ‘acquirer-divestor’ is the treated and ‘acquirer’ is the comparison group.
When the results for the t− 1 to t+ 2 period and the t− 1 to t+ 3 period are considered,
the findings show that there are no statistically significant differences in terms of changes
in productivity between ‘acquirer’ and other events. Overall, these results show that both
types of acquiring event result in an initial increase in TFP growth. The coefficients for
‘mergers’ present contrasting findings indicating a post-event decrease in the change in
TFP, but this result is not statistically significant.
Table (5.13) show the results of the analysis when UK and foreign events are com-
pared. The difference between ‘foreign no event’ and ‘UK no event’ is highly statistically
significant. ‘Foreign no event’ firms incur a greater rise in productivity growth than ‘UK
no event’ firms. There are few other statistically significant ATTs, but some patterns
are observed based on the signs of the coefficients. The impact of being ‘acquired’ by a
UK owner is positive, but a larger positive impact is incurred following acquisition by a
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foreign owner relative to ‘UK no event’ firms. This finding is not statistically significant
but is consistent with Conyon et al. (2002), which finds that foreign acquisition leads to
higher productivity. ‘Foreign acquirers’ show a greater increase in the change in produc-
tivity than ‘UK no event’ and ‘UK acquirer’ comparison groups, but less than ‘foreign
no event’ comparisons. The findings for ‘merger’ are not consistent when treatment and
comparison groups are reversed therefore interpretations cannot be drawn.
The literature review in chapter 3 indicates that separating events may arise due to
managerial, refocusing or strategic motives. Managerial motives for engaging in separat-
ing events may be inspired by the desire to keep shareholders happy in order to maintain
a managerial position. This motivation is likely to dominate if the enterprise group is ex-
periencing poor performance. This decline in performance may continue or recovery may
occur depending on the success of the separating event. The refocusing motive acts as a
correction for over-diversification or excess growth. It is likely to lead to an improvement
in performance due to the removal of excess communication and co-ordination of activ-
ities between enterprises resulting in a more simplistic structure or to free up funds for
alternative investments. These benefits are unlikely to be received immediately. Strate-
gic motives may arise from changes in industry conditions such as a decline in demand,
increases in supply costs or competition. This may result in a decline in performance for
all firms within the industry.
The results in table (5.10) show that the ‘break-up’ treatment compared to ‘no event’
results in a 5.3% increase in the change in productivity over the t−1 to t+1 period. This
result is significant at the 5% level. When the ‘acquired’ treatment is compared to the
‘break-up’ comparison, a decrease of 10% results from the treatment. This implies that
the post-event increase in productivity is greater for ‘break-up’ firms than ‘acquired’. The
results for ‘divested’ firms indicate that being divested results in a 5% increase in TFP
growth relative to the ‘change of ownership’ comparison group. There is a significant
coefficient at the 1% level on the ATT when ‘divestor’ is the treatment and ‘no event’
is the comparison group. The ‘divestor’ treatment leads to a 4% increase in the change
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in productivity than if no event occurs. The ATT results when‘no event’ is the treated
and ‘divestor’ is the comparison concur with this finding, although the coefficient is not
significant. This finding continues to persist when the period t− 1 to t+ 2 is considered.
UK and foreign ‘divested’ firms both show a positive change in TFP relative to ‘UK
no event’ comparison groups in table (5.13), although these results are not statistically
significant. This effect appears to be negative when comparing ‘foreign divested’ firms
to ‘foreign no event’ firms. UK and foreign ‘divestors’ also show a rise in the change
in productivity relative to ‘UK no event’ comparison groups. This impact is greater for
foreign firms and remains present for ‘foreign divestors’ in relation to the ‘foreign no
event’ comparison.
When ‘change of ownership’ firms are compared to the ‘no event’ comparison groups
in table (5.10), the effect of treatment results in a 4% decrease in the change in TFP.
A negative impact of ‘change of ownership’ is also found when compared to ‘acquired’,
‘acquirer’, ‘breakup’, ‘divested’ and ‘divestor’. These impact are not significant when
the period of change is expanded to subsequent periods. ‘Tradesale’ does not provide
any significant ATTs in relation to the ‘no event’ group for t − 1 to t + 1 period. The
‘tradesale’ comparison relative to the ‘acquired’ treatment group indicates that treatment
results in a 23% reduction in the change in productivity. This suggests that the post-
event increase in productivity is greater following ‘tradesale’ than for ‘acquired’ firms.
This finding remains significant in the t − 1 to t + 2 period. Results from this period
also indicate that ‘tradesale’ results in a decrease in the change in productivity relative
to ‘no event’. ‘Acquirer-divestor’ results in a rise in the change in productivity relative to
‘no event’. This increase is also present in relation to ‘acquired’ and ‘acquirer’ treatment
groups. This relationship is not present when the period of change is extended to ‘t− 1
to t+ 2’ and ‘t− 1 to t+ 3’.
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The findings from the previous chapter indicated that foreign joining events may be
motivated by innovation synergies. The ATT results for change in log R&D expenditure
as the dependent variable are reported in table (5.14). There are no significant coefficients
on the ATTs for joining events and the signs on the coefficient are not consistent when
treatment and comparison group are reversed. This suggests that there is no observable
impact of joining events on R&D expenditure. Although the coefficients for joining
events in table (5.16) are also not significant, they provide weak evidence to imply that
foreign-owned ‘acquired’ and ‘acquirer’ firms show a rise in post-event R&D expenditure
relative to foreign and UK-owned ‘no event’ firms. The evidence for merging firms is
mixed. The findings weakly imply that post-acquisition innovation activity may increase
for foreign-owned firms, which is consistent with the motivation indicated in the previous
chapter and concurs with the results found by Bertrand (2009), Bandick et al. (2010) and
Guadalupe et al. (2012).
The previous chapter also indicated that the innovation refocusing motive for sepa-
rating was present for R&D performing firms. This may imply that separating events
may lead to a reduction in innovation activity if firms are reacting to a change in demand
circumstances. Alternatively ‘divestors’ may use funds from divestment pro-actively, to
re-invest in alternative projects. These alternative motives for refocusing are described
by Kaul (2012).
Although few significant differences between treated and comparison groups are found,
the coefficients imply that R&D expenditure may rise following separating events, par-
ticularly divestments. When ‘divestor’ is the comparison and ‘no event’ is the treated
group, ‘divestor’ results in an increase in the change in R&D expenditures relative to
the ‘no event’ case. In the t − 1 to t + 2 period reported in table (5.15), the impact of
‘divestor’ relative to ‘no event’ is positive but no longer significant. Positive and signifi-
cant coefficients are found for ‘divestor’ in comparison to ‘acquirer’ and ‘break-up’ events.
This implies that ‘divestor’ events lead to higher R&D expenditure than ‘acquirer’ and
‘break-up’ events. This pattern continues into the t − 1 to t + 1 period. These findings
279
may indicate a proactive response and are consistent with the empirical findings by Kaul
(2012), which found evidence of an increase in innovation activity following divestment.
‘UK divested’ firms show an increase in post-event R&D relative to ‘UK no event’ in table
(5.16), whereas the coefficients for ‘foreign divested’ firms are negative relative to ‘UK no
event’ and ‘foreign no event’. This suggests that foreign owned firms reduce R&D expen-
diture after being divested indicating refocusing. This is not the case for ‘divestors’; both
foreign and UK owned ‘divestors’ show an increase in R&D expenditure, which suggests
that the divestments may have been undertaken to free up funds for re-investment in
innovation.
The ATT on the ‘no event’ treatment relative to the ‘acquirer-divestor’ comparison
is positive and significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the change in R&D
expenditure for an ‘acquirer-divestor’ is lower than if the firm experienced ‘no event’.
This result remains positive but not significant in the t − 1 to t + 2 period. When
‘acquirer-divestor’ is the comparison group in this period, the ‘acquirer’ and ‘divestor’
event treatment results in a reduction in R&D expenditure.
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5.5 Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of firm restructuring events on post-event outcomes
in terms of innovation activity and productivity. Previous studies have mostly focused
on one event type. This study contributes to the literature by comparing outcomes
for various joining and separating events. Propensity score matching and difference-in-
difference is used to reduce bias arising from differences in pre-event firm characteristics.
Results indicate that most restructuring events lead to an increase in productivity.
Support for this finding is particularly strong during the initial post-event period. An
initial increase in productivity is found following acquired, acquirer, break-up, divestor
and acquirer-divestor events. This may be the result from the realisation of synergies and
streamlining of the organisation. This increase may persist for divestors into subsequent
periods. A persistent fall in productivity is found following a change in ownership.
The findings also show that foreign-owned firms generally show greater increases in
productivity over-time than UK-owned firms. There is some weak evidence to suggest
that firms acquired by foreign owners also show increases in productivity relative to their
UK-acquired outcome. This implies that foreign acquirers may apply superior knowledge
to their acquisition targets, which conforms with findings in other studies. There is also
weak evidence to suggest that the positive effect on productivity may be greater for
foreign-owned divestors than UK-owned divestors.
The findings relating to innovation activity of R&D performing firms indicate that
divestors tend to display increases in R&D expenditure following the event, which ties in
with the idea of refocusing motives. This motive appears to be present for foreign and
UK-owned divestors. There is weak evidence to imply that post-acquisition innovation
activity increases for foreign-owned firms. This is consistent with the innovation synergy
motivation indicated in the previous chapter and concurs with other studies in the litera-
ture. The results show fewer significant coefficients than the productivity analysis which
may be a result of the volatility of R&D expenditure and difficulties in obtaining suitable
matches in terms of innovation activity. The analysis may benefit from applying patent
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data to obtain measures of R&D productivity, but unfortunately this data is unavailable
in this study.
The validity of this analysis rests on the suitability of the comparison samples to pro-
vide an accurate counterfactual for the treated sample. Tests indicate that the matching
quality varies across matched samples, therefore some results are more reliable than oth-
ers. Control variables are included in the difference-in-difference stage to account for
pre-event differences within the matched samples. This aims to reduce the bias on the
average treatment effects on the treated in order to make the comparisons between event
types as reliable as possible.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationships between globalisation, firm
structure, productivity and innovation. The study makes three empirical contributions
to the literature. The first empirical analysis in chapter 2 poses two research ques-
tions. One aims is to investigate if productivity and knowledge differences exist between
multinational and non-multinational firms. The other aim is to investigate whether com-
plementarities exist between internal and external sources of knowledge. The second
and third contributions of the thesis focus on firm restructuring events. A distinction is
made between foreign and domestic restructuring events. The second empirical analysis
in chapter 4 investigates the motivations behind restructuring events by focusing on the
pre-event characteristics of the firms. The aim of this chapter is to identify if differences
exist between the types of firms that are involved in each type of restructuring event and
make inferences about the motivations driving these events. Results from this analysis
inform the third contribution in chapter 5, which looks at the impact of restructuring
events on productivity and innovation activity.
The key themes in chapter 2 are globalisation, knowledge and productivity. The anal-
ysis specifically aims to understand if differences in multinational status are associated
with differences in knowledge and productivity. Various measures of knowledge are used
including stock of in-house R&D expenditure, stock of R&D expenditure on knowledge
transfers from external sources, knowledge spillovers emanating from the local area cal-
culated by summing in-house R&D of other firms within a local radius and number of
R&D employees. R&D stock measures recognise that knowledge is path-dependent and
labour measures acknowledge that knowledge can be embedded in human capital. The
study also aims to ascertain whether the complementarities exist between these different
sources of knowledge.
A contribution to the literature is made by analysing these questions using a unique
combination of highly detailed UK firm-level datasets. These include the AFDI, ARD
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and BERD. The majority of previous UK studies in this literature have used the CIS
to investigate innovation. The benefit of using BERD is that a large consistent panel
can be created, whereas CIS questions change across waves, limiting samples to shorter
time frames. Furthermore, BERD R&D expenditure may be considered a more accurate
indication of R&D activity than self-reported responses to the CIS questionnaire.
International trade theory suggests that multinational firms posses intrinsic intangi-
ble knowledge which has allowed them to break into foreign markets and compete with
domestic firms. The results of the study are consistent with this idea and show that
multinational firms are more productive than non-multinational firms. Furthermore,
foreign-owned multinationals are more productive than domestic-owned multinationals.
This finding also concurs with the majority of existing empirical literature. Differences in
productivity between multinationals and non-multinationals are partly due to differences
in labour and capital. Multinationals derive higher returns to capital and lower returns to
labour than non-multinational firms. This may imply that these firms transfer superior
technology from other countries, in terms of more effective machinery and equipment.
The remaining differences in productivity can be attributed to intangible knowledge such
as managerial competence, which is not captured by the R&D knowledge stock.
Findings regarding the relationship between knowledge and productivity are also con-
sistent with the majority of previous studies. A positive relationship between the stock
of in-house R&D expenditure and output is found indicating that increases in internally
created knowledge stock leads to an increase in productivity. Conversely, a negative
relationship is found between stocks of external knowledge transfers and output. This
is likely to reflect difficulties in absorbing knowledge from external sources. These re-
sults persist for multinational and non-multinational firms. An increase in the number of
skilled R&D employees shows a small positive impact on productivity in the short run.
This impact is likely to be greater in the medium to long term because results may take
time to manifest.
The theory of absorptive capacity suggests that performing in-house R&D improves a
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firm’s ability to absorb knowledge from external sources. This implies that complemen-
tarities exist between internal and external sources of knowledge. The study provides
little evidence to support the presence of absorptive capacity as the results suggest that
increases in the stock of in-house R&D expenditure or number of R&D employees do not
increase a firm’s ability to productively utilise knowledge from external sources. These
findings contrast results from earlier studies and may reflect the fact that these measures
do not perfectly represent the quality of innovation.
It is clear that differences exist between multinationals and non-multinationals, but
whether this is a causal effect is not conclusive. There are three ways that a multinational
firm can be created; expansion of UK-owned firms overseas, greenfield investment by
foreign firms or takeover of existing firms by foreign owners. The observed differences
in productivity may arise if foreign owners join with more productive firms and separate
from less productive firms. In this case the productivity difference cannot be attributed
to knowledges advantages associated with becoming multinational, it may be a case of
“cherry picking” in terms of selection based on productivity. The subsequent analyses
investigate this notion further.
Chapter 4 seeks to obtain a greater understanding of the motivations driving firm
restructuring events. These motivations cannot be directly observed therefore they must
be inferred based on the the pre-event characteristics of the event participants. Previous
empirical studies have mainly focused on the motivations behind joining events and few
have looked at motivations behind separating events. The identification of detailed firm
restructuring events distinguishes this analysis from previous work in the literature. Ten
distinct event types can be identified. The events are identified using enterprise and
enterprise group reference codes in the BSD. The BSD provides data on the population
of firms with operations in the UK, therefore this data allows the restructuring events
to be identified as reliably as possible. A further distinction is made between foreign
and UK event to identify differences in restructuring motivations between foreign and
domestic owners.
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Four main motivations for restructuring events are identified in the literature re-
view in chapter 3. These are strategic, synergistic, refocusing and managerial incentives.
Strategic motivations arise from industry circumstances such as competition, demand
and supply. Synergistic incentives relate to potential benefits from economies of scale
and combining knowledge that may arise from joining events. Refocusing incentives refer
to streamlining of activity through separating events as a response to excessive growth
or over-diversification. Managerial incentives for restructuring events refer to the pur-
suit of the managers own objectives. These may involve growth associated with prestige
and managerial hubris or actions that are favourable with shareholders to maintain a
managerial position. These motivations are not mutually exclusive.
The model is estimated using a multinomial logit, where the categorical event variable
is a function of pre-event characteristics. Average marginal effects are obtained to indicate
how the average probability of an event is expected to change with an increase in an
explanatory variable, holding other things constant. Although the competing risks model
has been used in some recent studies, the application of this methodology with many
competing events would be computationally burdensome and would add little explanatory
power as the sample period is relatively short. Duration time to the event is not of
particular interest in this case and it can be argued that the restructuring event is more
likely to be a function of its pre-event characteristics than the duration that no event has
occurred.
The results show indications that managerial, synergistic and refocusing motivations
for restructuring are present. Higher profit firms are more likely to acquire or merge
and low profit firms face a greater risk of being divested. This suggests managers may
be performing restructuring events to please shareholders and retain their position as
manager. The likelihood of an event occurring increases for those firms that have had
involvement in previous events, suggesting that engagement in restructuring events is
habit forming.
Separating events are more likely to occur for larger, more diversified enterprise groups
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indicating the presence of refocusing motives. Innovation refocusing is observed for di-
vestors and divested firms, but not for break-ups. This motive is particularly present for
foreign divestments. Foreign joining events may be motivated by innovation synergies,
but this motive does not appear for UK joining events. This suggests evidence of “cherry
picking” in terms of innovation by foreign owners.
After investigating the motivations behind restructuring events, it seems logical to
investigate post-event outcomes, focusing on the themes of productivity and innovation.
The findings from chapter 4 provide evidence that firm characteristics differ across event
types. The analysis in chapter 5 uses propensity score matching in order to account
for endogeneity from selection bias. This method is preferred to propensity score re-
weighting as it provides a more suitable control for endogeneity. Matched samples are
created to enable comparisons between ‘no event’ firms and each event type. Difference-
in-difference estimation is performed on the matched samples to obtain average treatment
effects on the treated. This method is used to control for pre-event differences in terms of
the dependent variable. Control variables are also included in the estimation to capture
differences in pre-event characteristics which may remain in the matched samples. The
reliability of the estimates rests on the validity of the common support and conditional
independence assumptions.
The findings show that most restructuring events result in an increase in productiv-
ity, which may reflect the realisation of refocusing and streamlining motivations. These
findings are more robust when the change from t − 1 to t + 1 is assessed in comparison
to the change to subsequent periods. This may be partly due to the reduction in the
number of observations as fewer firms are observed over longer time periods. The study
finds weak evidence to suggest that firms acquired by foreign owners show greater rises
in productivity than if they were acquired by a UK-owned firm. This is consistent with
findings in previous studies and suggests that foreign firms may apply superior knowledge
to their target firm.
The results on innovation activity show that divestors invest more in R&D expenditure
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than they would have if they had not restructured. This implies that the action of
divestment released funds for reinvestment in innovation. There is also weak evidence to
suggest that foreign firms show increases in post-acquisition innovation activity. These
findings tie in with the innovation refocusing motives and innovation synergy motives
indicated in chapter 4. Fewer statistically significant results are derived in the innovation
activity analysis than the productivity analysis. This is likely to be the result of the
volatility of R&D expenditure and difficulties associated with finding appropriate matches
in terms of innovation activity. This analysis could possibly be improved by placing a
greater emphasis on innovation characteristics of firms in the matching process.
The sophistication of the empirical methods used develops as the thesis progresses.
Chapter 2 looks at the differences between multinational and non-multinational firms,
but does not acknowledge the restructuring mechanisms that may lead to multinational
creation. Identification of distinct restructuring events in the data allowed for larger
methodological contributions to be made by the second and third empirical chapters.
Chapter 4 makes a methodological contribution by applying a multinomial logit model
with 10 categories. The results are reported as average marginal effects AMEs rather than
coefficients as generally reported in the literature. These AMEs are likely to provide
a more general representation of the effect of a variable on the likelihood of an event
occurring as the entire distribution is taken into account. The empirical method could be
further developed to account for differences between the sample and the BSD population
by including a weighting. This would ensure that the results more accurately reflect the
entire population of firms. Chapter 5 provides a further methodological contribution by
applying the multiple treatment propensity score matching method suggested by Lechner
(2002) to this literature. Lechner (2002) previously applied this method to investigate
the impact of multiple labour policies. The difference-in-difference method including
pre-event control variables is applied to the matched samples to account for remaining
endogeneity within the matched samples.
Access to ONS data via the Secure Data Service (SDS) has played a crucial role in
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this thesis. Initially, this data was only available at the Virtual Micro-data Lab (VML)
which involved expensive trips to London and time restricted access. Although there
have been some problems with the SDS, data access at my own university desktop was
far more convenient and allowed sufficient time to understand the datasets and perform
detailed analysis and robustness checks.
The Micro-level data from the ARD, BERD and BSD have proved vital in under-
standing motivations and behaviour at the firm-level. The data from these surveys are
detailed and very useful for most of the purposes of this study. Lack of documentation in
the foreign ownership codes made identification of ownership country unfeasible beyond
the UK-foreign split. The lookup table provided by Richard Harris was very useful to
improve the quality of the merges between these datasets. The AFDI was much more
difficult to merge as enterprise group codes where coded in a manner that was not con-
sistent with the other datasets. This made merging more complicated. FAME data was
relatively easy to compile from the Bureau Van Dijk database. The data merging was
performed on my behalf by the people at the SDS to ensure that disclosive information
about firms was not revealed during the merging process.
A limitation in each of these investigations is the unavailability of patent data for
the empirical analysis. R&D expenditure provides a measure of inputs into the R&D
process, but there is no way of identifying how productively this expenditure is used by
focusing on this input alone. Patent measures represent innovation outputs and the ratio
of inputs to outputs can act as a indication of innovation productivity. This would greatly
benefit the analysis. Patent data proved too difficult to merge with this data, because
each patent is recorded by name and address of the firm. The lack of firm identification
code makes merging problematic as the SDS data is anonymised and SDS postcodes are
not consistent with actual postcodes. Without additional information, it is impossible to
merge these datasets. Furthermore, the SDS would not permit any activity that could
potentially disclose the name of a firm.
In summary, the key message from this thesis is that it is important to distinguish be-
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tween foreign and domestic firms and also between different types of restructuring events,
because differences in terms of productivity and motivations exist. These differences have
important implications for firms, the UK economy and government policy.
The finding that in-house R&D activity increases productivity implies that govern-
ment policy should encourage in-house R&D, because increased productivity improves
the competitiveness of UK based firms in the international market and leads to increased
profits for the firm. Although, this finding does not imply that the same incentives should
be given to UK and foreign owned firms. The benefit of this for the UK economy depends
on the extent that this increase in productivity leads to increased profits and the extent
that these profits are re-injected into the UK economy. Profits for UK owned firms may
stay in the UK, whereas profits from foreign-owned firms may be taken abroad.
Foreign firms enter the UK either by Greenfield investment or via merger or acqui-
sition. The impact of foreign ownership of firms in the UK economy remains uncertain.
The main channels of impact for the UK economy are via the labour market, impact on
UK competitors and impact on consumers. The effects on the labour market are associ-
ated with job creation or losses and changes in wages. The impact on UK competitors can
lead to displacement of firms and further job losses or lead to technology spillovers which
benefit local firms. Although the findings of this study suggest foreign multinationals are
more productive than UK firms, there does not appear to be any benefit of multinational
presence in the UK in terms of knowledge spillovers to UK-owned firms in this study.
Foreign acquisition appears to have a positive impact on productivity of the firms
involved in the restructuring event, but the statistical significance of this finding is weak.
This implies that the impact may vary within this group. Furthermore, increases in
productivity may occur alongside job losses, which may have a negative impact on the
local area. Additional analysis in this area can be investigated using the data in this
study.
The investigation into the motivations behind restructuring events indicates that the
majority of joining events appear to be motivated by managerial growth motives. This
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is not necessarily a problem as findings indicate that restructuring leads to improved
performance in terms of productivity, but there may be implications for the UK economy
in terms of labour and competition. Within the managerial growth motivation, there
may be unobservable differences in management style and ruthlessness of corporate be-
haviour. Separating events revealed refocusing as a motive, which also leads to increased
productivity. This appears to be beneficial for the economy to minimise the negative
effect of over-diversification, particularly if the alternative to separation is firm closure,
but also highlights the fact that excessive growth should be limited to minimise the need
for refocusing as a result of poor performance.
R&D performing firms are more attractive acquisition targets to foreign firms. The
post-event outcomes weakly indicate that R&D expenditure increases following a foreign
acquisition event. This event should be studied more closely and investigations by indus-
try could be performed to ensure that UK-based innovation is maintained or expanded.
This thesis presents many possibilities for future research. There are clear indications
that deeper analysis by industrial sector would be useful and informative because firm
characteristics and behaviour are likely to differ across industries. Additional distinc-
tions between countries of ownership would also be beneficial, particularly to distinguish
between developed and developing countries. Firms from highly developed countries are
likely to possess a greater level of technological knowledge and act as technology leaders.
The motivations for joining events and post-event outcomes are likely to differ greatly
between these developed and developing groups. Further investigation into these aspects
would be a beneficial extension for each of the three empirical chapters.
Alternative measures of innovation could be used. The BSD restructuring data could
be merged with the CIS to provide additional measures of innovation and explore the
impacts further. A way of merging patent data with SDS data may also become available
in the future. The high level of R&D volatility noted in chapter 5 may be due to the choice
of R&D expenditure variables. BERD provides expenditure data on R&D wages, R&D
capital and basic, applied and experimental research. R&D wages are likely to provide
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a less volatile measure of R&D expenditure, therefore it may be useful to compare all
available measures.
Additionally, wages and number of employees could also be used as dependent vari-
ables in order to understand the broader impacts of these restructuring events on the
labour market and the UK economy. It would be useful to understand which restructur-
ing events lead to redundancies and if the effect is larger following foreign events, because
this would impact employment, economic growth and would be very informative from a
policy perspective.
As AFDI, ARD, BERD and BERD data becomes available for more recent years,
this opens up the potential for post-event outcomes to be observed over longer periods.
This will allow comparisons of the impacts of restructuring events on innovation and
productivity over the long-run and short-run, and will establish if the initial impacts
have a lasting effect.
Further analysis related to chapter 4 could expand the potential outcomes to include
firm exit and investigate the relationship between restructuring events and firm exit using
duration analysis. This analysis would address a different research question to the one
posed in chapter 4, focusing on the propensity to exit and therefore duration analysis
would be deemed appropriate.
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